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This dissertation reports analyses of performance for rewarding brain stimu-
lation in a three-part sequential task. A session of self-stimulation was composed of
three trial types, during which the strength and opportunity cost of electrical stim-
ulation were kept constant. Within a trial, a lever allowed animals to harvest brain
stimulation rewards as soon as the lever had been held for a set, cumulative amount
of time. When the time spent holding reached this criterion, the lever retracted and
a burst of rewarding electrical stimulation was delivered. A ﬂashing house light and
10s inter-trial interval signalled the start of a new trial. Rats were presented with
strong/inexpensive/certain stimulation on one trial, a randomly selected strength,
cost and risk on the next trial, and weak/inexpensive/certain stimulation on the
third trial of a sequence. The sequence then repeated. Rewards during the second
trial of this sequence were delivered with cued probabilities ranging from 0.5 to 1.0.
The current thesis evaluates the ability of a previously published (molar) model of
performance during a trial to accurately detect the eﬀect of risk on payoﬀ but not
reward intensity. Although animals were less willing to work for stimulation trains
that may not be delivered than those delivered with certainty, risk did not change
the relative reward produced by stimulation. We also present evidence on a ﬁne time
scale that self-stimulating rats develop a model of their world. The ﬁrst pause made
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as a trial began was a function of the payoﬀ the animal had yet to receive, indicat-
ing that rats had a model of the triad sequence. Analysis of the conditions under
which pauses were uncharacteristic also provides evidence of what this model might
be. Analysis of the ﬁne scale of performance provides evidence that animals had a
model of the stability of trial conditions. Finally, we present a (molecular) model of
performance for brain stimulation rewards in real-time. Our results demonstrate that
rats develop a model of the testing paradigm and can adjust to changes in reward
contingencies with as few as one exemplar.
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A rat sits idly by the corner of his cage, carefully grooming his upper body in
comforting darkness. He licks one paw, then the other, running it along the mound of
acrylic atop his head. The implant has been part of his proprioception for some time.
Midway through his grooming bout, a large ﬂashing light stops him in his tracks. As
the ﬂashing stops, the rat leaps to the lever and begins patiently holding, periodically
tapping it. Nothing can tear him away from the manipulandum. He steadies the lever
down with his snout, teeth digging into the metal paddle, paws slipping. Soon, he
receives his reward. This rat is neither hungry, nor thirsty, nor in a position to gain
access to an oestrous female. The reward this animal receives can only be detected on
an oscilloscope: he is tirelessly working for a brief burst of cathodal pulses that will
be delivered via implanted electrodes to the lateral hypothalamic level of the medial
forebrain bundle.
The phenomenon of brain stimulation reward was ﬁrst discovered by Olds &
Milner (1954). In their preparation, animals would quickly return to a location that
had been paired with the delivery of electrical stimulation. Before long, instrumental
methods were used to investigate the behavioural eﬀects of electrical stimulation.
Electrical stimulation provides at least three distinct advantages over natural
rewards like food and water. First, there is no satiety for electrical stimulation (Olds,
1958). An animal may cease to be hungry, or cease to desire a speciﬁc type of food,
but they do not cease to seek out strong and easily acquired electrical stimulation
trains. Second, the electrode is implanted within a substrate that is identiﬁable in
principle and can compete with, summate with (Conover and Shizgal, 1994; Conover
et al., 1994), and act as an economic substitute for (Green and Rachlin, 1991) natural
rewards. Food, water, and sex may activate the circuitry of valuation at some point
- 1 -
in the animal’s pursuit of each, but only electrical stimulation provides a probe into
a common evaluative circuitry. Finally, the rewarding eﬀect produced by electrical
stimulation can be tightly controlled experimentally. Although more food may be
more valuable to a hungry animal than less food, the exact degree to which the
animal values every ounce of food is much less under experimental control than the
signal that is artiﬁcially injected into the medial forebrain bundle.
1.1 A brief history of the psychophysics of reward
Brain stimulation reward oﬀers the exemplar par excellence of motivated be-
haviour. We can tightly control the subjective rewarding impact of the stimulation by
way of the current and pulse duration, which set the spread of activation, the pulse
frequency, which sets the induced ﬁring rate, and the train duration, which sets the
activation period. There is no satiety, so animals will work tirelessly for many hours
without ﬁlling up on coulombs of electricity. The electrode is in an identiﬁable sub-
strate; as a result, it is possible to derive (at least in principle) some characteristics
of the neurons responsible for the rewarding eﬀect of stimulation.
The ﬁrst manipulations of intracranial self-stimulation simply assessed whether
the response rate was aﬀected. The logic was simple: if a particular manipulation
boosted the value of rewards, it followed that animals would work more vigorously
for brain stimulation under those conditions. Although initial studies by Olds (1956)
mapping the rewarding eﬀect across brain regions employed a rough estimate of the
percentage of session time spent responding, subsequent studies focused on changes
in self-stimulation rates that resulted from a particular manipulation. For example,
Brady (1957) measured response rates for brain stimulation reward as a function of the
duration of a food or water deprivation, and found signiﬁcant increases the longer the
rat had been deprived. These types of measures may, at best, detect that a variable
- 2 -
aﬀects self-stimulation performance, and little else. At worst, rate measures fail to
reveal important eﬀects or identify eﬀects that may not be related to the motivation
for brain stimulation rewards.
It was not long before critics of the non-parametric approach began voicing
concerns. In their seminal article, Hodos & Valenstein (1962) pointed out that rate
alone may not be an accurate measure of the rewarding impact of brain stimula-
tion reward. Although others had parametrically varied the degree of training on
self-stimulation (Bindra and Mendelson, 1962) and electrical stimulation parameters
(Ward, 1959), this paper provided a solid argument for parametrically varying the
strength of the stimulation, by way of the stimulation current, comparing perfor-
mance for septal and posterior hypothalamic stimulation. The road had been paved
for a parametric analysis of brain stimulation reward (Gallistel et al., 1974; Edmonds
et al., 1974; Edmonds and Gallistel, 1974), allowing researchers to determine whether
manipulations of the circuitry underlying reward valuation and action selection af-
fected how the injected signal was impacted by lesions (Murray and Shizgal, 1991;
Waraczynski, 2006) and pharmacological agents (Franklin, 1978; Hernandez et al.,
2008).
The paradigm that emerged from this approach, the curve-shift paradigm (Mil-
iaressis et al., 1986), was intended to allow researchers to determine whether a manip-
ulation has aﬀected the circuitry that underlies an animal’s goal-directed behaviour.
By assessing the rate of responding at various stimulation strengths, varying either
the spread of activation via the current, or the injected spike rate via the pulse fre-
quency, a manipulation that simply reduces responding can be distinguished from a
manipulation that alters the animal’s motivation to seek out rewarding stimulation.
In essence, performance will vary from ﬂoor to ceiling levels along with a given stimu-
lation parameter (pulse current, pulse duration, pulse frequency, and train duration).
The stimulation parameter that drives half-maximal performance (often referred to
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as M50) provides a meaningful comparison to that collected under a diﬀerent set of
conditions. For example, if cocaine reduces the pulse frequency that supports half-
maximal performance without aﬀecting the rat’s maximum response rate (Hernandez
et al., 2008), then cocaine boosts the animal’s pursuit of non-maximal rewards at a
given programmed rate of reinforcement. If Pimozide-induced dopamine depletion
increases the pulse frequency that drives half-maximal performance without aﬀect-
ing the rat’s maximum response rate (Phillips and LePiane, 1986), then Pimozide
reduces the animal’s motivation to seek out rewards. In the original study by Ho-
dos and Valenstein (1962), although the rate of responding for septal stimulation
was lower, overall, than posterior hypothalamic stimulation, the current required to
produce a threshold level of responding was also lower for septal stimulation than
posterior hypothalamic stimulation. Although rats responded less vigorously for sep-
tal stimulation, posterior hypothalamic stimulation required stronger stimulation in
order to drive performance to a similar level.
The curve-shift paradigm is not without its problems. Fouriezos et al. (1990)
evaluated the eﬀect of increasing task diﬃculty (adding weight to the manipulandum)
on self-stimulation thresholds derived from parametrically varying the pulse frequency
of a 500ms stimulation train. The authors found that as lever loads increased from 0
to 45g, the rate of self-stimulation for the highest pulse frequencies decreased, but the
pulse frequency required to drive half-maximal performance increased. Consequently,
weighted levers, and possibly other challenges unrelated to reward valuation per se,
are capable of changing the stimulation strength required to drive a threshold level
of performance.
As a result of the inadequacies of the curve-shift paradigm in identifying the
stage of processing at which a manipulation acts to alter reward seeking, Shizgal
(Arvanitogiannis and Shizgal, 2008) developed a computational model of brain stim-
ulation. The proportion of time allocated to self stimulation activities was assessed
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as a function of the number of pulses delivered in a train of ﬁxed duration and the
experienced rate of reinforcement. As a result, manipulations that aﬀect the transla-
tion of injected pulse rate can be distinguished from those that aﬀect the translation
of payoﬀ into performance. The current thesis builds on this tradition by validat-
ing a molar computational model of performance for brain stimulation reward that
assesses performance, indexed by the proportion of time an animal invests in harvest-
ing rewards, as a function of the pulse frequency of the stimulation delivered and the
amount of time the animal must invest to obtain such a reward. Furthermore, we
propose a molecular model of performance and derive its molar predictions.
Although the psychophysics of brain stimulation reward have focused on mo-
lar measures of performance, collapsing performance across an entire trial or session,
concerns about the obscuring eﬀect of molar measures were voiced early-on. In their
critique of response-rate measures, Hodos and Valenstein (1962) conceded that mea-
sures that preceded reinforcement rate, based on the proportion of session time spent
responding, were insensitive to the pattern of responding. Molar measures generally
cannot take into account the pattern and syntax of performance on every trial.
1.1.1 The patterning of behaviour
The tradition most obviously concerned with characterizing the molecular pat-
tern of behaviour is reinforcement learning. In this account, performance reﬂects the
learned value of various states and the actions that may be taken in those states. For
example, pressing a lever for some small period of time dt allows the rat to be that
much closer to a reward state that follows lever-pressing. Not pressing the lever for
that period of time does not bring it closer to a reward, but that non-pressing state
may have some value of its own. The rat implements a policy, or a probability of
selecting an action in a particular state, that will maximize the rate at which it will
be rewarded, based on the value of anticipated states and associated possible actions
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that it has learned over the course of the trial, session, and experiment. This thesis
takes inspiration from all these traditions in developing a molecular computational
model of performance for brain stimulation reward.
1.2 Action selection
The problem of how animals select actions among all those available, and how
this process may be implemented in the brain, has been approached most comprehen-
sively by learning theorists interested in problems of conditioning. A deep philosoph-
ical tradition exists indeed regarding the power of associative learning in directing
behaviour. From Aristotelian ideas describing the mind at birth of being a blank
slate, to John Locke’s conceptualization of human empiricism, associative learning
has provided a useful methodological framework for understanding how agents se-
lect actions. That said, it is simplistic to assume that all actions are selected solely
on the basis of conditioned associations between stimuli, responses, and outcomes.
Even if they were, their representation is not likely to involve only associations to
outcomes, and selection itself is not likely a reﬂexive system. Human phenomenology
certainly suggests that many actions are selected following protracted deliberation,
and it may not be particularly far-fetched to presume that similar, though much less
complex, deliberative processes are at work in non-human animals, even those with
continuously-growing upper and lower incisors.
The idea that two parallel systems compete for the selection of an action is
not new. Greek mythology describes a dichotomy between Apollonian (god of rea-
son) and Dionysian (god of intoxication) modes of thinking. William James (Boring,
1950) believed that a dual process governed behaviour, one which was purely asso-
ciative and one which relied on reasoning and insight. Others (Kahneman, 2011)
have since reﬁned the distinction between a fast, automatized, habitual, intuitive and
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aﬀect-dependent system, and a slow, ﬂexible, deliberative, reasoned and cognition-
dependent system. The two systems may not be as unique to human experience as
might be supposed at ﬁrst glance. Rats faced with a diﬃcult decision will pause at a
choice point in a maze and move their heads back and forth (Tolman, 1948), implying
a deliberative process (Johnson et al., 2007); this back-and-forth movement is more
prominent early in training than later on and more prominent on early laps of a maze
than later laps (Johnson and Redish, 2007). The problem of action selection across
a wide range of animals is arguably likely to involve a dual process of habitual and
deliberative systems, both competing for action selection.
1.2.1 Classical conditioning
The simplest description of action selection involves classical (Pavlovian) con-
ditioning. In this paradigm, the animal learns an association between one stimulus—
the conditional stimulus (CS)—and another stimulus—the unconditional stimulus
(US)—thereby producing a conditional response (CR). Over multiple trials, an ani-
mal is presented with pairings between the CS, which has a neutral valence, and the
US, which induces a reﬂexive unconditional response (UR) on its own. Eventually,
the CS alone is capable of eliciting a CR.
It may be diﬃcult to infer that an animal is “selecting” a response in this
case, as it would be easy to assume the conditional response is a reﬂexive behaviour.
Evidence to the contrary can be found in investigations of Pavlovian-to-instrumental
transfer. In this case, a CS, such as light, is paired with an appetitive US, such as
sucrose, and an instrumental action is subsequently paired with a diﬀerent outcome.
General Pavlovian-to-instrumental transfer occurs when the presentation of the CS,
which had never before been presented in the instrumental setting, increases the rate
of responding for a reinforcer that was not paired with the CS (Estes, 1943). Moreover,
classically conditioned actions may compete with instrumental actions. For example,
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an animal may avoid a lever that shuts oﬀ a loud noise if it is physically close to a
cue that has been paired with the noise (Breland and Breland, 1961). These ﬁnd-
ings suggest that the association learned during classical conditioning aﬀects action
selection on a higher level than the simple reﬂex.
In fact, one can trace the birth of computational reinforcement-learning models
to classical conditioning. In an eﬀort to explain the inability of a new stimulus, CS2,
to acquire the ability to produce a CR when the US had already been paired (pre-
conditioned) with a diﬀerent CS1, Rescorla and Wagner (1972) developed a model of
classical conditioning based on violated expectation. When CS1 is pre-conditioned
with the US, the US is perfectly predicted by CS1; subsequent pairings of CS2 with
CS1 and the US fail to produce a learned association between CS2 and the US because
no expectation is violated. The Rescorla-Wagner model implies that the degree to
which new learning occurs depends on the level of learning that has already taken
place.
1.2.2 Instrumental conditioning
The most direct description of action selection occurs in free-operant instru-
mental conditioning, during which an animal learns the relationship between an ac-
tion and a desirable or undesirable consequence of that action. The animal chooses
to spend its time working for experimenter-programmed rewards or for the rewards
it derives from all other actions it may perform in the operant chamber. Normative
models of action selection assume that the partition of time the rat makes between
operant responding and everything else reﬂects a partition of time the rat deems op-
timal. The dimension along which the rat is optimizing is operationalized as utility;
if the rat spends half of its time lever-pressing, then the inference is that the rat de-
rives maximum utility from allocating 50% of his time to experimenter-programmed
rewards and 50% of his time to non-experimenter related rewards.
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The foundations for this analysis run deep in the behaviourist tradition in
psychology. Allison (1983) characterized operant performance as the result of an
economic contract between subject and experimenter. For example, the experimenter
will deliver one pellet of food for every three lever presses the rat makes, and the
rat is free to allocate its time to fulﬁlling that economic contract as it deems ﬁt.
Similar microeconomic analyses are made of human behaviour: an individual is free
to allocate his or her time to pursuing the fruits of labour, or to pursuing the fruits of
leisure. The labourer balances the amount of time spent working with the amount of
time spent away from work such that the overall utility of a particular partitioning of
work and leisure is subjectively optimal. Just as a labourer cannot pursue both goals
at once, the rat must necessarily trade oﬀ time it would otherwise spend grooming
and resting for the time it must spend pursuing experimenter-programmed rewards.
As the rat can’t hold the lever and groom at the same time, it necessarily sacriﬁces
one for the other, and must select the action that maximizes the utility of a particular
partitioning of operant performance and everything else.
Microeconomic accounts of animal behaviour (Kagel et al., 1995) propose that
animals partition their time in an operant setting according to an underlying utility-
maximizing rule. Just as a graduate student with a ﬁxed budget to buy bread and
peanut butter is presumed to maximize the best combination of these goods in their
shopping basket, a lever-pressing rat is thought to allocate their ﬁxed “budget” of
lever presses to the goals of eating and drinking according to the subjectively optimal
combination of food and water (Green and Rachlin, 1991). In a single operant con-
text, because the goods that can be acquired by lever-pressing (for example, electrical
stimulation) are only partly substitutable for those that can be acquired from extra-
neous activities (like grooming), the rat’s “investment” into pursuit of experimenter-
controlled and extraneously-delivered rewards changes as the temporal and energetic
budget is manipulated. Assuming perfect information, were the two types of rewards
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completely fungible, the underlying utility-maximizing rule would have to be a step
function: as soon as one was even slightly better than the other, the rat would spend
its time pursuing one to the exclusion of the other. The same is true of any savvy
graduate student: if, while holding all other factors equal, the cost of one peanut
butter jar was even slightly lower than the cost of another, they would exclusively
buy that which drained the budget less.
1.2.3 Experimental control
In the traditional variable-interval schedule of reinforcement used to assess
instrumental conditioning, animals are rewarded following the ﬁrst response after a
lever is armed. The levers are armed at intervals drawn from an exponential distribu-
tion, thereby providing no time signal about when they are likely to be armed, since
the probability they will be armed is constant over time. Such a schedule is more
likely to produce steady responding (Skinner et al., 1997), providing experimenters
with a large quantity of data.
However, animals may take advantage of the nature of these inﬁnite-hold
variable-interval schedules of reinforcement. The animal can sacriﬁce a small number
of rewards by waiting suﬃciently long, since the lever will continue to be armed for
so long as a reward has not been harvested. As a result, there will be little need for
the self-stimulating rat to trade oﬀ the time spent working for electrical rewards that
come at a low rate with that spent engaged in other activities. By simply waiting,
obtaining the fruits of leisure, the probability that a reward is waiting will increase,
and the rat can therefore almost guarantee that it can also obtain the fruits of lever-
pressing while it waits for rewards (Arvanitogiannis, 1997).
One way to control for this is to ensure that the rewards from self-stimulation
must be traded oﬀ with the rewards from other activities by enforcing a free-running,
zero-hold variable interval schedule (Conover and Shizgal, 2005; Breton et al., 2009).
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In this procedure, rewards are only delivered when the lever is depressed at the end of
the interval. If it is not, a new interval is drawn and the rat has missed an opportunity
to obtain rewards. As in the wild, unless the rat is actively foraging, the fruits of its
labours may spoil, but while the rat is foraging, it cannot pursue other goals. On this
view, the time spent in one activity truly imposes an opportunity cost that the rat
cannot avoid.
The nature of exponential distributions of latencies is such that a large number
of samples must be drawn before the mean of that exponential distribution can be
known with any conﬁdence. However, previous work (Breton et al., 2009) has shown
that when the price (the reciprocal of the rate of reinforcement) is held constant
over long periods of time, its lower evaluability makes rats much more insensitive
to changes in price and produces inconsistencies in behavioural allocation. When
the price changes often, its value is much more salient, and no inconsistencies are
observed.
Experimental control over both the trade-oﬀ imposed by and the evaluability
of the rate of reinforcement—or more accurately, its reciprocal, the price—can be
achieved using a schedule of reinforcement inspired by behavioural ecology. In the
ﬁxed cumulative handling time schedule, animals must invest a ﬁxed amount of time,
accumulated over possibly many bouts, into acquiring the reward on oﬀer. One
hallmark of such a schedule is that the number of rewards that can be harvested
is directly proportional to the amount of time spent engaged in the activity (unlike
traditional variable-interval schedules). Another is that the ﬁxed time requirement
can, at least in principle, be extracted from a single exemplar (unlike free-running
variable interval schedules). As a result, eliminating the variability in price facilitates
measurement of the rate at which animals can learn the work requirement in eﬀect
during a trial.
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1.2.4 “Cognitive” action selection
Not all action selection is the direct result of a learned association between
stimuli, responses, and rewards. Tolman famously proposed (Tolman, 1948) that
maze learning in the rat proceeded, not by a sequence of associative response-reward
pairings, but instead by the establishment of a cognitive map by which animals could
navigate. Using a metaphor that many today would read as quaint, Tolman likened
the learning of complex mazes to requests to a map control room rather than a
telephone switchboard. Rats that were free to explore a maze before it was baited
with food learned where the food was located much more quickly than rats without
this experience, suggesting that spatial navigation decisions can be based on non-
associative components. Furthermore, when sated but thirsty rats were free to explore
a Y-maze baited with food in one arm and water in the other, they approached the
water location quickly when they were subsequently made hungry but not thirsty.
Those that had not had the previous free exploration phase approached the food-
baited arm much more slowly. If a simple process had associated the location with
a representation of reward magnitude, one would expect pre-trained rats to make
incorrect responses when their homoeostatic state changed. Some process must have
occurred during the pre-training phase, above and beyond the reward magnitude to
be found at each baited end: a process mapping the identity of the reward to be
found to its spatial location.
What does spatial navigation have in common with instrumental conditioning?
While it may be natural to describe the solution of a spatial navigation task in terms
of maps, it is equally possible to describe instrumental conditioning tasks in terms
of maps, too. When an animal is aﬀorded the opportunity to acquire rewards, some
process may map lever-pressing actions not only to the absolute reward intensity that
can be derived from that lever, but also to the identity of the reward. To wit, rats
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that are made ill from a food delivered in an operant setting may subsequently cease
responding for the food (Dickinson et al., 1995; Belin et al., 2009), suggesting there
is a representation of the identity of the reward to come.
This mapping may even be applicable to higher-level representations of the
task. In traditional studies employing brain stimulation reward as the operant rein-
forcement, trials are presented in a repeating sequential order, from those delivering
strong stimulation to those delivering weak stimulation. After a trial providing weak
stimulation, the sequence repeats, and a new trial of very strong stimulation begins.
Anecdotal evidence can be found for periodic, unexpectedly vigorous responding on
trials for which stimulation should not be particularly motivating, even when there
is no other cue. The trials have a ﬁxed duration and follow a ﬁxed sequence. When
the stimulation is suﬃciently weak, and a suﬃcient amount of time has passed, the
reward on oﬀer on the next trial will be very strong. By the end of a trial of ﬁxed
duration delivering suﬃciently weak stimulation, an animal may come to anticipate
the value of lever-pressing on the next trial. It may be possible—and we present for-
mal evidence here—that experimental subjects are at least capable of a higher-order
representation of how trials progress within a session. In other words, the control
over which actions to perform and how long for which to engage in them is not only
driven by strict associative learning, but also by a cognitive map of task demands
based on statistical regularities in the environment that can be detected.
1.3 Computational models
In order to forage eﬃciently, animals must balance the anticipated costs and
beneﬁts of pursuing one option with those involved in pursuing all others. The basic
question of action selection in this sense regards how animals make the trade-oﬀ and
what the key determinants are that aﬀect the goal to be pursued.
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Quantitative models allow precise predictions about the eﬀect of manipulations
on performance. These models can come from the normative tradition, deriving what
action should be selected from ﬁrst principles, or from a more descriptive tradition,
deriving what action will be selected from experimental ﬁndings. Of course, there
is considerable overlap between these two approaches, because it is important ﬁrst
to identify what animals should do in order to determine where they stray from
optimality.
At shorter time scales, the most common normative description of action se-
lection is provided by temporal diﬀerence reinforcement learning models. The agent
is conceived as an integrated pair consisting of a “critic,” which determines the map-
ping of trial states to the total temporally-discounted sum of future rewards, and
an “actor,” which determines the optimal policy to implement and the sequence of
actions that will bring about the greatest discounted sum of rewards at the greatest
rate. Furthermore, two types of reinforcement learning are possible: learning about
the temporally discounted value that is associated with a trial state (model-free learn-
ing), and learning about the mapping between trial states themselves (model-based
learning). In one case, the rat maintains only a representation of the common cur-
rency required to judge the desirability of actions in particular states, while in the
other, the rat maintains both the value of the state and qualitative aspects of how
states and actions are interrelated. The relevant time scale for these paradigms is
on an action-state pair level, and temporal diﬀerence reinforcement learning models
usually describe the action selection problem in terms of punctate events: if the rat
is in trial state S at time t, the action to be selected is that which will lead to a state
S ′ at time t + 1 that will bring about a larger net total reward in the long run.
Behaviour on an operant task can be parsed on multiple time scales. The
Matching Law (Herrnstein, 1974), for example, states that the ratio of rates of re-
sponding on one operant compared to another will match the ratio of the rates of
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reinforcement on each. If pecking a key delivers rewards at a rate of one grain per
second, and another at a rate of one grain per four seconds, pigeons will peck at
the ﬁrst key at four times the rate of its responding at the second, and vice-versa
for the second key. This phenomenon was described by Herrnstein (1961) in pigeons
responding on concurrent variable interval schedules, and was soon generalized to the
single-operant case. Assuming a constant amount of behaviour to allocate between a
single operant and extraneous activities, the rate of operant responding is a function
of only the rate at which it provides rewards and the rate at which extraneous activ-
ities provide rewards. Thus, the matching law provides a means of scaling the value
of rewards by assuming that the rate of reinforcement from extraneous activities is
constant and there is a constant amount of behaviour to be allocated to each. If a
manipulation has altered the perceived rate of reinforcement, it will also change the
response rate, such that a rate of reinforcement required to drive performance to a
given level will be altered. The assumptions have not gone unchallenged in the case
of brain stimulation rewards (Conover et al., 2001a) and although a change in rein-
forcement rate will produce a change in response rate, the converse cannot be said:
changes in threshold rates of reinforcement required to drive performance to a given
level are not necessarily the product of altered perception of the rate of reinforcement.
Such a description of action selection is intrinsically molar, and does not ex-
plain how time is partitioned among competing goals in an ongoing sense. Melioration
is one attempt at explaining the ﬁrst principle that guides ongoing action selection,
though it has not been uncontroversial (Williams and Royalty, 1989; Vaughan, 1981).
Maximization is another attempt (Green et al., 1983), though it, too, has had its
detractors. Neither has been entirely successful in unequivocally explaining perfor-
mance in a wide range of operant schedules of reinforcement. One proposal (Gallistel
et al., 2001) has been that feed-forward mechanisms provide the self-stimulating rat
with an interval over which to compute the expected rate of reinforcement, which,
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when combined with the subjective reward magnitude, provides an expected income.
Stay durations at each option—and therefore the selected action—are stochastic re-
alizations of a stay-termination process that depends on the expected income from
each option.
The following sections will elaborate on these two diﬀerent accounts of per-
formance for rewards in the context of brain stimulation rewards: normative models,
based on temporal-diﬀerence reinforcement learning, and a descriptive model, based
on Herrnstein’s Matching Law.
1.3.1 Markov decision processes
Typical temporal-diﬀerence reinforcement learning (TDRL) models boil the
problem of action selection down to a Markov decision process (MDP) in which the
rat attempts to maximize its total net reward, subject to costs it incurs by selecting
one action in a given state of the world rather than all others. Strictly speaking,
a MDP refers to any control process—such as action selection—in which the only
relevant state to consider is the current state. In other words, the probability of
moving from one state to any other state is independent of any previous state. In
its discrete formulation, a MDP simply requires that the probability of moving from
state S at time t (St) to state S ′ at time t + 1 (S ′t+1) depends only on St, or
P [St|St−1, St−2, . . . , S0; at−1, at−2, . . . , a0] = P [St|St−1, at−1].
The original problem was formulated by Richard Bellman (1957) in solving his
shortest path problem. Suppose there are multiple roads that lead from location A
(New York) to location Z (Los Angeles), which may each pass through intermediate
destinations. The problem is to ﬁnd the shortest path from A to Z. Each point on
the map is connected by roads of varying length. Although an individual may collect
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some amount of reward (R) immediately upon visiting a point on the map (a state
S), taking a particular road (an action) will incur a cost (C) related to how long the
road is. The net reward from travelling from point A to Z on the map, assuming a
sequence of actions given by π, will be the sum of the net rewards (R − C) obtained
by following that particular route. The task, then, is to ﬁnd the policy π which will
maximize the expected total net reward from visiting all the states and completing
all the actions inherent in the policy. Starting at state S0, the policy will tell the
decision-maker to take action a0, which brings it to state S1, where the policy will tell
the decision-maker to take action a1, which brings it to state S2, and so on, until we
reach the desired absorbing state Sn. The total expected net reward from following
policy π in state S0 will be the sum of all the rewards and costs incurred by visiting
all the states and implementing all the actions in the sequence:
Vπ(S0) = R(S0) − C(a0) + R(S1) − C(a1) + . . . + R(Sn) − C(an).
This sum can be re-written recursively. The total expected net reward from following
policy π in any state S will be the immediate net reward, summed with the total
expected net reward from following policy π in the state that follows it from taking
action a. Following policy π in state S0 will lead to state S1; supposing we were to
start in state S1 rather than S0, the total net reward from following policy π is
Vπ(S1) = R(S1) − C(a1) + R(S2) − C(a2) + . . . + R(Sn) − C(an),
so the total net reward from following policy π in any given state is
Vπ(S) = R(S) − C(a) + Vπ(S ′),
where S ′ is, in this deterministic case, the state that results from executing policy π
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(taking action a in state S). This recursively formulated objective can be expressed
as a set of linear equations: there is one Vπ for each possible state S that can be
visited, which imposes a set of linear constraints on what Vπ could be. By solving for
the system of n linear equations (for each Vπ(S)) with n unknowns (for each S), it is
possible to solve the total net rewards that arise from executing policy π.
The solution to the problem, then, is to ﬁnd the policy for which this re-
cursively deﬁned “value function” (the total net rewards obtained by executing the
policy) is maximal. In other words, if we deﬁne V ∗(S) as the value of state S when
executing an optimal policy, then
V ∗(S) = max
π
{Vπ(S)} .
The value function for state S, when executing the optimal policy, will provide an
immediate net reward, and will tell the agent to execute the action that leads to a
future state with maximal expected net reward when taking the cost into account.
In other words,
V ∗(S) = max
a
{R(S) − C(a) + V ∗(S ′)}
or the value of a state S when using an optimal policy is the maximum, over all
potential actions a that can be performed, of the immediate net reward and future
net rewards. This is usually called “Bellman’s equation,” and leads to the deﬁnition
of the optimal policy: if a decision-maker is in a state S, which delivers a reward and
imposes a cost as soon as it is entered, the optimal policy for state S, π∗(S), will be
π∗(S) = argmax
a
{R(a) − C(a) + V ∗(S ′)}
or the action that will lead to the highest future net rate of reward when taking its
cost into account, assuming the agent implements an optimal policy from that point
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forward.
The original problem dealt with deterministic transitions; that is, when a
decision-maker takes action a in state S, it leads unequivocally to state S ′. The
problem can be extended to non-deterministic state transitions by introducing the
state-transition probability function T = P [S ′|S, a], which gives the probability of
entering state S ′ when taking action a in state S. The value function therefore
becomes,
V ∗(S) = max
a
{
R(S) − C(a) +∑
S′
(T V ∗(S ′))
}
where the expected net reward over future states involves the sum over the random




R(S) − C(a) +∑
S′
(T V ∗(S ′))
}
as a consequence of that expectation.
The shortest path problem is isomorphic to a rat working for electrical stimu-
lation. The normative solution is for the rat to ﬁnd the shortest sequence of actions
that will lead to the greatest net reward. It may engage in lever pressing, which will
come at some opportunity and eﬀort cost, but will eventually provide it with a brain
stimulation reward; or it may engage in other activities, which will bring about their
own intrinsic rewards but will not lead to electrical brain stimulation.
The original problem contains an absorbing state—Z—from which no further
action is possible. In this case, calculating V ∗ is trivial, because there is a ﬁnite num-
ber of locations that will be visited before reaching this state. If, on the other hand,
there is no absorbing state, there will be inﬁnitely many locations visited following
the current state, including (possibly) the current state again. As a result, the value
of any given state could become inﬁnite, because it sums the values of inﬁnitely many
future states. This is what is meant by the inﬁnite-horizon problem. Since a rat
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working for electrical rewards may not know the duration of a trial when it begins,
and can revisit certain trial states arbitrarily often, the problem of action selection
has, for all intents and purposes, an inﬁnite horizon. If the trial state represented by
the rat includes a measure of how much trial time is left, there is once again an ab-
sorbing state (the end of the trial), and action selection reduces to Bellman’s original
shortest-path problem.
In the absence of an absorbing state, the rat must discount rewards it expects
to receive some time in the distant future. Without this discount factor, the MDP
cannot be solved. Commonly, this is accomplished with an exponential discounting
function. Rather than maximize the total net rewards, the solution requires maxi-
mizing the total net discounted rewards, where rewards in the future are less valuable
than those that can be obtained immediately, and costs in the future loom less than
those that must be incurred right away. Future rewards (and costs) are exponentially
discounted by a factor of γ, where γ = 0 would indicate a decision-maker for whom
future rewards and costs are irrelevant, and γ = 1 would indicate a decision-maker
for whom all future rewards are as valuable as immediate rewards. The recursive
expression of Bellman’s equation becomes
V ∗(S) = max
a
{
R(S) − C(a) + γ∑
S′
(T V ∗(S ′))
}









A large literature on inter-temporal choice generally contradicts this normative
model. Exponential discounting would predict that an outcome is devalued at a
constant rate across time: with a discount rate of 10% per day, a dollar tomorrow is
worth 90 cents today, and a dollar in two days is worth 81 cents today. If two options
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are presented—a small amount sooner (42$ in one day) or a larger amount (52$ in
10 days) later—seemingly impulsive Harvard undergraduates will tend to prefer the
smaller/sooner option (Kirby and Herrnstein, 1995). This preference implies that the
additional 10$ cannot overcome the temporal discount factor: a dollar in 10 days
is worth less than 81 cents tomorrow, so it is preferable to select the sooner option
to the later one. The ﬁnding itself is perfectly valid and ecologically reasonable. A
resource that can be obtained now is preferable to one that can only be reaped later
and which may no longer be available. As a result, a reasonable forager will discount
future rewards compared to their value when immediately available. It would be
foolish indeed for a restaurant owner to accept payment for a meal in six decades,
or for a hungry diner to accept a wait of many days before being served. Temporal
discounting is made explicit in temporal-diﬀerence reinforcement learning algorithms
by giving exponentially less weight to future rewards as a function of time.
The important test of exponential discounting is whether displacing the two
options by the same lag will reverse the preference. If the rate of discounting is con-
stant, when a dollar tomorrow is only worth 81 cents in 10 days, a dollar in one week
and 10 days is worth 81 cents in one week. In other words, Harvard undergraduates
should also prefer 42$ in 6 days to 52$ in 16 days, and certainly to 52$ in 27 days.
Alas, impulsive undergraduates (Kirby and Herrnstein, 1995), pigeons (Ainslie and
Herrnstein, 1981) and rodents (Logan and Spanier, 1970) all appear to discount at
a time-varying rate that has often been approximated by a hyperbolic curve. The
19 year-old Harvard undergraduate, for whom a dollar tomorrow was worth under
81 cents in 10 days, prefers an oﬀer of 52$ in 27 days equally to 42$ in 6 days. In
other words, although a constant discount rate implies that the smaller-sooner reward
should be preferred when both options are displaced in time, the preference reverses
(thereby suggesting a time-varying, hyperbolic discount rate) when the options are
displaced by a median of 6 days. Some reformulations of reinforcement learning have
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incorporated hyperbolic temporal discounting (Kurth-Nelson et al., 2012), but even
these models fail to account for other features of the data that will be presented here.
1.3.2 Unsupervised learning
The problem of action selection faced by a rat lever-pressing for brain stimu-
lation rewards, re-cast in terms of a MDP, is to ﬁnd a policy (π∗) to follow in order to
maximize the net rate of reward. The policy gives the action to perform in a particular
state, for some known transition function that maps the current state to the next state
when an action is taken. The rat receives a particular reward, R(S), when it reaches
state S, incurs cost C(S), and transitions according to a state-transition function from
state S to state S ′ when action a is taken with probability T (S, S ′, a) = P [S′|S, a].
The rat then receives a diﬀerent reward R and incurs a diﬀerent cost C for taking
action a′ in state S ′, and so on. The rat does not know, a priori, the value of each
action in each state. As a result, the problem of action selection is compounded by
the problem of unsupervised learning. What is learned will determine how an animal
selects actions.
When the value of all state-action pairs is known, the rat only needs to iden-
tify the policy that will result in the greatest net rate of reward. When the value of
all state-action pairs is not known, the rat must learn the values by trial and error.
If there is an absorbing state the rat only needs to look ahead through every possi-
ble series of states and actions and identify the sequence that will bring about the
greatest net reward at the lowest cost by the end of the trial. Although the solution
is straightforward, as we will demonstrate, implementing it in neural circuitry with
limited resources is intractable and unlikely.
Instead of an animal working for rewards, we can imagine two chess players
competing against each other. In this scenario, there is, indeed, an absorbing state:
the game will necessarily end in a win, loss, or draw for the two players. Beginning
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with some initial state of the world—the pieces in their arrangement at the start of
the game—it would be possible, given suﬃcient time and resources, to enumerate
every single sequence of moves that each player can possibly make. The move a
player should make given any arrangement of pieces ought to be the one which leads
to more wins than losses or draws down the line. The grandmaster-in-training must
keep track of not only the rewards that can be reaped from moving a piece to a
location (an action) when the board is in a particular conﬁguration (a state), but
also the distribution of possible board conﬁgurations that will result when it will be
their turn once again. As very few board conﬁgurations are one move away from
a win, loss or draw, the prediction of board conﬁgurations must also be projected
arbitrarily into the future. Naturally, no human player actually looks arbitrarily far
ahead to every possible absorbing state before evaluating which piece to move. Such
a procedure would require searching through what are pragmatically inﬁnitely many
decision trees of inﬁnite length.
This description of the solution to the action-selection problem is called “model-
based,” because it relies on the decision-maker to hold in memory a model of the
function that maps previous states (like the position of both sides’ pieces on the
chess board when it will be their turn it is at time t) to subsequent states (like the
distribution of piece positions at time t + 1) in terms of an action taken at time t
(the identity and location of the moved piece). Action selection is trivially solved by
searching through each possible sequence, and selecting the sequence of actions (the
policy) that will maximize the net rate of rewards. However, the trivial solution may
involve a search through a non-trivial state space requiring a non-trivial amount of
time to compute.
Rather than searching through a stored decision tree of all possible sequences,
thereby selecting that which is optimal, it is possible to store only the value of taking
a particular action in a particular state, without representing how states transition
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to each other (the state transition function). A mediocre chess player might simply
have learned that moving a pawn when the board is in a particular conﬁguration is
more desirable than moving the queen, without necessarily knowing why, or what
the resulting conﬁguration will be. Since all that is learned is the value of taking an
action in a particular state, without any representation of what future states may
be, there is no need to engage in a time- and resource-consuming search through an
extensive decision tree. In the case of self-stimulating rats, during training, the rat
would learn that lever-pressing leads to an electrical reward of magnitude Ibsr, after
pressing for Po seconds.
This type of scheme is called “model-free” because all that is kept in memory
is a record of the net amount of reward subject to costs, rather than the rat’s model
of the world instantiated by a state-transition function. While “model-based” rein-
forcement learning requires the rat to store state-related information (such as reward
identity) along with magnitude information, “model-free” reinforcement learning re-
quires the rat to store only the net reward.
For example, one may train a rat that lever pressing will deliver an amount of
food pellets giving rise to reward R, having ﬂavour F . The food pellet with ﬂavour F
may subsequently be devalued by pairing it with lithium chloride. A rat employing
a model-based learning system will learn not only that lever pressing results in R
units of reward, but that lever pressing results in the delivery of food pellets with
ﬂavour F . If the model-based system has control over the rat’s performance after F
is paired with illness, the rat will cease to lever press. In essence, the rat is looking
ahead to the world state that will result from lever-pressing, and making its decision
based not only the reward that was paired with the action of lever pressing, but also
on what lever-pressing does to change the state of the world. In contrast, a rat using
a completely model-free learning mechanism will only have stored the value of the
state that is produced by lever-pressing, and thus will continue to lever-press as it
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did before the food reward was paired with illness. Whereas model-free systems are
insensitive to changes in underlying motivational states, model-based systems allow
the decision-maker to ﬂexibly alter what policy to implement at any given time, at
the cost of increased representation.
Neither model-based nor model-free reinforcement learning models can account
for all performance in all settings. When a rat has only been moderately trained,
its performance following reinforcer devaluation operates as though it had a world
model of lever-pressing: namely, the rat behaves as though it knows that pressing
the lever will lead to a reward of not only a particular magnitude but also of a
particular identity. When that reward is devalued, the rat will cease to lever-press.
In contrast, following extensive training, a rat’s performance appears to follow a
model-free algorithm: the rat behaves as though lever-pressing is associated only
with a reward magnitude. While the rat will not consume the devalued reward, it will
continue to press the lever because it has not maintained a state-related representation
of the identity of the reward that is produced by lever-pressing.
When the model-free reinforcement system is in control of behaviour, the rat
still selects actions that maximize its net rate of reward. The critical diﬀerence
between model-free and model-based systems is that performance can only depend
on cached values of the next state when using model-free systems. If all that is learned
is that lever-pressing leads to a state with value V (bsr), then un-cued but predictable
changes in V (bsr) will have to be learned on-line, as a function of the discrepancy
between the old and new values. If the rat also acquires a model of the world, as
is the case with model-based reinforcement learning, then un-cued but predictable
changes in V (bsr) will not have to be learned. The change in V (bsr) is presumably
already extant in the model of the world the rat has learned. What is learned by
the rat—be it both reward and state-transition information or reward information
alone—will dictate the actions the rat selects following training.
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1.3.2.1 Model-based TDRL
In model-based reinforcement learning, the rat acquires a world model that
includes more than merely the value of rewards it can expect to receive. More specif-
ically, a rat acting based on a model of the world will act as though it is thinking
ahead about how its actions will alter the world within which it lives, rather than just
the amount of reward that has been associated with that action. The rat acquires, in
some sense, a state-transition function that maps a state S to a future state S ′ when
it takes action a. That state-transition function essentially allows a feed-forward
mechanism to inform behaviour.
In the case of electrical rewards, it may be unclear how model-based systems
are involved with driving performance. After all, the task is simple, and the reward
may not be identiﬁable. Nonetheless, there is still a state-transition function that can
be learned in principle. In traditional two-dimensional parametric procedures, where
the reward is delivered following every lever press, the strength of the stimulation
changes predictably (usually in descending fashion) from cued trial to cued trial, in
a repeating sequence. In the inter-trial interval that precedes every trial, priming
stimulation is delivered of identical strength to the stimulation the rat will receive
in the upcoming trial if it fulﬁls the work criterion, accompanied by a ﬂashing house
light. Throughout the trial period, the stimulation strength and cost will remain
constant. These may all provide cues about what state of the world the rat is in,
and the rat may learn that a trial delivering weaker stimulation will follow one with
all but negligible strength, and a trial delivering excessively weak stimulation will be
followed by one delivering very strong stimulation. Furthermore, the rat may learn
that following the ﬂashing house light, the strength and cost of brain stimulation
rewards will remain constant. In both of these cases, the rat does not learn exclusively
the value of lever-pressing. Instead, it learns a rule about which states are likely to
follow others.
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Using exclusively model-based systems, the rat either searches through an ex-
tensive tree of which states follow which other states when taking particular actions,
or else it “ﬁlls in” the key determinants of its decision to press and bases its perfor-
mance on a rule for identifying which state it is currently in and, therefore, which
policy is optimal. In any case, the rat must construct a model of how the next trial in
a session is related to the current one, or the next trial state is related to the current
trial state, and base its policy on that model. Ultimately, model-based reinforcement
learning models require the rat to learn T = P [S ′|S, a] for an arbitrarily large state
space, which may include the total net reward it obtained, the action it just took, the
running session time, its current position in the sequence of trials, whether there has
been an inter-trial interval, and more. On the basis of this model of T , the rat must
then implement the policy that will maximize its total net reward, bearing in mind
all the attributes of the state space which may or may not be relevant to the task.
With a suﬃciently extensive model of how one state leads to the next, the rat could
(at least in principle) determine the optimal policy from the time it is placed in the
operant chamber. Although the horizon is not inﬁnite—with a suﬃciently complete
model, the rat can implement an optimal policy from beginning to end—the decision
space grows exponentially with the size of the state space and the number of possible
actions. As a result, it is unlikely that rats use a completely model-based system.
A much simpler, though equally imperfect, algorithm for learning which actions to
perform in a particular state is model-free temporal diﬀerence reinforcement learning.
We shall turn to this scheme now.
1.3.2.2 Model-free TDRL
In model-free TDRL, the rat updates its estimate of the reward it receives
with successive trials, but does not maintain any information about how one state of
the world transitions to the next. Although this formulation would appear to be most
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suited to brain stimulation rewards, it also implies that the rat does not keep track of
any information above and beyond total net reward, and therefore does not maintain
a representation of how key decision variables change throughout the experiment. In
its simplest form, the rat has an expectation for reward, pursuant to costs, in any
particular state. When the actual value (net reward) diﬀers from what is expected,
a discrepancy signal modiﬁes the value of the state that followed the action.
During training, a rat using model-free reinforcement learning systems will
try to minimize the discrepancy between the total net reward earned at a point in
time and the total net reward it expected for that point in time, called a reward
prediction error. Before any training occurs, the rat has no expectancy for reward.
When the rat ﬁrst holds the lever long enough to fulﬁl the work requirement, the lever
is retracted and an electrical reward is delivered. At this point, there is a discrepancy
(a prediction error) between the value of the state that is brought about by lever
pressing and its expected value. As a result, the optimum V ∗(S) is diﬀerent, because
the total discounted sum of future rewards is larger than expected. At time t, the rat
expects an optimal total net discounted value of V ∗(St), but receives rt + γV ∗(St+1)
instead. The reward prediction error can be expressed as
δt = [rt + γV ∗(St+1)] − V ∗(St)
or the diﬀerence between rewards (immediate and predicted to come) actually deliv-
ered and those that were predicted to have been delivered (Dayan and Abbott, 2001).
The name temporal-diﬀerence reinforcement learning comes from the assumption that
learning involves an update to the value of actions according to the degree to which
the rewards and costs incurred at each time step violate expectation. When the re-
ward prediction error (δt) becomes 0, the predicted value of a trial state corresponds
to the total net discounted reward that is delivered in that state.
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If the rat increments its estimate of the total net reward of this state in pro-
portion to the discrepancy between that expected and that observed (δt), the next
time around, the rat will behave with an updated estimate of V ∗(S ′). By induction,
the discrepancy will appear earlier and earlier in responding to the ﬁrst moment the
reward can be predicted. Neural activity appearing like such a discrepancy signal has
been observed in non-human primates (Apicella et al., 1991) and forms the basis of
a major computational model of dopamine signalling (Montague et al., 1996).
The degree to which the discrepancy aﬀects a subject’s revised estimate of
the trial state’s expected total net reward is set by a learning rate parameter. If
the learning rate parameter is 1, the current estimate is simply replaced by the last
obtained reward. In contrast, if the learning rate parameter is 0, the current estimate
is never updated. Since the policy depends on the current estimate of the total
discounted reward of all states, in the absence of any model of what rewards may be
expected from lever-pressing, the animal will need to re-learn that mapping every time
the subjective intensity and opportunity cost of the reward changes. If the current
estimate is updated rapidly, temporal-diﬀerence reinforcement models require the rat
to either (A) learn at a very high rate updating over very few time steps, or else (B) to
have a model of how the task is designed. The former is not very likely without some
process allowing the learning rate to be tuned to the task structure, since performance
would be highly dependent on the immediately previous rate of reinforcement on
variable interval schedules, an observation that does not obtain (Gallistel et al., 2001,
though see Neiman and Loewenstein, 2013). Instead, we propose that rats develop a
model of how the operant task is set up allowing them to tune the rate at which the
value of lever-pressing is updated—in other words, a model of their world.
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1.3.2.3 Average-reward temporal diﬀerence model
One solution to the inﬁnite-horizon problem that does not involve exponential
discounting is to penalize actions with a long latency. Niv (2008) developed a model
in which animals choose both what to do and the latency with which to perform it.
When waiting a long time before lever-pressing, the rat forgoes the opportunity to
collect rewards for longer. When waiting a very short time, the rat incurs a non-
negligible vigour cost for performing the lever-press with a shorter latency. The task
for the rat is to maximize its net rate of reward when choosing actions and latencies
with which to perform them. Each state is associated with an optimal total net
future reward corresponding to the rewards that may be reaped now (subtracting
costs), and those that may be reaped when following an optimal policy from now
on (subtracting costs), all expressed as a diﬀerence from the average rate at which
rewards will be delivered when following an optimal policy. If there are only two
punctate trial states (lever is up, lever is down), two punctate actions (lever press,
groom), and rewards and costs are delivered and levied at punctate state transitions,
two recursively-deﬁned equations specify the value of each state. If we presume that
the lever can only be down if the action taken is a press, and up if the action is to
groom, the two equations become
V ∗(up) = reward(up)-cost(groom)
+P[groom | up] V ∗(up)
+P[press | up] V ∗(down)
−average reward∗ ,
and
V ∗(down) = reward(down)-cost(press)
+P [groom | down] V ∗(up)
+P[press | down] V ∗(down)
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−average reward∗ ,
where V ∗ represents the optimal total net reward and P [action|state] is the policy.
The system can easily be re-written as
V ∗ = r∗ − c∗ + T V ∗ − R¯∗, or
(1 − T )V ∗ = r∗ − c∗ − R¯∗,
where T is a state-transition probability, V ∗ is the total net reward rate when engaging
in an optimal policy, r and c are immediate rewards and costs, respectively, and R¯∗
is the average reward rate when the policy is optimal.
Since this deﬁnition only holds when the policy is optimal, the solution to the
system of equations directly provides the optimal policy. As the rows of T in the
above expression must all sum to 1 (the sum of the probabilities of transitioning from
a state to every possible state is necessarily 1), the matrix is rank n-1 (in our example,
1) rather than full rank (in the above example, 2). Subtracting the average rate of
reward when the policy is optimal allows the system to be solved up to an additive
constant (Niv, 2008), thereby solving the inﬁnite horizon problem.
The average-reward formulation described by Niv (2008) proposes that animals
choose both an action as well as a latency with which to perform the action. The
rat may choose to begin a press more quickly, thereby incurring a heavy cost related
to its vigour of responding, but sacriﬁcing fewer rewards, or to begin a press more
slowly, thereby incurring a lower vigour cost but sacriﬁcing many rewards from waiting
longer. The model penalizes both fast responding as a function of the vigour cost
divided by the latency, as well as slow responding as a linear function of the average
rate of reward and the latency. In essence, the total net reward obtained in a state S
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by following policy π is




P [S ′|S, a]Vπ(S ′)
where action a and latency τ are given by the policy, states provide unit reward
Ur when they are visited, actions incur unit cost Cu each time they are performed
and variable cost Cv related to how fast they are performed, and the average rate of
reward R¯ decreases as the latency to perform actions is increased.
In her original formulation, the rat makes punctate actions—lever pressing,
nose poking, or “other”—and obtains food rewards by lever pressing according to a
ratio schedule of reinforcement, which can be collected by nose poking into the feeder.
Although attractive, the concept of vigour as described here only makes sense when
the various activities are punctate and occur following a latency. It is only in this type
of task that “vigour” as it is deﬁned makes any sense. When the rat must choose what
to do and how long to do it for, rather than how quickly to do it, the costs the rat
incurs will necessarily diﬀer from this proposed hyperbolic relationship. The longer
the rat chooses to perform an action, the more eﬀort it must put into that action.
The trade-oﬀ between doing something more quickly and losing reward opportunities
disappears. The longer the animal chooses to spend performing an action, the greater
both the vigour and opportunity costs.
As a result, we propose an action selection mechanism that diﬀers from the
average reward model in three important respects. First, the animal selects what to
do and for how long to do it, rather than how soon to do it. An alternate, but equally
valid way to say this is that speciﬁc activities, which may or may not be directly
observable, are chosen by the animal and the animal chooses when those activities
terminate. Second, the animal selects actions according to a policy that depends
on the scalar, not additive combination, of subjectively mapped key determinants of
- 32 -
decision, which we call the payoﬀ. Third, and perhaps most importantly, the action
to be selected is not chosen on the basis of a slowly updating policy. Instead, the
chosen action is the result of a rapidly-updating (“ﬁlling-in”) process that integrates a
model of the task demands with internal and external stimuli that directly sets what
to do and the probability per unit time that the action will cease.
1.3.3 The matching law
A very diﬀerent approach to modelling the action-selection problem derives
from Herrnstein’s Matching Law. The matching law states that the ratio of response
rates for two sources of reward will match the ratio of rates at which those two sources
deliver rewards. Rather than providing a normative basis for what the animal ought
to do in any given circumstance, the Matching Law provides an empirical basis for
what animals actually do. The matching law states that relative response rate over an






where R is the response rate and Rf is the rate of reinforcement (de Villiers and
Herrnstein, 1976). Assuming there is a constant “amount” of behaviour k to be





Although the Matching Law describes what animals do over long periods of
time, it does not describe performance on the molecular level. The explanation that
Herrnstein gave (Vaughan, 1981; Herrnstein and Prelec, 1991) is melioration, which
proposes that animals respond to local rates of reinforcement in choosing which action
to perform. For example, suppose that one manipulandum (A) provides rewards at
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a rate of one reward per second and the other (B) provides them at a rate of one
every two seconds. If the rat were to press 6 times per second on A, the local rate
of reinforcement from that option would be 1/6. If it were then to press 6 times per
second on the B, the local rate of reinforcement from that option would be 1/12. Since
the local rate of reinforcement from option 1 is much higher than from option 2, the
rat may then decide to allocate 10 responses per second to A, and 1 per second to B. In
this case, the local rate of reinforcement from A would become 1/10, while that from
B would become 1/2. As the local rate of reinforcement from A is much lower than
from B, the animal will shift responding to B. When the local rates of reinforcement
from both alternatives are equal—that is, 10 responses per second to A producing a
local rate of 1/10 and 5 responses per second to B producing a local rate of 1/10—
the animal also matches the relative rate of responding (10/5) to the relative rate of
reinforcement (1/0.5). Melioration theory is not uncontroversial (Green et al., 1983),
as matching in this case is also a maximizing strategy, and neither melioration nor
maximization can account for molecular level performance with the same normative
framework that is aﬀorded by the temporal-diﬀerence reinforcement learning models
described above.
As we will show, matching emerges from real-time level interactions between
the rat and the lever, and though matching is not built on ﬁrst principles, the only
assumptions made in our modelling of real time performance are that (1) the an-
imal bases its decision on payoﬀ, and (2) the stream of holds and releases can be




The implementation of action selection in neural machinery involves multi-
ple interacting regions, which have been ascribed various functions depending on the
quantitative approach used to model action selection. Below, we describe four struc-
tures that have been extensively studied in the context of action selection, from purely
model-free, purely model-based, average-reward, and Matching Law-scaling points of
view: the medial forebrain bundle, the ventral striatum, the dorsal striatum, and
the orbitofrontal cortex. Their contribution to decision-making likely integrates all
approaches, as a single approach to the action-selection problem is unlikely to be
exclusively correct in modelling how animals partition their time among competing
goals. Nonetheless, a parsimonious, yet, comprehensive description of performance
in real time could provide a stronger basis for identifying how a particular structure
participates in an animal’s ongoing decision to engage in one of a variety of behaviours
in a particular context.
1.4.1 Medial forebrain bundle
The region this dissertation will most directly investigate is the medial fore-
brain bundle, as it passes through the location at which the electrode is implanted.
The medial forebrain bundle is a large tract of ﬁbres running ventrally from the ol-
factory tubercle to the tegmental mesencephalon, and neurons with cell bodies in
dozens of locations send projections though the bundle both in ascending and de-
scending directions (Nieuwenhuys et al., 1982; Veening et al., 1982). Although the
electrode has the potential to induce activation in any subset of this heterogeneous
collection of axons running near the tip, those neurons responsible for the rewarding
eﬀect likely represent only a small fraction of those coursing past the electrode. Early
studies (Wise, 1982) supposed that the rewarding eﬀect was produced by directly ac-
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tivating ascending dopamine ﬁbres. The behaviourally-derived characteristics of the
neurons involved in the rewarding eﬀect of medial forebrain bundle stimulation are,
however, incompatible with known properties of dopamine neurons: the ﬁrst-stage
neurons have short absolute refractory periods (Yeomans and Davis, 1975; Yeomans,
1979); they are likely ﬁne and myelinated and have fast conduction velocities (Shizgal
et al., 1980; Bielajew and Shizgal, 1982); and at least a subset of them project in the
anterior-posterior direction (Bielajew and Shizgal, 1986). Although VTA dopamine
neurons are activated by the electrical stimulation (Hernandez et al., 2006), it is highly
unlikely that dopamine is itself the cable along which reward-producing stimulation
has its eﬀect.
Similarly, computational models of the activity of dopamine cells (Montague
et al., 1996), whose activity as measured in electrophysiological recordings appears
to track the discrepancy between expected and obtained rewards, assume that the
electrode is a dopa-trode: electrical stimulation causes dopamine neurons to ﬁre,
dopamine neurons adjust the synaptic weights involved in assigning value to stimuli
like the lever, and the self-stimulating rat engages in lever-pressing because of the
increased value of the lever. Since the discrepancy between expected and obtained
rewards is the proximal cause of electrical stimulation, these synaptic weights either
grow to inﬁnity or saturation. Thus, the rat would always come to expect that lever-
pressing will provide a maximal reward. This view is also incompatible with empirical
ﬁndings: rats will adjust performance to sub-maximally rewarding brain stimulation
(Hodos and Valenstein, 1962) and can respond to a wide range of stimulation strengths
at diﬀering rates (Hodos and Valenstein, 1960).
Instead, electrical stimulation induces a volley of action potentials that ap-
pears to be spatio-temporally integrated by a network, or system of networks, whose
peak activity is encoded somewhere in a memory engram of the subjective intensity
of the rewarding eﬀect (Gallistel et al., 1974). The growth of this intensity with stim-
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ulation strength is well-described by a power function at low pulse frequencies that
saturates at high pulse frequencies (Simmons and Gallistel, 1994), and can thus be
reasonably approximated by a logistic function. We propose that the rat maintains
this key subjective decision variable, as well as other subjective decision variables like
the opportunities foregone, the eﬀort expended, and the risk involved, in memory,
and they are subsequently combined multiplicatively, as suggested by Baum (1979)
and later by Leon and Gallistel (1998). The scalar combination, termed “payoﬀ” in
the remainder of this thesis, is the organizing principle by which actions are selected.
Factors that may be deemed more “cognitive,” like statistical regularities inherent in
the operant task structure, also have representations which may inform and poten-
tially very rapidly update the payoﬀ that can be expected from engaging in a variety
of actions. Below, we brieﬂy describe three regions that have been heavily implicated
in the process of action selection, and brieﬂy describe how they may ﬁt into this
organization.
1.4.2 Orbitofrontal cortex and task modelling
One region that has garnered interest in the study of decision-making is the
orbitofrontal cortex (OFC). Activity within the OFC has been correlated with ﬂavour
perception of pleasant foods (Kringelbach et al., 2003; Rolls, 2005), delay (Roesch
and Olson, 2005), risk (Kepecs et al., 2008) and cost (Kennerley et al., 2009), and
responses within the region are highly heterogeneous. Lesions of orbitofrontal cortex
impair discriminations between outcomes that diﬀer with respect to their identity but
not their value, but abolish the facilitation in learning a cue-response pairing when
the outcomes of the two responses diﬀer by their value (McDannald et al., 2011).
These results suggest a general mechanism is at work in the orbitofrontal cortex that
provides a mapping of task-related outcome identity information (what, when, how
likely, how hard, under which circumstances) to other stimuli, responses, and goals.
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As we shall discuss later, the process is similar to what is meant by a world model,
which establishes how stimuli both internal and external to an agent are related to
each other, if indeed they are.
1.4.3 Ventral striatum and value updating
Another region that has received considerable attention is the ventral striatum,
a major component of the basal ganglia system. The ventral striatum receives aﬀerent
connections from cortical structures, including the orbitofrontal cortex (Eblen and
Graybiel, 1995) as well as subcortical structures like the hippocampus (Kelley and
Domesick, 1982), amygdala (Kelley et al., 1982) and ventral tegmental area (Ikemoto,
2010). Activity in sub-populations of ventral striatum cells correlates with reward
receipt (Apicella et al., 1991), some show anticipatory responses (van der Meer and
Redish, 2009), and others ﬁre prior to speciﬁc cued actions but not the nature of
the cues that preceded them (Taha et al., 2007). These results would imply that
the ventral striatum is involved in some way with the mapping between actions and
the degree to which these actions ought to be chosen. As will be argued later, it is
possible that neurons within the ventral striatum integrate task-speciﬁc information
regarding the set of world models the rat may have acquired in training with speciﬁc
and non-speciﬁc outcomes so that the mapping between actions and their desirability
may be maintained.
1.4.4 Dorsal striatum and response-outcome gating
In contrast to the ventral striatum, in which activity is tied to updating the
mapping between actions and their putative payoﬀs in exploratory phases of a task
(van der Meer and Redish, 2009), the dorsal striatum may maintain this mapping for
as long as necessary. Ensemble recordings of the dorsal striatum show an increase
in the coding eﬃciency of units during decision-rich portions of a spatial naviga-
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tion task as the correct path is learned (van der Meer et al., 2010). Human func-
tional neuroimaging studies have found diﬀerential activation in the dorsal striatum
in response to high-calorie visual food stimuli when presented to obese individuals
(Rothemund et al., 2007). Lesions of the dorsal striatum disrupt the acquisition of
a dual-operant task when each response alternative provides a diﬀerent (sucrose or
food pellet) reward, as well as subjects’ sensitivity to devaluation of the outcomes
(Yin et al., 2005). Post-training lesions also impair performance and render animals’
lever-pressing insensitive to devaluation of the outcomes that each response bring
about. These results appear to imply that the dorsal striatum is suﬃcient for an
accurate representation of the mapping between actions and outcomes, and necessary
for acquiring and maintaining that mapping. It is possible that while ventral striatum
is involved in integrating task-speciﬁc information with current payoﬀ estimates to
update the desirability of an action, the dorsal striatum is involved in maintaining
the map.
1.5 This thesis
1.5.1 A computational molar model
In this thesis, we will elaborate on a molar model of performance for brain
stimulation rewards based on a modiﬁcation of Herrnstein’s Matching Law, termed
the Shizgal Reinforcement Mountain Model. In essence, brain stimulation delivered
to the medial forebrain bundle elicits a volley of action potentials that travel caudally
to a downstream network that performs a spatio-temporal integration of the signal.
Peak activity is then recorded in an engram of subjective reward intensity, the growth
of which can be fairly well approximated by a power function at low pulse frequen-
cies that rises to asymptote at high pulse frequencies (Simmons and Gallistel, 1994).
The engram provides the information required to direct future behaviour, and this
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representation is combined with the subjective impact of other key determinants of
decision like the cumulative amount of time the lever must be depressed (the price),
the force required to depress the lever, and the probability that a reward is delivered
following successful completion of the work criterion. The scalar combination of these
quantities we term the “payoﬀ,” and it will be a central organizing principle of this
thesis. It is on the basis of the payoﬀ that the rat allocates its time between self-
stimulation and non-self stimulation activities. At the molar level, we have modelled
the dependence of time allocation to self-stimulation activities on payoﬀ as the ratio of
suitably transformed payoﬀ from self-stimulation to the sum of suitably transformed
payoﬀs from self-stimulation and non-self stimulation activities. Manipulations that
aﬀect reward circuitry prior to the peak detection stage, and thus before an engram
can be recorded, will alter the sensitivity of the psychophysical translation of pulse
frequency into subjective reward intensity. That is, any interference with informa-
tion processing before a reward intensity can be recorded will change the ability of
stimulation pulses to drive the integration network to a particular relative level of
reward intensity. Interference with information processing upstream from or at the
output of the spatio-temporal integration network will ultimately alter the absolute
scaling of the reward intensity without aﬀecting its sensitivity to inputs. Since the
relevant decision variable is presumed to be a scalar combination of the arbitrarily
scaled intensity with the subjective impact of the price, and given that the arbitrary
scaling can be simply set to 1, changes beyond the output of the peak detection stage
will result in changes to the animal’s inferred responsiveness to the price. When we
deﬁne a criterion price at which the payoﬀ from a maximal reward will only produce
half-maximal time allocation, manipulations occurring at or beyond the peak detec-
tion stage will result in changes in this criterion, whereas manipulations prior to the
peak detection stage will result in changes in the pulse frequency that produces a half
maximal reward.
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A distinction can thus be made between the sensitivity of the reward-growth
function, mapping stimulation strength into subjective reward intensity, and its gain.
When reward growth is made more sensitive to changes in stimulation strength with-
out altering the gain, weaker stimulation will have a greater subjective impact, but
strong stimulation will be unaﬀected. When the gain of reward growth is increased,
all stimulation strengths are scaled. Similar processes occur in sensory-perceptual
systems; adaptation to the darkness of a movie theatre alters the visual system’s
sensitivity to light, such that even a few photons will be perceptible. As one leaves
the movie theatre, one is blinded because even moderate light is perceived at maxi-
mum. An increase in gain would, in contrast, make all lights, bright and dim–appear
brighter. The mountain model can similarly distinguish changes in the sensitivity of
the reward substrate, which aﬀect only the relative impact of rewards, from changes
in gain, which aﬀect only the absolute impact of rewards.
The model, in its current state, has been previously validated (Breton et al.,
2013; Arvanitogiannis and Shizgal, 2008) with respect to its ability to correctly de-
tect the eﬀect of a manipulation aﬀecting the substrate for self-stimulation, and has
proved useful in reinterpreting the eﬀects on self-stimulation produced by alterations
in dopaminergic transmission (Hernandez et al., 2010). A previous experiment val-
idated the strong positive prediction that manipulation of the directly stimulated
neurons (increasing the duration for which they are stimulated) should aﬀect the
sensitivity of the psychophysical process translating pulse frequency into subjective
reward intensity (Breton et al., 2013). However, in a subset of animals, the weaker
negative prediction that this manipulation should not aﬀect the gain or absolute scal-
ing of the psychophysical process was not supported. One proposed mechanism for
the observed changes in gain was that stimulation in these animals provoked activity
in multiple integrators with diﬀerent strength-duration trade-oﬀ functions. Decreases
in train duration would then displace the strength-duration relationship in one of
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these integrators suﬃciently that it no longer contributes to the stored record of re-
ward. The hypothesis relies on the assumption that, indeed, changes in the subjective
intensity of a reward are dissociable and orthogonal from changes in the subjective
opportunity cost. Similarly, alterations in dopaminergic neurotransmission, either by
cocaine (Hernandez et al., 2010) or GBR-12909 (Hernandez et al., 2012), produced
reliable changes in gain with unreliable or trivial changes in sensitivity as assessed by
the mountain model. These previous studies have assumed that changes in gain (Pe)
are orthogonal to and experimentally dissociable from changes in sensitivity (Fhm).
This thesis will demonstrate that manipulations of the payoﬀ from self-stimulation
that do not alter the post-synaptic impact of the stimulation can indeed be correctly
identiﬁed using the Shizgal Mountain model.
In the chapters that follow, we shall ﬁrst validate the molar model’s capacity to
identify the stage of processing at which risk acts. Then, we shall use the estimates of
subjective reward intensity and opportunity cost inferred in ﬁtting this molar model
to describe some of the supra-molar strategies that rats may use in our procedures
and the molecular processes by which actions are selected in real time.
1.5.2 World models
Although a well-trained rat’s performance on any given trial can be modelled
in the aggregate by the Shizgal Reinforcement Mountain, it could be even more use-
ful to describe performance on the molecular level. Trial performance reduces the
entire stream of holds and releases to a single number, and the Shizgal Reinforcement
Mountain uses trial performance to identify the stage of processing at which a manip-
ulation has occurred. Since our experimental protocol follows a deﬁnite structure, it
is possible that the rat develops a model of its own—a world model—of the statistical
regularities it encounters in the course of testing.
World models allow the rat to quickly learn which actions are optimal in a
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variety of settings. For example, if it learns that the pulse frequency and price of
trains of brain stimulation rewards will remain constant throughout a trial, the rat
only needs a single exemplar of price and frequency to tune its optimal policy of
pressing and releasing. If it learns that following a trial of very low pulse frequencies
it will be presented with a trial with a very high payoﬀ, it can begin working as soon
as the high payoﬀ trial has begun to collect rewards at as fast a rate as possible. If it
learns that following a trial with intermediate payoﬀ, it will be presented with a trial
with very low payoﬀ, then it can forgo pressing entirely.
Chapters 3 and 4 will explore the question of whether rats construct a world
model of the triad structure of the session, and whether they construct a world model
of the stability of the trials.
1.5.3 A computational molecular model
If rats can be said to have a session model of triad structure and a trial model
of trial structure, it should be possible to describe what animals do in real time once
the subjective intensity and price of the electrical reward are known. This description,
which I call a computational molecular model of performance, provides a means of
identifying what actions the animal takes in real time. Such a model makes possible
a much more ﬁne-tuned analysis of how various manipulations aﬀect performance
in real time. For example, the computational molecular model makes possible the
investigation of whether activity in various brain regions is related to the rat’s varied
behavioural states, some of which may not be directly observable even in principle. It
also allows for a detailed description of what lesions and pharmacological interventions
do to the propensity of the rat to enter various behavioural states. Indeed, a real-time,
molecular model of choice is indispensable for experiments in which millisecond-scale
physical measurements—electrophysiological recordings, electrochemical assays, and
optogenetic manipulations—are obtained.
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Chapter 5 concerns this descriptive model. The computational molecular
model of performance assumes that the various observable activities the rat is in—
pausing after reinforcement, holding, releasing for a short while, releasing for a long
while—are the result of a mixture of underlying behavioural states with characteristic
properties. The hidden behavioural states produce stay durations in each activity ac-
cording to characteristic gamma distributions, whose mean depends only on the payoﬀ
for the trial. Following this descriptive model, we compare the proportion of time
allocated to holds or short (tapping-related) releases predicted by the computational
molecular model to the molar prediction of the Shizgal Reinforcement Mountain. If
the two are in good agreement, then the molar performance described in the Shizgal




A computational molar model of performance for
brain stimulation reward
2.1 Introduction
For many animals, the longer one forages, the longer one leaves oneself open
to predation. Often, if an animal fails to ﬁnd food, it will starve. The longer it
forages, the less opportunity it will have to copulate, ﬁnd water, or hide. Pulled by
the various goals that would be advantageous for them to pursue, successful animals
nonetheless eﬃciently balance competing objectives. Indeed, for any species to be
successful, it must successfully trade oﬀ costs and beneﬁts inherent to one goal with
the opportunities and risks from goals it has foregone.
Instrumental responding is no diﬀerent from naturalistic action selection in this
respect. Experimental animals must arbitrate among competing goals of experimenter-
delivered rewards and those not under experimenter control. An animal that is given
the opportunity to harvest brain stimulation rewards will have to balance pursuit
of electrical pulses with the rewards that accompany grooming, exploring, and rest-
ing. Below, we develop a model of performance for these rewards—the Mountain
Model—and provide a reasoned basis for evaluating how performance is changed
when variables are manipulated. Indeed, operant responding is the result of a series
of trade-oﬀs, translations and combinations. As a result, the tools needed to ascertain
how a manipulation has altered responding and what stage of processing has been
aﬀected need to take these multiple transformations into account.
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2.1.1 The Shizgal Mountain Model
Performance for rewarding brain stimulation is not simply a reﬂection of its
subjective impact. Multiple factors aﬀect whether or not an animal will invest time
and energy in obtaining any reward, and brain stimulation is no diﬀerent in this
regard. The amount of time an animal will invest in holding down a lever will depend
on the intensity of the rewarding eﬀect produced by the stimulation, the opportunities
forgone by holding the lever, and the energetic demands required to maintain its
depression. So long as the stimulation is strong, the opportunities forgone are few,
and the energetic demands are negligible, the rat will devote almost all of its time
to lever-pressing. When the stimulation weakens, the opportunity costs grow, or the
energetic demands place an increasing burden, the rat will devote less time in pursuit
of the reward. This conjecture implies that the central decision variable for the rat
in pursuit of brain stimulation rewards, the single criterion to be traded oﬀ, is the
payoﬀ derived from self-stimulation activities compared to the payoﬀ derived from all
other activities available to the rat in the operant chamber.
When a rat harvests a train of brain stimulation reward, the cathodal pulses
induce activity in the ﬁbres of passage and local somata surrounding the electrode
tip, injecting a volley of action potentials in, among others, the ﬁrst-stage neurons
composing the substrate within the medial forebrain bundle responsible for the re-
warding eﬀect. The injected signal is characterized by an aggregate rate code. The
rat behaves as if a small number of ﬁbres (low current stimulation) ﬁring at a high
rate (high frequency stimulation) produces a reward of equal magnitude to a larger
number of ﬁbres (high current stimulation) ﬁring at a low rate (low frequency stimu-
lation). These ﬁndings (Gallistel, 1978) imply that a process, occurring downstream
from the ﬁrst-stage neurons, eﬀectively performs an integration over time and space.
The peak activity in this integrator network is committed to memory (Gallistel et al.,
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1974). In parallel, a process must have committed to memory the average amount
of time invested in obtaining the reward, as well as the average amount of eﬀort ex-
pended, in order for these variables to aﬀect future behaviour. These stored subjective
determinants of performance are combined, presumably in scalar fashion, for the rat
to arrive at a subjective estimate of the payoﬀ that self-stimulation will oﬀer him. A
similar process presumably occurs in evaluating the payoﬀ from all other activities:
the stored record of the rewards that can be derived from grooming and resting, for
example, are combined with the eﬀort and opportunity costs of performing them to
provide the self-stimulating rat with the payoﬀ it can expect to receive from these ex-
traneous activities. Action selection is simply the process of allocating time between
pursuit of competing goals such that the overall payoﬀ derived from all activities is
maximal.
Figure 2.1 shows the presumed sequence of events leading up to a decision
regarding the allocation of time to work (self-stimulation) and leisure (non-self stim-
ulation) activities. First, the electrode induces a volley of action potentials in the
substrate within which it is embedded. This volley of action potentials travels down
the ﬁbres to one or more networks that perform a spatio-temporal integration. The
peak activity of this volley of action potentials is identiﬁed by a peak detector and
stored in a memory engram that represents the subjective intensity of the rewarding
eﬀect of the brain stimulation. In parallel, the rat revises its estimate of the opportu-
nity cost of acquiring trains of brain stimulation by considering the average amount of
time it spent holding the lever to earn the reward (the price, P) and the opportunities
thus foregone. In addition, the rat revises its estimate of the energetic requirements
(ξ) of acquiring brain stimulation trains and the probability that it will be rewarded
(Pr). The stored records of these subjective determinants of performance are com-
bined multiplicatively, updating the rat’s estimate of the payoﬀ that lever-pressing









































































































Figure 2.1. Sequence of events in the decision to press. When a rat harvests a brain
stimulation reward, the stimulation induces a volley of action potentials that travel to
a network that integrates the injected signal over space and time (Σ). This integra-
tion results in a subjective reward intensity (I); the peak activity of this subjective
intensity signal is committed to memory in an engram. In parallel, the probability
of reinforcement (Pr), the amount of time required (P ), and the eﬀort invested in
acquiring rewards (ξ) is also determined, turned into subjective variables (risk, op-
portunity cost, and eﬀort cost) and committed to memory. Their scalar combination
provides the rat with the payoﬀ it can expect from self-stimulation activities (Ub). A
comparison of the payoﬀ from self-stimulation with the payoﬀ the rat expects from
all other activities it can perform in the operant box (Ue) provides the rat with the
proportion of time it will spend engaged in self stimulation-related activities (TA),
which will drive performance for rewards.
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of the subjective payoﬀs it can expect to derive from them.
This model requires that processes implement the psychophysical transfor-
mation of objective experimental variables, like stimulation strength, price, reward
probability, and exertion, into subjective determinants of choice, like subjective re-
ward intensity, subjective opportunity cost, subjective probability, and subjective
eﬀort cost. The psychophysical function that describes the translation of stimulation
strength into subjective reward intensity, or the reward-growth function, has been
well described (Simmons and Gallistel, 1994; Hernandez et al., 2010). The reward
growth function can be reasonably well approximated by a logistic function whose
value grows as a power function at low strengths (pulse frequencies) and saturates at
high strengths. This function is a critical component of the model, as it prescribes
a nonlinearity in a processing stream that otherwise contains multiple scalar com-
binations which cannot, in principle, be distinguished. The reward-growth function
establishes that there is some pulse frequency that will produce a maximal reward (as-
suming the duration and current remain constant), beyond which higher frequencies
will fail to raise the subjective intensity of the rewarding eﬀect.
Figure 2.2 shows the sequence of events in the decision to press, when focus-
ing on the reward growth, payoﬀ-computation, and behavioural allocation functions.
Suppose there are ﬁve pulse frequencies, A, B, C, D, and E, ordered from lowest to
highest. A rat may respond sub-maximally for rewards of pulse frequencies A and
B, while responding at a maximal rate for rewards of pulse frequencies C, D and E
(extreme right-hand side of ﬁgure 2.2). Given a choice between pulse frequency A and
B, the rat prefers to respond for B, and when given a choice between pulse frequencies
B and C, the rat prefers to respond for C. This is relatively unsurprising, because the
rat’s single-operant performance demonstrates that the rat responds more to C, D,
and E than B, and the rat responds more to B than A. However, even though the rat







































P × (1 + ξ) × Pr
Figure 2.2. Simpliﬁed sequence, focusing on reward growth and behavioural allocation
functions. The subjective intensity of the stimulation (I) is a logistic function of pulse
frequency (f); peak activity in the network that implements this psychophysical trans-
formation is committed to memory. Consequently, while pulse frequencies A through
D elicit diﬀerent remembered reward intensities, pulse frequencies D and E elicit the
same, maximal reward intensity. Intensity is then combined with probability (Pr),
opportunity cost (P ), and eﬀort cost (ξ) multiplicatively to provide the animal with a
payoﬀ from self-stimulation activities (Ub). Performance itself is a non-linear function
of the payoﬀs from self-stimulation activities (Ub) and non-self stimulation activities
(Ue). As a result of this composition of functions (TA = b(g(x, y)), where b and g
are the non-linear behavioural-allocation and reward-growth functions, respectively),
even though the rat allocates equal proportions of time to acquiring stimulation trains
of pulse frequencies C, D, E, their subjective intensities are not equal. In eﬀect, the
performance level motivated by any given pulse frequency is not a reﬂection of its
underlying reward intensity alone.
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preference, measured in a dual-operant setting, of D to C, and no preference between
pulse frequencies D and E. This implies that the subjective intensity of the rewarding
eﬀect is both non-linear (since it saturates at high pulse frequencies) and convolved
with a process that translates the intensity into performance (since stimulation pro-
ducing equal response rates are not necessarily equi-preferred). Because the rat’s
preference (or lack thereof) between two trains of diﬀerent pulse frequencies is gov-
erned by the subjective intensity that they produce, pulse frequencies D and E may
produce subjectively equal reward intensities, while pulse frequencies C and D may
produce diﬀerent subjective reward intensities. Furthermore, the rat’s performance
for pulse frequencies C and D in a single-operant setting is not a direct reﬂection of
their subjective intensity, but rather, a functional composition of the reward growth
and behavioural allocation functions, both of which are non-linear.
Unlike linear functions, for which location (position along the abscissa) is
confounded with scale (position along the ordinate), a non-linear function allows us
to interpret the eﬀect of a manipulation very clearly. In the case of the reward-growth
function, a change in the location of the logistic is identical to a change in the relative
subjective impact of stimulation strengths, such that weaker stimulation produces a
more intense rewarding eﬀect or stronger stimulation produces a less intense reward.
A maximum reward, however, remains at a constant absolute value; it is simply the
relative impact of each additional stimulation pulse that is altered. A change in the
scale of the reward-growth function is identical to a change in the absolute impact of
stimulation strengths, such that the intensity of all stimulation trains is multiplied
by a constant. The relative impact of a particular train will remain constant, even
though its absolute value will be scaled up or down.
At constant train duration and current, the pulse frequency whose subjective
impact is half-maximal (Fhm) is an index of the relative impact of stimulation trains.
When injected action potentials are more eﬀective at producing a level of reward rela-
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tive to maximum—that is, the reward system is highly sensitive—the pulse frequency
that produces a half-maximal reward will be lowered. As such, a manipulation that
alters Fhm will act prior to the output of the process that identiﬁes the peak activ-
ity in the substrate and commits the subjective intensity of the rewarding eﬀect to
memory. It is therefore possible to identify a manipulation of the ﬁrst-stage neurons
themselves, like prolonging the duration of the train or increasing the current of the
stimulation pulses (Breton et al., 2013; Arvanitogiannis and Shizgal, 2008). In con-
trast, because the output of the reward growth function, implemented by the peak
activity of a spatio-temporal integration network, is committed to memory and com-
bined in scalar fashion with the other determinants of the decision, any alteration of
the neural machinery of choice beyond the output of the peak detector will scale the
reward growth function along the ordinate.
The payoﬀ from brain stimulation reward is a scalar combination of the reward
growth function with psychophysical translations of required work time (P ), required
eﬀort (ξ), and probability of reinforcement (Pr). The resulting payoﬀ (Ub) is compared
to the payoﬀ from everything else the rat could do in the operant chamber (Ue), such
as grooming, resting, and exploring. A common means of describing the translation of
payoﬀ into performance, and the means we have adopted here, is to adapt Herrnstein’s
Matching Law (Herrnstein, 1974) to the single operant context (McDowell, 2005;
de Villiers and Herrnstein, 1976; Hamilton and Stellar, 1985, see) using a suitable
exponent (A) to take into account the partial substitutability of the fruits of work
with those of leisure. In this case, the payoﬀ from everything else is equal to the payoﬀ
from brain stimulation reward when the rat spends equal time engaged in each; as a
result, the proportion of time allocated to self-stimulation will be 0.5 when work and
leisure are equi-preferred. If we deﬁne a price, Pe, at which a maximal reward (Imax)






















where Ub is the payoﬀ from brain stimulation rewards, Ue is the payoﬀ from extraneous
(“leisure”) activities, Imax is the maximum subjective intensity of the rewarding eﬀect,
P is the opportunity cost (“price”) of the reward, ξ is the eﬀort cost (“exertion”) of
the reward, and Pr is the probability of reinforcement.
Re-arranging terms, the price at which a maximal reward produces half-
maximal time allocation, Pe, is the following function of the maximal intensity of






Substituting the equation of the logistic reward growth function for the intensity of
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Simplifying terms, we obtain the following prediction of time allocation as a function
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As stated above, a manipulation that aﬀects the circuitry that underlies deci-
sion making at any point between the electrical stimulation and the peak detection
process will result in a change in the pulse frequency that produces a half-maximal
reward, Fhm. A manipulation that aﬀects decision making circuitry beyond the out-
put of the peak detector—one that alters Imax, Ue, ξ, or Pr—will result in a change
in the price at which a maximal reward drives only half-maximal performance, Pe.
Thanks to the non-linearity inherent in the reward growth function, it is possible
to identify whether or not a manipulation has occurred beyond the peak detection
process. Because of the scalar combination of the subjective determinants of choice,
multiple manipulations will similarly and indistinguishably aﬀect the resulting 3D
time allocation function (Hernandez et al., 2010).
Previous validation studies of this mountain model have established that a
manipulation known to aﬀect the ﬁrst-stage neurons directly can indeed be correctly
identiﬁed. A diﬀerent version of the model, in which the relevant experimental vari-
ables were the rate of reinforcement and number of pulses injected, correctly identi-
ﬁed alterations in train duration and pulse current as manipulations aﬀecting ﬁrst-
stage neurons directly (Arvanitogiannis and Shizgal, 2008). However, Conover et al.
(2001a) found that, at least in the case of brain stimulation reward, the assumption
that operant tempo was independent of rate of reinforcement did not hold, compli-
cating interpretations of the Arvanitogiannis et al. (2008) results that were obtained
under an inﬁnite-hold variable-interval schedule of reinforcement. Furthermore, the
data in that experiment were obtained by systematically varying a single indepen-
dent variable (pulse frequency or programmed rate of reinforcement) while holding
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the other constant. Breton et al. (2009) found that this experimental design distorted
performance, by reducing the evaluability of price, which requires multiple exemplars
for the rat to gain an accurate estimate of the opportunity cost of brain stimulation
rewards In a separate validation experiment, Breton et al. (2013) used a cumulative
handling time schedule which provides a tighter control of the rate of reinforcement.
Breton et al. (2013) delivered stimulation trains 1.0s and 0.25s in duration, and ob-
served diﬀerences in Fhm from one duration condition to the next. Additionally,
Breton et al. (2013) used the experimental design suggested by Breton et al. (2009),
which dramatically increases the evaluability of relevant independent variables by
presenting pulse frequency-price pairs in random order alongside high payoﬀ (low
price, high pulse frequency) and low payoﬀ (low price, low pulse frequency) trials
that provide anchors for evaluating the payoﬀ on randomly selected test trials. These
validation studies establish that the mountain model, in its many incarnations and
across multiple performance-probing procedures, is capable of correctly identifying a
manipulation aﬀecting the reward circuitry prior to the output of the peak detection
process.
Fewer studies have been conducted, however, explicitly altering the payoﬀ of
brain stimulation reward without aﬀecting the directly stimulated substrate. Ar-
vanitogiannis (1997) altered the payoﬀ derived from leisure activities by delivering
sporadic leisure-contingent stimulation; although this produced changes in Re, the
rate of reinforcement that drove performance for a maximal reward to 50% time
allocation (related indirectly to the reciprocal of Pe), the eﬀects were messy. Provid-
ing background stimulation during leisure activities would indeed increase the payoﬀ
from leisure-related sources of reward, but also drastically increases the degree to
which leisure-derived and work-derived rewards can be substituted for one another.
Moreover, such a manipulation did not alter the payoﬀ from brain stimulation reward
directly; rather, it alters performance for a given payoﬀ without altering the payoﬀ
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itself. To determine whether the mountain model can, indeed, correctly detect an
orthogonal change occurring beyond the output of the peak detector that also alters
the payoﬀ from brain stimulation reward, we compared performance for certain re-
wards to that for risky rewards. The probability of reinforcement is expected to alter
the rat’s estimate of the opportunity cost for rewards, in the sense that it will have to
devote more time for every reward delivery when successful completion of the work
requirements (the price) does not always lead to a train of electrical brain stimulation.
In addition to validating the ability of the mountain model to correctly iden-
tify post-peak detection manipulations, the degree to which a particular probability
changes the payoﬀ from self-stimulation can be quantiﬁed. If Pe1 is the price at which
a maximum, certain reward produces a payoﬀ from self-stimulation that is equal to
the payoﬀ from everything else, and Pe2 is the price at which a maximum, risky reward
produces a payoﬀ from self-stimulation that is equal to the payoﬀ from everything
else, then it follows that the ratio of the two is the factor by which the rat discounts
a risky reward compared to a certain one. For example, if the ratio between a max-
imal reward delivered with probability 0.75 and a maximal reward delivered with
certainty (probability 1.00) is 0.75, then the rat discounts two identical (maximal)
rewards by a factor of 0.75. If that ratio is 0.7, then the risky reward is relatively
under-weighted; if that ratio is 0.8, the risky reward is relatively over-weighted, as
compared to the normative probability. As a result, in addition to testing whether
the mountain model could correctly identify a post-peak detection eﬀect, we set out





The study of how risk impacts the selection of actions that lead to probabilistic
outcomes has been of considerable interest to economists and neuroscientists alike.
In the classical economic analysis of decision-making under uncertainty, the agent
weighs the gains by their probability of occurrence to extract an expected value for
either option, and performs the action which will lead to the greatest expected value.
Fundamentally, the process that drives the decision is arbitrary and the ultimate out-
come is of utmost importance. In contrast, the typical neuroscientist takes for granted
the assumption that agents maximize this expected value, and studies correlates of
this expected value to identify where economic determinants of decision-making are
represented (van Duuren et al., 2008, 2009; Pennartz et al., 2011).
The idea that humans maximize objective, probability-weighted objective out-
comes is not without its detractors. Kahneman and Tversky (Kahneman and Tversky,
1979) proposed that losses loom larger than gains (that is, the objective loss −x is
much more undesirable than the objective gain of x is desirable). For example, indi-
viduals will have a strong aversion to an option that pits a gain with 50% probability
against an equally likely loss of the same amount of money, and of two gambles with
symmetric outcomes (a gain of x with probability 0.50 or a loss of x with a proba-
bility of 0.50), people will choose the one in which the expected gain/loss is smallest.
Furthermore, Kahneman and Tversky propose that while outcomes with very low
probabilities (0.001 and 0.002) carry more-than-normative weight in a stated op-
tion, non-certain (non-zero and non-unitary) probabilities carry less-than-normative
weight. Individuals overwhelmingly (73%) prefer a lottery where the probability of
winning 6000 Israeli pounds with probability 0.001 (and the complementary prob-
ability of nothing) to one where the probability of winning 3000 Israeli pounds is
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0.002, implying that the ratio of probabilities 0.001/0.002 is greater than 1/2—the
normative value (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). Moreover, individuals prefer (72%)
a 0.001 probability of winning 5000 Israeli pounds to the objective expected value of
the ticket (5 pounds) for certain (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979).
Despite overweighting small probabilities, individuals prefer (82%) 2400 pounds
with certainty to a gamble where they can win 2500 pounds with probability 0.33,
2400 pounds with probability 0.66, or nothing with probability 0.01. This preference
implies that the utility of 2400 pounds is more desirable than the utility of 2500
weighted by 0.33 and summed with the utility of 2400 weighted by 0.66, or
u(2400) > 0.33u(2500) + 0.66u(2400).
Subtracting the ﬁnal term (0.66 times the utility of 2400 pounds) from both sides,
we obtain a preference of
0.34u(2400) > 0.33u(2500).
In other words, the preferences imply that 2400 Israeli pounds with probability 0.34
is better than 2500 pounds with probability 0.33.
In a separate question, respondents had to choose between 2500 Israeli pounds
with probability 0.33 (or 0 with probability 0.67) and 2400 pounds with probability
0.34. A large majority of individuals (83%) opted for the ﬁrst choice, which is opposite
what would be expected from above. The two preferences imply that the sum of the
weight associated with a probability of 0.66 with that associated with a probability of
0.34 is less than the sum of their objective probabilities, 1. As a result, for probabilities
that are neither a few tenths of a percent nor trivial (0 and 1), the impact of a
probabilistic outcome on the subjective value of the option for which it is a part is
under-weighted compared to its normative value. In the decades since Kahneman and
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Tversky (1979) proposed their prospect theory, which describes choice as a result of
a concave function of gains, a convex function of losses, and a non-linear function of
probability that is discontinuous at 0 and 1, many other researchers have probed the
degree to which risky options are devalued (Rachlin et al., 1991; Gonzalez and Wu,
1999). Individuals consistently violate the assumptions of expected utility theory,
according to which equal outcomes for pairs of gambles cancel each other out.
There is a relative paucity of research on probability discounting in non-human
animals. Studies of the degree to which rewards become less interesting when they are
made probabilistic do not usually perform the adequate psychophysics. MacDonald et
al. (1991) tested the proposition that rats would exhibit a similar preference reversal
as demonstrated by Allais (Allais, 1953) in humans. Suppose a decision-maker is
presented with the following choice: A) Y dollars with probability p or X dollars with
probability (1-p), or B) Z dollars with probability q or X dollars with probability
(1-q). If the individual prefers A over B, we can assume that
pY + (1 − p)X > qZ + (1 − q)X,
so we can also assume, multiplying both sides by a constant, that
rpY + (1 − rp)X > rqZ + (1 − rq)X.
If the decision-maker is presented with choice C) Y dollars with probability rp or X
dollars with probability (1-rp), or D) Z dollars with probability rq or X dollars with
probability (1-rq), the preference is reversed for small values of r.
This eﬀect, called the common ratio eﬀect (because in both gambles, the ratio
of probabilities of Y to Z is the same) has been observed in many cases, and was
investigated in water-deprived rats making choices between levers that delivered either
A) 8 cups of water with probability 1, or B) 13 cups with probability 0.75 or 1 cup with
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probability 0.25. Following this preference test, rats were given the choice between
two diﬀerent outcomes that maintain a ratio common to the ﬁrst: C) 8 cups of water
with probability 1/3 or 1 cup with probability 2/3, or D) 13 cups with probability
1/4 or 1 cup with probability 3/4.
MacDonald et al. (MacDonald et al., 1991) found that rats, indeed, preferred
the certain option (A) when it was available, but their preference switched when the
options were multiplied by a common factor. In other words, rats appear susceptible
to the certainty eﬀect, and show preference reversals similar to those that led Kah-
neman and Tversky (1979) to propose prospect theory in explaining choice between
uncertain outcomes.
Despite these studies, most investigators assume that delivery of 4 food pel-
lets is 4 times as rewarding as a single food pellet and that a reward delivered with
0.75 probability will be 75% as desirable as the same reward delivered with certainty
(van Duuren et al., 2009). In each case, a psychophysical mapping exists between
the variable that can be manipulated and its subjective impact. In order to truly
assess how much less valuable a reward has become by virtue of its uncertainty, the
psychophysics of that reward must be conducted. In the case of brain stimulation,
the subjective intensity of the rewarding eﬀect of stimulation is a (non-linear) logis-
tic function of the pulse frequency (Simmons and Gallistel, 1994). The rat’s actual
performance is a non-linear function of this subjective intensity, the subjective op-
portunity and eﬀort costs, and the payoﬀs the rat derives from other activities. As a
result, the comparison between riskless and probabilistic rewards at a single strength
and response requirement is an inaccurate assay of how much risk has discounted the
reward.
As an example, consider rewards delivered with a probability of 0.75. Even
when the objective probability and its subjective impact are given a one-to-one map-
ping, such a risky reward would raise the subjective opportunity cost 4/3-fold, as the
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rat must expend (on average) 4/3 as much time in pursuit of the reward when it is
only delivered 3/4 of the time compared to when it is always delivered. If a rat is
presented with a maximally intense reward at a suﬃciently low price, the observed
eﬀect of probability would be undetectable, as performance would still be nearly
maximal. If the response requirement is raised, the observed eﬀect of probability on
performance will be much more pronounced. As a result, some researchers may detect
an eﬀect, and some may not. Only by measuring the performance that results from
many reward strengths and opportunity costs can the true eﬀect of probability on
performance be assessed. Only when the subjective intensity of the reward is accu-
rately estimated can the true degree to which it is degraded by probabilistic delivery
be found.
2.1.2.2 The present study
The probability that a reward will be delivered when the response requirement
(price) has been fulﬁlled is not likely to aﬀect the eﬀectiveness of the stimulation to
drive a given relative level of subjective reward intensity. It will, however, aﬀect the
subjective opportunity cost of obtaining rewards, since the rat will have to spend
more time lever-pressing per reward when the reward is not delivered every time the
lever has been held for the required amount of time. For example, the rat will have to
spend roughly twice as much time depressing the lever when the reward is delivered
with a probability of 0.5 as it would when the reward is delivered with certainty.
As a result, although the payoﬀ from working for electrical rewards is altered
by the probability that the reward will actually be delivered, the subjective intensity
of the reward the rat eventually receives will not be aﬀected by its probability. In
eﬀect, the probability of reward delivery aﬀects decision-making beyond the peak
detection stage, leaving Fhm unaﬀected while altering the payoﬀ from self-stimulation.
A probabilistic reward will therefore produce a decrement in Pe (the benchmark for
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manipulations that occur beyond the peak-detection stage) and leave Fhm unchanged.
The degree to which probability aﬀects Pe can also be used to quantify the de-
gree to which probabilistic rewards are discounted as compared to their riskless coun-
terparts. Provided the probability of a reward aﬀects all opportunity costs equally,
and aﬀects neither eﬀort costs nor the payoﬀ from all other activities, then the decre-
ment in Pe that results from the probabilistic nature of a reward is itself a proxy
for the decision weight of that reward. If an animal is willing to work 30 seconds
for a maximal reward given with certainty, and it is willing to work only 20 seconds
for that same reward delivered with 0.75 probability, then the probabilistic reward
is eﬀectively under-weighted in the decision. In this example, a 4/3-fold decrement
in probability is subjectively weighted as a larger, 3/2-fold decrement in payoﬀ. In
other words, the probabilistic reward carries less weight than would be normatively
expected.
The psychophysical mapping between an outcome’s objective probability and
its subjective impact on choice has been extensively studied in humans (Kahneman
and Tversky, 1979) and provides one of the two important bases of prospect theory,
which seeks to answer how humans evaluate economic gains and losses under risk.
Since the decisions presented to people are word-and-number problems, it would be
easy to assume that the fact that human beings underweight non-trivial probabili-
ties and overweight very low probabilities results from being literate and numerate.
No “prospect theory” of rats has ever been advanced, despite various risk preference
reversals in rats and pigeons (Kalenscher and van Wingerden, 2011; Kacelnik and
Bateson, 1996). In many experiments in which rats perform a probabilistic task, the
subjective decision-weight of a probabilistic reward is presumed equal to its objective
probability (Roitman and Roitman, 2010; Gilbert et al., 2011; Zeeb and Winstan-
ley, 2011; St Onge et al., 2010, 2011; Cardinal and Howes, 2005). It remains to be
shown whether prospect theory is universally true, or whether non-human animals
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underweight middle probabilities as humans do.
The goal of the following experiment is two-fold. First, we wished to validate
the ability of the Reinforcement Mountain Model to correctly identify a manipulation
that occurs strictly beyond the output of the peak detector. To do this, we ﬁt the
model to two types of trials the rats were exposed to in random order: riskless
trials on which reward is always delivered when the response requirement is met, and
risky trials on which reward is delivered with non-certain (0.75 or 0.5) probability
when the response requirement is met. Second, we wished to quantify the degree
to which the two probabilities of reinforcement aﬀected the payoﬀ, thereby deriving




Long-Evans rats (Charles River, St-Constant, QC) weighing at least 350g at
the time of surgery, were stereotaxically implanted bilaterally with macro-electrodes
aimed at the lateral hypothalamic level of the medial forebrain bundle. Macro-
electrodes were fashioned from 00-gauge insect pins insulated to within 0.5mm of
the tip with Formvar enamel. Rats received a subcutaneous injection of Atropine
(0.02 to 0.05 mg/kg) to reduce mucous secretions, an intra-peritoneal injection of a
Ketamine/Xylazine cocktail (87 mg/kg and 13 mg/kg, respectively) to induce anaes-
thesia, subcutaneous buprenorphine (0.05 mg/kg) as an analgesic, and intramuscular
Penicillin (0.3 ml) to reduce infection. Rats were maintained on 0.5% isoﬂuorane at
a ﬂow rate of 800 ml/min for the duration of stereotaxic surgery. Stereotaxic coor-
dinates for stimulating electrodes were 2.3mm posterior to bregma, 1.7mm lateral to
the midline, and halfway between 9mm from the skull surface and 8.2mm from dura
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mater. A return wire was aﬃxed to two of the skull screws anchoring the implant.
The head cap, containing Amphenol pins connected to each stimulating electrode and
the return wire, was cemented on the skull surface (anchored by a minimum of 5 skull
screws) with dental acrylic.
Immediately following surgery, rats were given a second injection of buprenor-
phine (0.025 mg/kg). Rats were also given mild analgesic injections (Anafen, 5
mg/kg) 24 and 48 hours after surgery. Rats were allowed to recover for at least
one week from the day of surgery before screening for self-stimulation began.
2.2.2 Behavioural protocol
Following surgical implantation of stimulation electrodes, rats were screened
for self-stimulation behaviour in non-computerized operant chambers in which every
depression of the lever triggered a 500ms train of 0.1ms cathodal pulses delivered to
one of the hemispheres, on a continuous reinforcement schedule. Only animals who
quickly learned to avidly depress the lever without stimulation-induced involuntary
movements or evident signs of aversion (vocalizations, withdrawal or escape behav-
iors) were retained for this study. Currents were tested from 200 to 1000uA, adjusted
for each rat and each electrode to provide optimal performance.
After screening, rats underwent operant training in the computer-controlled
testing boxes that would eventually be used for the experiment. All tests were con-
ducted in the dark phase of their light/dark cycle. Rats were ﬁrst presented with a
repeating sequence of 10 trials in which the ﬁrst two trials were identical and each
subsequent trial delivered stimulation that decremented in pulse frequency by 0.1
common logarithmic steps. Trials were signalled by a house light that ﬂashed for
the duration of a ten-second inter-trial interval; priming stimulation consisting of
the highest pulse frequency the animal could tolerate at a train duration of 500msec
was delivered two seconds before the end of the trial. Each trial lasted 25 times the
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objective price, allowing the rat to obtain a maximum of 25 rewards if it held the
lever continuously throughout the trial. The price, pulse frequency, and probability
of reinforcement were held constant for the duration of a trial. A cumulative handling
time schedule (Breton et al., 2009) was in eﬀect for the remainder of the experiment.
In this schedule of reinforcement, a reward is delivered only when the cumulative
amount of time the rat has spent holding the lever reaches a set criterion (the “price”
of the stimulation). For this ﬁrst phase of training, the price was set to 1s. Pulse
frequencies were adjusted throughout to ensure a range of frequencies that produced
high time allocation ratios, a range that produced low time allocation ratios, and a
range that produced intermediate time allocation ratios.
When performance on such training “frequency sweeps” was reliably high on
high-frequency trials and low on low-frequency trials, as determined by visual in-
spection, rats were presented with a repeating sequence of 10 trials in which the
ﬁrst two trials were identical and each subsequent trial delivered stimulation that
incremented in price by 0.125 common logarithmic steps. The pulse frequency deliv-
ered on these trials was as high as the animals would tolerate without involuntary
stimulation-induced movements or vocalizations. Training on these “price sweeps”
was considered complete when low prices produced reliably high time allocation ra-
tios and high prices produced reliably low time allocation ratios, as determined by
visual inspection.
Following “price sweep” training, rats were presented with a repeating se-
quence of 10 trials in which the ﬁrst two were identical and each subsequent trial
decremented in pulse frequency and incremented in price. The actual prices and fre-
quencies of stimulation were arrayed along a line that passed through a price of 4s
and the pulse frequency delivered during price sweeps, and through the price and
frequency that produced half-maximal performance on price and frequency sweeps,
respectively, in logarithmic space. Training on these “radial sweeps” was considered
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complete when high payoﬀ (high frequency, low price) trials produced reliably high
time allocation ratios, and low payoﬀ (low frequency, high price) trials produced
reliably low time allocation ratios by visual inspection.
When training was complete, animals progressed to the discounting portion of
the experiment. Preliminary ﬁts to the frequency, price, and radial sweeps were used
to aim three vectors in the sample space of prices and pulse frequencies: a vector of 9
frequencies obtained at a price of 4s (the frequency pseudo-sweep), a vector of 9 prices
obtained at the highest frequency the animal would tolerate (the price pseudo-sweep),
and a vector of 9 price-frequency pairs that was arrayed along the line that passed
through the intersection of the frequency and price pseudo-sweeps and through the
anticipated value of Fhm and Pe. The vectors thus formed describe the set of price-
frequency pairs that would be delivered on certain (P=1.00) trials. These vectors were
shifted leftward along the price axis by 0.125 common logarithmic units (decreasing
all prices on those trials by roughly 25%) for the list of price-frequency pairs that
would be delivered on risky trials where the probability of reinforcement following
successful completion of the work requirement was 0.75. The vectors were shifted
leftward along the price axis by 0.30 common logarithmic units (decreasing all prices
on those trials by roughly 50%) for the list of price-frequency pairs that would be
delivered on risky trials where the probability of reinforcement following successful
completion of the work requirement was 0.50.
The ﬁrst probability condition rats encountered was 0.75 (P1vp75). A master
list combining the frequency, price, and radial pseudo-sweeps for P=1.00 and P=0.75
conditions was assembled. The central 5 price-frequency pairs of each pseudo-sweep
(the 3rd through the 8th elements of each pseudo-sweep when ordered by payoﬀ) were
repeated in this master list. As a result, we collected twice as many observations of
the time allocation ratio in the dynamic range of the performance curve, reducing our
uncertainty about the position of the curve along either the frequency or price axes.
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This master list was then randomized in a new list, providing one full “survey,” or a
full description of performance at each point in the parameter space that was tested.
Rats were presented with repeating triads in which the ﬁrst trial delivered the
highest pulse frequency the animal could tolerate at a price of 1s. The price and
pulse frequency of the stimulation delivered on the second trial were drawn without
replacement from the randomized list. The third trial of the triad delivered 10Hz
stimulation, a pulse train so weak the animals would never work for it, at a price
of 1s. This triad sequence was repeated until all trials in the master list had been
presented, for a maximum session duration of 9h a day. On certain trials (P=1.00),
the reward was always delivered when the cumulative amount of time the rat spent
holding the lever reached the price on that trial. On risky (P=0.75) trials, the reward
was only delivered with a probability of 0.75 when the cumulative amount of time the
lever had been depressed reached the price on that trial. Only one lever was armed
on any given trial.
For rat MA5, the same lever served as manipulandum for both certain (P=1.00)
and risky (P<1.00). For rats DE1, DE3, DE7, PD8, DE14, DE15, DE19 and DE20,
one lever was mapped to all trials in which reward was certain and the other lever
was mapped to all trials in which reward was risky. In all cases, a steady cue light
mounted above the lever signalled that reward would be delivered with certainty,
while a ﬂashing cue light (300ms on, 300ms oﬀ) signalled that the reward would not
be delivered with certainty.
When performance was judged stable by visual inspection for 8 consecutive
“surveys,” or, in other words, when the entire master list had been presented 8 times
and led to reliably high time allocation ratios on high payoﬀ trials, reliably low time
allocation on low payoﬀ trials, and intermediate time allocation ratios on intermediate
trials, the probability of reinforcement was changed to 0.50 (P1vp5). A new master
list was created by amalgamating the frequency, price, and radial pseudo-sweeps for
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the certain (P=1.00) condition with the new risky (P=0.50) condition. As above, the
central 5 points of each pseudo-sweep were double-sampled. The list was presented
again, in triads for which the 2nd trial was now randomly drawn without replacement
from the new master list.
When performance on this new probability condition was judged stable by
visual inspection for 8 consecutive “surveys,” the location of the certain (P=1.00) and
risky (P=0.50) rewards was switched (P1vp5sw). A steady cue light still signalled
that the lever would always deliver reward, and a ﬂashing cue light still signalled
that the lever would not always deliver reward, but the mapping of levers to those
probabilities was inverted. If, for example, the lever delivering certain rewards was
on the left side for the previous two probability conditions, the right lever would
now fulﬁl that role, and vice-versa. This switch enabled us to partly control for
side-preferences.
After rats completed 8 stable surveys comparing certain and risky rewards,
the probability was changed again to 0.75 (P1vp75sw). A master list was constructed
again by amalgamating pseudo-sweeps for the P=1.00 condition with those for the
P=0.75 condition, double-sampling the central 5 price-frequency pairs as above. The
levers maintained their inverse mapping, and the 2nd trial of every trial was drawn
at random without replacement from this ﬁnal master list. Data collection continued
until 8 stable surveys were collected under this switched certain (P=1.00) compared
to risky (P=0.75) condition.
Rats DE1, DE3, and DE7 began the experiment as MA5, with probabilities
mapped to the same lever but signalled with a steady or ﬂashing light. As no diﬀerence
in performance was observed under either P1vp75 or P1vp5 between certain and
risky conditions, mapping of levers to probabilities was instituted, as described above.
Then, 8 stable surveys at P1vp75 and 8 (DE1), 5 (DE3) or 6 (DE7) surveys at P1vp5.
In summary, rats were presented with a triad sequence of trials in which the
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ﬁrst delivered strong, inexpensive stimulation, the second delivered a trial of random
price and frequency drawn from the P1vp75, P1vp5, P1vp5sw or P1vp75sw lists, and
a third trial delivered weak, inexpensive stimulation. The order of the probability
conditions was always P1vp75, followed by P1vp5, P1vp5sw, and ﬁnally P1vp75sw.
Rat MA5 did not undergo the lever-switch conditions, as a single lever was used for
both conditions. Due to the substantial duration of the individual conditions, most
rats did not complete the entire experiment. Rat DE1 became ill at the start of
P1vp5, rat DE7 became ill at the start of P1vp5sw, PD8 became ill midway through
P1vp5, DE14 became ill at the end of P1vp5sw, and DE15 became ill at the end of
P1vp5.
2.2.3 Statistical analysis
The dependent measure was corrected time allocation, the proportion of trial
time the animal spent working for brain stimulation rewards. The correction involved
including lever releases lasting less than 1s along with lever holds as our measure of
corrected work time (Hernandez et al., 2010). Corrected time allocation was therefore
calculated as the total amount of time the lever was depressed (for any period of
time) or released for less than 1s, divided by the total trial time. The Reinforcement
Mountain Model surface












was ﬁt to the corrected time allocation measured at each combination of pulse fre-
quency (f), price (p), and probability condition. The only parameters of the model
that were free to vary between probability conditions were Fhm, the location of the
surface along the frequency axis, and Pe, its location along the price axis. Slope
(A, G), ceiling (TAmax) and ﬂoor (TAmin) parameters were not free to vary between
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probability conditions. Separate ﬁts were conducted for P1vp75, P1vp5, P1vp5sw
and P1vp75sw conditions.
A bootstrapping approach was used to derive the conﬁdence intervals around
Fhm, Pe, and the probability condition-induced diﬀerence in both. The bootstrap-
ping and ﬁtting algorithms were both implemented in MATLAB R2011b (The Math-
works, Natick, MA). Corrected time allocation values were sampled 1000 times from
the observed data with replacement. For example, if 8 time allocation values were
observed at a particular price, pulse frequency, and reward probability, the boot-
strapping procedure would obtain 1000 samples of 8 time allocation values obtained
pseudo-randomly from that list of 8 (with replacement). A mountain surface was ﬁt
to each of the 1000 re-sampled replications, thereby producing 1000 estimates of Fhm
at each probability condition and 1000 estimates of Pe at each probability condition.
The 95%, bootstrap-derived conﬁdence interval about Fhm and Pe was deﬁned as the
range within which the central 950 sample Fhm and Pe values lay, excluding the lowest
and highest 25. Similarly, we computed the diﬀerence between estimates of Fhm and
Pe during riskless and risky trials by obtaining the diﬀerence for each replication. In
other words, each replication had an estimate of Fhm for riskless (P=1.00) trials and
one for risky (P=0.75 or P=0.50) trials, and the parameter diﬀerence in Fhm for the
replication was the diﬀerence between each. The 95% bootstrap-derived conﬁdence
interval about the diﬀerence in Fhm and Pe was deﬁned as the range within which
the central 950 sample diﬀerences lay for each parameter, excluding the lowest and
highest 25. Our criterion for statistical reliability was non-overlap of the 95% conﬁ-
dence interval about the diﬀerence with 0. A probability-induced diﬀerence in Fhm
or Pe was therefore considered statistically reliable if and only if the 95% conﬁdence
interval about the diﬀerence did not include 0. Any conﬁdence interval around a
diﬀerence that included 0 was considered statistically unreliable.
To evaluate our parsing of the probability conditions, we ﬁt a series of moun-
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tains to the data from trials in the P=1.00 conditions of each phase. Risk-less test
trials were extracted from the P1vp75, P1vp5, P1vp5sw, and P1vp75sw phases, and
a mountain surface was ﬁt to the data from each rat according to which slope (A,
G) and range (TAmax, TAmin) parameters were common to all conditions and loca-
tion (Fhm, Pe) parameters were free to vary among the diﬀerent phases. The same
re-sampling method was conducted as described above. We then obtained the dif-
ference, where applicable, in estimated Fhm (or Pe) values between P1vp75 and each
phase that followed it for the 1000 re-sampled estimates, and identiﬁed the central
tendency (median) of the 1000 diﬀerences between P1vp75 and P1vp5, P1vp75 and
P1vp5sw, and P1vp75 and P1vp75sw. These diﬀerences provide an indication of the
degree to which Fhm and Pe ﬂuctuated throughout the experiment. Because of large
ﬂuctuations occurring in the course of months-long testing conditions, we chose to
consider each presented pair of probabilities separately rather than in the aggregate.
2.3 Results
2.3.1 Stability of Fhm and Pe
All phases of the experiment—P1vp75, P1vp5, P1vp5sw and P1vp75sw—have
the P=1.00 condition in common. Since the data from P=1.00 conditions diﬀer across
phases with respect to time, statistically reliable changes in the estimated Fhm and
Pe for the P=1.00 across the experimental phases would complicate aggregating all
of the data together. In the absence of any drift, the estimated Fhm and Pe values for
rewards delivered with certainty would be identical in all phases, thereby justifying a
single, three-way comparison between P=1.00, P=0.75, and P=0.50 conditions. We
therefore sought to test the null hypothesis that mountain estimates when the reward
was riskless were identical in all phases of the experiment.
Figure 2.3 shows the diﬀerence in Fhm (left) and Pe (right) between the ﬁrst
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Figure 2.3. Stability of Fhm and Pe across phases of riskless conditions. The estimated
Fhm (left) and Pe (right) of the P=1.00 condition are compared across each phase of
the experiment, normalized to the ﬁrst (P1vp75) condition encountered. Although
there is little evidence for a systematic drift in parameters over time, there are large
reliable (though non-systematic) changes from one condition to the next in all animals.
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phase of the experiment and each subsequent phase, along with the bootstrap-derived
conﬁdence interval associated with that diﬀerence. Although there is a clear indication
of a steady drift in the parameter values from the start to the end of the experiment
in only one rat (DE3), all other animals show statistically reliable changes (conﬁdence
intervals about the diﬀerence that do not include 0) in those parameters at least at
one point in time. Since probabilistic and risk-less trials are presented inter-digitated
in random fashion, these drifts in Fhm and Pe would constitute part of the statistical
noise in estimating the probability-induced diﬀerence in those parameters. Over the
course of the entire experiment, however, these data suggest it is unreasonable to
assume the subject and electrode/brain interface that underwent the ﬁrst phase of
the experiment is in every way the exact same subject and electrode/brain interface
when it underwent the second phase of the experiment, occurring perhaps many
months later. We therefore present here separate comparisons of probability values
for each phase of the experiment, for each subject that was tested in that phase.
2.3.2 Eﬀects of probability on Fhm and Pe
2.3.2.1 P1vp75
All rats completed the ﬁrst phase of the experiment, P1vp75. In order to
gauge the estimated diﬀerence in parameters from one condition to the other, the list
of 1000 estimates of Fhm and Pe for the riskless condition obtained by re-sampling were
subtracted from the 1000 estimates of Fhm and Pe for the risky (P=0.75) condition.
The median of riskless estimate − risky estimate was used as a measure of central
tendency for the change in parameter estimate produced by risk. The 2.5% and
97.5% percentiles of the diﬀerences were used as an estimate of the 95% conﬁdence
interval surrounding the diﬀerence in Fhm and Pe between 1.00 and 0.75 probability
conditions.
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Figure 2.4. Shift in Fhm and Pe for P1vp75. Bar graphs (left) provide the magnitude
(±95% bootstrap conﬁdence interval) of the diﬀerence in Fhm (red) and Pe (blue) from
riskless (P=1.00) to risky (P=0.75) conditions in the ﬁrst phase of the experiment.
Positive numbers indicate that the risky conditions have greater estimates, while
negative numbers indicate that the estimates are lower on risky trials. The box-
whisker plot (right) provides the median (middle line), inter-quartile range (box), full
range (whiskers), and mean (square) of the estimated diﬀerences.
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Figure 2.4 shows the estimated diﬀerence in Fhm and Pe for all animals. In the
left-hand panel, the bar graph depicts, for all animals, the estimated diﬀerence in Fhm
(red) and Pe (blue) along with the bootstrap-estimated 95% conﬁdence interval about
the diﬀerence. In the right-hand panel, a box-whisker plot depicts the estimated dif-
ference (red for Fhm, blue for Pe) collapsed across all animals. Although some animals
showed only modest or unreliable shifts along the price axis, the median diﬀerence
between risk-less and risky rewards is a 0.14379 decrease, with an interquartile range
spanning from 0.10817 to 0.16865. Conversely, although one animal (DE1) showed
a statistically reliable shift along the frequency axis, the median diﬀerence across all
animals is approximately zero (−0.01791, IQR spans −0.0385 to 0.03159).
2.3.2.2 P1vp5
Rats DE3, DE7, PD8, DE14, DE19 and DE20 completed the second phase
of the experiment, P1vp5. As above, the list of 1000 estimates of Fhm and Pe ﬁt
by the bootstrapping procedure was used to derive the estimated diﬀerence in Fhm
and Pe produced by risk. The 1000 estimates of Fhm at each probability condition
were subtracted from each other, and the 1000 estimates of Pe at each probability
condition were subtracted from each other. The median diﬀerence was used as a
measure of central tendency of the diﬀerence produced by risk, and the 2.5% and
97.5% percentiles were used as the bounds of the 95% conﬁdence interval surrounding
the diﬀerence.
Figure 2.5 shows the diﬀerence in parameter estimate produced by delivering
rewards with 50% probability. The left-hand panel shows the estimated diﬀerence
in Fhm (red) and Pe (blue) for these 5 animals between risky (probability of 0.50)
and riskless (probability of 1.00) rewards. Error bars represent the 95% conﬁdence
interval about this diﬀerence. The right-hand panel collapses the estimated diﬀer-
ence across all rats, depicting a box-whisker plot of the diﬀerence in Fhm (red) and
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Figure 2.5. Shift in Fhm and Pe for P1vp5. Bar graphs (left) provide the magnitude
(±95% bootstrap conﬁdence interval) of the diﬀerence in Fhm (red) and Pe (blue) from
riskless (P=1.00) to risky (P=0.5) conditions in the second phase of the experiment.
Positive numbers indicate that the risky conditions have greater estimates, while
negative numbers indicate that the estimates are lower on risky trials. The box-
whisker plot (right) provides the median (middle line), inter-quartile range (box), full
range (whiskers), and mean (square) of the estimated diﬀerences.
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Pe (blue) produced by risk. Although two animals (DE7, DE14) showed a reliable
shift in Fhm, overall, delivering rewards with a probability of 0.5 did not alter Fhm
systematically. Instead, as expected, risky rewards produced large (median of 0.30199
common logarithmic units) statistically reliable shifts in Pe. The change in Fhm pro-
duced by delivering rewards with a probability of 0.5 had a median value of 0.02056,
with an interquartile interval spanning from −0.02482 to 0.05908. The change in Pe,
in contrast, had a median value of −.30199 with an interquartile interval spanning
from −0.45593 to −0.23712.
2.3.2.3 P1vp5sw
Rats DE3, DE14, DE19 and DE20 completed the third phase of the exper-
iment, P1vp5sw. In this condition, the mapping between levers and probabilities
switched, such that probabilistic rewards were associated with the right lever and
certain rewards were associated with the left lever. The procedure for estimating the
diﬀerence in Fhm and Pe produced by probability was the same as for phases P1vp75
and P1vp5.
Figure 2.6 shows the diﬀerence in parameter estimates between probability
conditions, with lever-to-probability mappings switched. In the left-hand panel, the
diﬀerence in Fhm (red) and Pe (blue) is shown for each rat, accompanied by the
bootstrapped-derived estimates of the 95% conﬁdence intervals. In the right-hand
panel, the diﬀerence is collapsed across all 4 animals in a box-whisker plot. Although
the shift in Fhm is not statistically reliable in only two cases (DE19, DE20), the
diﬀerence produced by a change in probability is inconsistent across the small number
of rats that made it to this stage of the experiment, and inconsistent with the changes
in Fhm that were observed in previous probability conditions. Estimated diﬀerences
in Pe are similarly accompanied by wide conﬁdence intervals, but their magnitude is
more consistent across animals than the diﬀerence in Fhm. The median diﬀerence in
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Figure 2.6. Shift in Fhm and Pe for P1vp5sw. Bar graphs (left) provide the magnitude
(±95% bootstrap conﬁdence interval) of the diﬀerence in Fhm (red) and Pe (blue) from
riskless (P=1.00) to risky (P=0.5) conditions in the third phase of the experiment,
when the mapping of lever sides to probability are switched with respect to the second
phase. Positive numbers indicate that the risky conditions have greater estimates,
while negative numbers indicate that the estimates are lower on risky trials. The box-
whisker plot (right) provides the median (middle line), inter-quartile range (box), full
range (whiskers), and mean (square) of the estimated diﬀerences.
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Fhm for this phase of the experiment was a 0.01212 decrease, with an interquartile
range spanning from −0.01264 to 0.08674, while the median diﬀerence in Pe was a
0.3418 decrease, with an interquartile range spanning from −0.24 to −0.37072.
2.3.2.4 P1vp75sw
Rats DE19 and DE20 completed the ﬁnal phase of the experiment, P1vp75sw.
In this phase, the probability of reinforcement on the risky lever was increased back to
0.75, but the lever mapping was retained as in the third phase (P1vp5sw). Estimated
diﬀerences in parameter estimates and their associated conﬁdence intervals were com-
puted as before, using the list of 1000 estimates in the bootstrapping procedure.
Figure 2.7 shows the eﬀect of probability on the estimated diﬀerence in param-
eter estimates for this ﬁnal phase of the experiment. The ﬁgure depicts the change
in Fhm (red) and Pe (blue) produced by delivering rewards with a probability of 0.75
rather than 1.00. The diﬀerence was not collapsed across animals, as only two rats
survived to the end of the experiment. Qualitatively, the shifts observed during this
replication of the P1vp75 condition are comparable to those observed in the ﬁrst
phase of the experiment, albeit with much greater variability. Rat DE19 showed only
a very modest shift in Pe during phase P1vp75, which went in the opposite direction
(and was not reliably diﬀerent from 0) in phase P1vp75sw, while DE20 showed a
slightly larger shift in Pe during phase P1vp75 that was slightly reduced during phase
P1vp75sw. The shift in Fhm was only reliable for DE20, which is inconsistent with
the shift in Fhm observed for this animal in the ﬁrst phase of the experiment.
2.3.3 Magnitude of the diﬀerence in Fhm and Pe
The estimated diﬀerence in Fhm and Pe induced by a given probability con-
dition can be collapsed across animals and lever-mapping conditions to provide an
estimate of how probability aﬀects each parameter. Figure 2.8 shows the box-whisker
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Figure 2.7. Shift in Fhm and Pe for P1vp75sw. Bar graphs (left) provide the magni-
tude (±95% bootstrap conﬁdence interval) of the diﬀerence in Fhm (red) and Pe (blue)
from riskless (P=1.00) to risky (P=0.75) conditions in the ﬁnal phase of the experi-
ment, when the mapping between levers and probabilities are switched with respect
to the ﬁrst phase. Positive numbers indicate that the risky conditions have greater
estimates, while negative numbers indicate that the estimates are lower on risky tri-
als. The box-whisker plot (right) provides the median (middle line), inter-quartile
range (box), full range (whiskers), and mean (square) of the estimated diﬀerences.
- 80 -
Figure 2.8. Magnitude of the diﬀerence in Fhm and Pe across all conditions. Box-
whisker plots show the change in Fhm (red) and Pe (blue) resulting from a decrease in
probability to 0.75 (dark symbols) and 0.50 (light symbols). Squares represent means,
whiskers represent the full range of diﬀerences. Negative numbers indicate that risk
decreases the estimate; positive numbers indicate that risk increases it. Filled circles
represent diﬀerences for each animal in each condition.
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plot of all the shifts in Fhm and Pe observed between P=1.00 and P=0.75 conditions
(collapsing P1vp75 and P1vp75sw together), as well as the bar-whisker plot of all
the shifts in Fhm and Pe observed between P=1.00 and P=0.50 conditions (collapsing
P1vp5 and P1vp5sw together). The shift in Fhm is close to 0 for both probabilistic
rewards (median increase of 0.02422 for 0.75 and median increase of 0.02056 for 0.50),
whereas the shift in Pe is probability dependent. When rewards are delivered with
0.75 probability, the estimate of Pe decreases by 0.13598 (the inter-quartile range
spans 0.07531 to 0.16481) compared to those delivered with a probability of 1.00.
When rewards are delivered with 0.50 probability, the estimate of Pe decreases by
0.33089 (inter-quartile range spanning spans 0.23712 to 0.4095) compared to those
delivered with a probability of 1.00.
2.4 Discussion
2.4.1 Utility of the mountain model
The Reinforcement Mountain Model has been proposed as a means to infer
the stage of processing at which a manipulation acts to alter reward seeking. Ac-
cording to the model, manipulations that alter the pulse frequency that produces a
half-maximal reward (Fhm) occur prior to the output of a circuit that integrates the
aggregate activity induced by the stimulation electrode. In other words, manipula-
tions that alter Fhm presumably operate on neurons responsible for the rewarding
eﬀect of electrical stimulation of the medial forebrain bundle. In contrast, manipula-
tions that alter the price that drives equi-preference between a maximally rewarding
train of brain stimulation and all other activities (Pe) occur at or beyond the out-
put of the integration network, modifying the payoﬀ from self-stimulation activities,
rescaling the output of the peak detector, or changing the payoﬀ from everything else.
As a result, manipulations that alter Pe do not aﬀect the primary neurons responsible
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for brain stimulation reward per se, but at some later stage instead.
Previous validations of the Reinforcement Mountain Model have focussed on
demonstrating its capacity to identify a manipulation known to aﬀect putative reward
neurons. For example, Arvanitogiannis et al. (2008) validated the Reinforcement
Mountain Model’s ability to correctly identify that alterations in both train duration
and current occur prior to the output of the peak-detection stage. More recently, Bre-
ton et al. (2013) validated the model’s ability to correctly identify the stage at which
alterations in train duration aﬀect brain reward circuitry using same the experimental
procedure as used in the present paper. Other studies have used the mountain model
to infer the stage of processing at which cocaine (Hernandez et al., 2010), the speciﬁc
dopamine transporter blocker, GBR-12909 (Hernandez et al., 2012), and cannabinoid
antagonists (Trujillo-Pisanty et al., 2011) act. The authors of these studies have gen-
erally concluded that the predominant eﬀect of these pharmacological interventions
occurs beyond the output of the peak detector, altering Pe with small and inconsistent
eﬀects on Fhm. However, it has not, until now, been shown that the Reinforcement
Mountain Model can correctly identify such an eﬀect.
We report a large, probability-dependent decrease in Pe, as predicted by the
Reinforcement Mountain Model, that is accompanied by small, unreliable, and in-
consistent shifts in Fhm. These results suggest that the model is, indeed, capable
of correctly identifying a manipulation known to aﬀect payoﬀ without aﬀecting the
eﬀectiveness of the induced rate of impulse ﬂow in driving reward intensity to a given
proportion of its maximal level. Along with the ﬁndings reported by Breton et al.
(2013), the results of this experiment establish that the Reinforcement Mountain
Model is a valid means of addressing which stage of processing a manipulation acts.
If the Reinforcement Mountain Model is a valid tool for identifying stages of
processing that are aﬀected by a manipulation, it can be used to isolate manipulations
of early stages of the stimulated reward circuitry from all other types of manipula-
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tions. For example, a lesion to the cell bodies from which primary reward ﬁbres orig-
inate would increase Fhm without altering Pe. A pharmacological intervention that
improves the eﬃcacy of the primary reward neurons’ input to the spatio-temporal in-
tegration process would decrease Fhm without altering Pe. A drug that decreases the
subjective eﬀort cost of lever-pressing would increase Pe without altering Fhm. A drug
that scales down the magnitude of all rewards by a constant factor would decrease Pe
without altering Fhm. With this new valid psychophysical tool, a world of possibilities
is opened for re-interpreting the eﬀect of a multitude of causal manipulations.
Moreover, the method used here is limited neither to electrical rewards nor
to lever-pressing. It would be possible to perform a similar analysis using a diﬀer-
ent reward—such as sucrose—of varying strength (like concentration), or a diﬀerent
manipulandum—such as a nose-poke hole—with varying work requirements (like time
spent). A similar logic would apply: the objective reinforcer, time spent, and caloric
expenditure involved would each be psychophysically mapped to subjective determi-
nants of choice, the scalar combination of which would be compared to the payoﬀ of
all other activities. By ﬁtting a similar “sucrose mountain,” varying sucrose concen-
tration and work requirements, one would be able to extract the stage at which a
manipulation has occurred.
2.4.2 A rat prospect theory?
The magnitude of the shifts in Pe from riskless to risky trials suggest that the
mapping between the objective probability of a prospect and the weight it carries in a
decision is linear. Indeed, the degree to which price must compensate for probability
in our hands is approximately what would be normatively expected if the probability
simply scaled by its reciprocal the opportunity cost of seeking rewarding brain stim-
ulation. Suppose the eﬀect of a reward delivered with 1/2 probability was to double
the subjective opportunity cost of the reward. In such a case, a simple halving of
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the price would compensate for the lowered probability. Similarly, if the eﬀect of a
reward delivered with 3/4 probability was to increase the subjective opportunity cost
by 4/3-fold, the probabilistic nature of the reward would be completely compensated
for by reducing the price by a factor of 3/4. The expected diﬀerence in Pe would
be a decrement of 0.125 common logarithmic units (the common log of 0.75) from
a probability of 1 to 0.75, and that expected diﬀerence would be a decrement of 0.3
common logarithmic units (the common log of 0.50) from a probability of 1 to 0.50.
The median shift in Pe from a probability of 1.00 to 0.75 was approximately 0.13598.
This suggests that the subjective impact of rewards delivered with 75% probability
was to devalue them by 73%, with an inter-quartile range spanning 68.4% to 84.1%.
Similarly, the median shift in Pe from a probability of 1.00 to 0.50 was approximately
0.33089. This shift implies that rewards delivered with 50% probability were devalued
by 47%, with an inter-quartile range spanning 38.9% to 57.9%.
Unlike what is observed in human participants asked to evaluate probabili-
ties in word-and-number problems (though see Hertwig et al., 2004), there was no
clear evidence of a non-linear mapping between objective probability and subjective
decision weight in our data. If we attribute a decision weight of 1 to a probability
of 1, the subjective decision weight of a reward delivered with 0.75 probability was
approximately 0.73, and that of a reward delivered with 0.50 probability was approx-
imately 0.46. It remains to be shown whether, like humans, the subjective decision
weight of very low probabilities is overweighted compared to the normative value.
Various groups (van Duuren et al., 2009; Burke and Tobler, 2011) have attempted to
record from populations of neurons while animals made choices among probabilistic
prospects. In all of these cases, the mapping of both magnitude and probability to
their subjective equivalents has been assumed linear for the purposes of correlating
activity to various determinants of decisions. The present study provides evidence
that, at least in the case of rewarding brain stimulation delivered with probabilities of
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0.75 and 0.50, the assumption of a one-to-one mapping holds at the level of precision
we were able to achieve.
The median shift in Fhm induced by a probabilistic reward is, as predicted
by the mountain model, within the level of session-to-session noise one would ex-
pect. However, the median shift in Pe induced by probabilistic rewards is large and
probability-dependent. Assuming the probabilistic nature of the reward alters only
the rat’s subjective evaluation of the opportunity costs of acquiring it, rather than
the payoﬀ from everything else or the subjective eﬀort costs of self-stimulation, the
shift in Pe can be used to derive the approximate subjective decision weight of the
risky reward. At a probability of 1, the subjective decision weight is necessarily 1:
the rat knows it will get rewarded if it invests a suﬃcient amount of time into lever
pressing at the expense of all other activities. At a probability of 0.5, normative
accounts of how the rat ought to allocate his time would dictate that, because the rat
must (on average) fulﬁl the work requirement twice in order to trigger an electrical
reward, the subjective opportunity cost ought to double. This would mean that if a
maximal reward delivered with certainty will require a price Pe1 to drive the payoﬀ
from self-stimulation to the same level as that of everything else, a maximal reward
delivered with a probability of 0.5 will require only half of Pe1 to drive its payoﬀ to
that of everything else. The subjective opportunity cost of that reward has eﬀectively
doubled. The data presented here provide evidence that the payoﬀ from rewards de-
livered with 0.75 and 0.5 probabilities is scaled by roughly 0.75 and 0.5 compared
to rewards delivered with certainty. Figure 2.9 provides a graphical representation
of the derived subjective weight of the two probabilities (the anti-log of the shift
riskless − risky) as a function of the objective probability of reinforcement, along
with the standard error of the mean surrounding this estimate. When looking across
rats, collapsing across lever mappings, the function is remarkably close to the identity







Figure 2.9. Derived subjective-to-objective mapping of probability. The dotted straight
line provides a reference for what the mapping of probability would be if subjective
risk were equal to objective probability. Assuming that P = 1.00 is subjectively
interpreted as 1.00, the anti-log of the change in Log10[Pe] from riskless to risky is an
index of the subjective probability. Blue circles indicate the mean derived subjective
probability of rewards (±SEM) delivered with P = 0.75 and P = 0.50 probabilities.
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2.4.3 General discussion
The purpose of the current experiment was two-fold: to conﬁrm the Reinforce-
ment Mountain Model’s validity in correctly identifying an eﬀect occurring beyond
the output of the spatiotemporal integrator, and to quantify the degree to which
various probabilities of reinforcement aﬀect the payoﬀ from self-stimulation. When
rats were presented with trials in which rewards were delivered probabilistically, we
observed no replicable, stationary, consistent diﬀerences in Fhm compared to trials in
which rewards were delivered deterministically. However, we observed large, consis-
tent and reliable changes in Pe that were dependent on the probability of reinforce-
ment. As a result, the evidence we present here supports all the predictions of the
model. The Reinforcement Mountain Model could correctly identify that probabilis-
tic reinforcement, which does not aﬀect the translation of stimulation strength into
subjective reward intensity, did not aﬀect reward circuitry prior to the output of the
peak detection stage, by showing no statistically reliable evidence of a change in Fhm.
Conversely, the Reinforcement Mountain Model correctly identiﬁed that probabilistic
reinforcement, which aﬀects the payoﬀ from self-stimulation, aﬀected reward circuitry
beyond the output of the peak detection stage, by showing overwhelming evidence of
a change in Pe. Furthermore, probabilistic reinforcement has a greater impact on the
payoﬀ when the probability is lower, and the diﬀerence in Pe between probabilistic
and deterministic trials was also probability-dependent.
The present experiment cements the validity of the Reinforcement Mountain
Model by providing the obverse set of predictions from Arvanitogiannis and Shizgal
(2008) and Breton et al. (2013). In those experiments, the Reinforcement Mountain
Model was shown to be a valid means of identifying that a manipulation acting prior
to the output of the peak detector, and not after, has occurred. In these experiments,
train duration (Breton et al., 2013; Arvanitogiannis and Shizgal, 2008) or pulse current
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(Arvanitogiannis and Shizgal, 2008) were altered, and changes in Fhm were observed in
the absence of changes in Pe (with some notable exceptions). In contrast, the present
experiment demonstrates that altering probability of reinforcement led to changes in
Pe in the absence of changes in Fhm.
With this valid measurement tool, it is now possible to identify the stage of
processing at which a large number of manipulations act. For example, the Rein-
forcement Mountain Model has been used to identify the stage of processing at which
cocaine (Hernandez et al., 2010), the dopamine transporter blocker GBR-12909 (Her-
nandez et al., 2012), the CB1 receptor antagonist AM-251 (Trujillo-Pisanty et al.,
2011), and the neuroleptic pimozide (Trujillo-Pisanty et al., 2012) act. The entire
catalogue of manipulations aﬀecting brain reward circuitry can be re-examined in the
Reinforcement Mountain Model context, providing a more reﬁned means of identi-
fying which manipulations alter the psychophysical mapping of stimulation strength
to subjective reward intensity, and which of them alter the payoﬀs of self-stimulation
and other activities, independently of the ﬁrst-stage neurons responsible for the re-
warding eﬀect. It would be very useful, indeed, to incorporate recent advances in
optogenetics with the Reinforcement Mountain Model to identify the source of the
rewarding eﬀect of electrical stimulation. ‘
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Chapter 3
The rat’s world model of session structure
3.1 Introduction
As an animal navigates its environment, it will come across patches where
food is bountiful, patches where food is scarce, patches where food is delectable and
patches where food is barely worth eating. Similarly, a patch where foraging will
provide a high payoﬀ (low cost, high quality food) at one moment may provide a
much lower payoﬀ (high cost or low quality food) at a later time. In order to select
actions advantageously, the animal stands to beneﬁt from a cognitive map of where
and when the payoﬀ from foraging will be high and when it will be low. When the
payoﬀ from pursuing food rewards is negligible, the advantageous choice is to pursue
other goals. If the payoﬀ from pursuing a reward changes predictably, an animal
beneﬁts tremendously from accurately developing and quickly updating a cognitive
model of how the payoﬀ from that reward changes over time.
In parametric paradigms entailing two- and three-dimensional measurement
of performance for brain stimulation reward, there are certainly periods of time in an
experimental session when the reward will have a high subjective intensity and the
cost of obtaining it will be low, as there are periods of time when it is suﬃciently
weak that the animal will prefer to engage in other activities in the operant chamber.
Indeed, in the randomized-triads design described in Chapter 2, the pattern of changes
in payoﬀ is largely predictable. Every three trials, a high-intensity, low-cost reward
will be delivered, every three trials, a reward of variable intensity and cost will be
delivered, and every three trials, a low-intensity reward will be delivered. These trials
are presented in sequential fashion for months at a time, leading to the question:
do rats working for brain stimulation reward develop a cognitive “map” of when the
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payoﬀ from self-stimulation will be particularly high and when it will be particularly
low? It would certainly be advantageous for the rat to be able to predict these changes
in strength and contingency, allowing it to select actions far more eﬃciently than if
it had to ﬁrst obtain a reward of potentially negligible intensity before implementing
a behavioural policy.
The following chapter concerns the existence of such a map, which we call a
“world model” of session structure. After establishing that rats working for BSRs
behave as if they had a model of the triad structure of an experimental session, we
attempt to uncover the rule they might use to infer the current trial’s payoﬀ.
3.1.1 World Model
In the commonly used curve-shift paradigm for inferring the eﬀects of manip-
ulations on self-stimulation behaviour (Miliaressis et al., 1986), stimulation strength
is systematically decreased, in logarithmic steps, from pulse currents, frequencies or
train durations that produce asymptotically high responding to those that produce
asymptotically low responding. The sequence of trials on these “sweeps” is repeated
for the duration of the session, systematically decreasing from very strong to very
weak and returning to strong. On average, the animal allocates all of its time re-
sponding to strong stimulation, and none of its time responding to weak stimulation.
However, researchers will sometimes ﬁnd anecdotally an animal that responds vigor-
ously, on a few select trials, to stimulation that should not be particularly motivating.
The duration of each trial is usually kept ﬁxed in these protocols, which means the
animal can, in principle, know when the stimulation will be highly rewarding again.
It is quite possible, in this light, that on some of those very weak stimulation trials,
the rat begins to expect that working at the lever will have a high payoﬀ soon.
Indeed, this account of self-stimulation behaviour implies that the rat has a
somewhat noisy internal “model” of the structure of the session. Following the trial
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on which the stimulation is weakest will be a trial on which the stimulation strength
has been reset to its maximum value, and following a trial on which the stimulation
strength is strong will be a trial on which the stimulation is slightly weaker. It
would behove the rat working for brain stimulation rewards, or indeed any reward,
to exploit the statistical regularities in the world within which it lives and to infer
the “kind” of trial that it is about to encounter, either with regard to the payoﬀ,
the strength, or the opportunity cost of the reward to come. The complex session
structure of the randomized design used in Chapter 2, which entails both predictable
and unpredictable features, provides a promising opportunity to probe the rat’s ability
to exploit the regularities inherent in our triad design and infer a payoﬀ for trials that
it would not be able to ascertain without an internal representation of the triad
structure of experimental sessions.
3.1.2 Introduction to the world model of triad structure
3.1.2.1 Common assumptions
Model-free reinforcement learning accounts of performance for rewards imply
that the rat keeps track only of the magnitude of the reward it receives. During
training, a rat only learns that certain trial states (like the blackout delay during
which the reward is delivered and all lever pressing activities that preceded it) have a
particular value. The rat can therefore base its decision to press on the cached value
of the current trial state, and if an action can be taken that will lead it to a better
total net reward when considering all the costs it will incur, the rat will take such an
action. When acting optimally—that is, when implementing an optimal policy—the
rat takes actions for which the total net reward it expects is maximal.
According to Bellman’s equation (Bellman, 1952), the total net reward at a
point in time can be recursively deﬁned as the sum of the current total net reward ob-
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tained, R(t), with the total discounted sum of future rewards expected when following
an optimal policy. The value of a state at time step t is the sum of the immediate
net reward at time step t with the discounted value of the next state, which is itself
the sum of the immediate net reward at time step t + 1 with the discounted value of
the state at time step t + 2, and so on. In other words, this formulation deﬁnes the
value of a state visited at time step t as
V (St) = R(t) + γ
∑
k
T (St = j, St+1 = k)V (St+1)
where γ is an exponential temporal discount factor and T is a function that returns
the probability of transitioning from state St = j to state St+1 = k.
In order to ﬁnd the total net reward from lever-pressing at time step t, then,
one would add to the (possibly zero) reward delivered at time step t the discounted
sum of the total net rewards from all trial states that can be reached from lever-
pressing at time step t, weighted by the probability that these states can be reached.
In the simple scenario where the states can be “lever up” and “lever down”, the
total net reward from lever-pressing will be the (possibly zero) reward delivered when
pressing summed with the temporally-discounted rewards obtained from continuing
to press at time t+1 and the temporally-discounted rewards obtained from engaging
in other activities at time step t + 1. Just before the end of the required response
interval (the price), the rat may choose to press, which will then lead to a reward, or
to engage in other activities which will not. If the delivery of a reward is surprising—
that is, the rat obtains a reward it may not have been expecting—then the rat must
alter its estimate of the value of all lever-pressing (and non-pressing) states that led
to this surprising reward. The value Vˆ (St) is updated for the time step just preceding
reward delivery. The updated values can then be used to shape a policy that is closer
to optimal. The next time the animal is in state St−1, just before the state that led
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to reward delivery, there will again be a discrepancy, which will prompt the animal
to update Vˆ (St−1). Eventually, the estimated value of states cease to change, and the
rat necessarily acts in a way that is optimal in the sense that it will pursue a policy
that will provide it with the greatest net reward at the highest rate.
This model-free learning account implies that the value of taking an action
in a state will be altered as a function of the discrepancy between the cached, or
expected, value of a state and the reward that is actually delivered. The rat has an
expectation for reward when the trial state is S at time t (Vˆ (St)), and an expectation
for reward from future trial states S ′ at time t + 1 (Vˆ (St+1)). As a result, at time
t, the rat expects that the state it is in will have value Vˆ (t) and that the next trial
state it visits will have value Vˆ (t + 1). If the net reward the rat obtains at time t
(R(t)) diﬀers from expected, then the discrepancy is
δ(t) = R(t) + γ
∑
k
T (St = j, St+1 = k)Vˆ (St+1) − Vˆ (St)
where R(t) is the net reward obtained at discrete time step t, γ is a temporal discount
factor, and T (St, S ′t+1) is the probability of transitioning from state S at time step t
to a state S ′ at time t + 1, and Vˆ (St+1) is the total net reward expected from future
states.
This delta describes the diﬀerence between the current estimate of the value
expected by being in state S at time step t, Vˆ (t), and the actual total net reward by
being in state S at time step t, R(t) + γT (St, S ′t+1)Vˆ (t + 1). The value of state S at
time t can then be updated based on this discrepancy by the following learning rule
(Dayan and Abbott, 2001)
Vˆ (St) ← Vˆ (St) + α · δ(t)
where α is a parameter that sets the learning rate. The value of a state will be
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updated at rate α to a unit step change in reward. With higher values of alpha, a
given discrepancy will drastically alter the total net reward expected the next time
the animal encounters state S; with lower values, a given discrepancy will have a very
small eﬀect on the expected total net reward.
From this formulation, it is clear that the animal does not learn the mapping
between current states and future states as a function of the actions it can take in the
current state. All that is learned by this scheme is the total discounted net reward
obtained in the current state. The rat learns throughout training the total discounted
net reward it can expect from lever-pressing states, and adjusts its estimate of this
value as the rewards and response requirements change. The rat’s decision to press—
its policy—will depend on the currently cached expected value of pressing.
Suppose, for example, that the rat has acquired during training an expectation
that lever-pressing for 1s will lead to a reward of maximum intensity. When the
conditions change, say the response requirement is increased to 4s and the reward
delivered is sub-maximal, the rat must update its evaluation of the total net reward
it can expect after it has held the lever for 1s and has not yet received a reward. As
it holds the lever and updates the total net reward it can expect from various trial
states, the rat’s estimate of those values converges on the “true” total net reward it
can expect by following an optimal policy, and learning ceases until conditions change
again. The rat must re-learn, as soon as brain stimulation is no longer at the expected
intensity or delivered at the expected time, the value of lever-pressing and non-lever
pressing states that may now be encountered.
3.1.2.2 Model-based reinforcement learning
In contrast, model-based formulations imply that the rat learns, in as simple a
sense as suﬃces, how states (and stimuli) are related to each other: taking a particular
action will lead to various trial states, each of which will bring about a net reward
- 95 -
that may depend on motivational variables internal to the rat. For example, the rat
may learn that pressing the lever for a period of time when it is extended will bring
about a blackout period accompanied by a subjective reward. In the case of a rat
working for food rewards, it may learn both that it receives a food reward of intensity
I and the ﬂavour F of the food reward that will be delivered. If the food is devalued,
either by selective satiety or by explicitly pairing the food with illness, a rat using a
model-based learning system will cease to respond on the lever.
The underlying mapping implies that rats behave as if they investigate a simple
decision tree. In the context of the experimental procedure I will describe below, the
mappings underlying a model-based account of session structure are: if the current
trial is a leading bracket, the payoﬀ will be high; if the current trial is a test trial, the
payoﬀ will be intermediate on average and selected at random from a ﬁnite set; if the
current trial is a trailing bracket, the payoﬀ will be low. Once that very simple tree
has been investigated, the rat need only implement an optimal policy based on the
payoﬀ it can expect from lever pressing in the state predicted to come. The cached
value of trial states for trials with a completely known payoﬀ need not be updated,
because they have in essence already been learned. Only during the test trial, when
there will be real variance to the payoﬀ that can be expected, must the rat update its
estimate. Without a model of how states of the world transition to each other, the
rat would have to re-learn the net reward from pressing on every trial, regardless of
whether the rewards and costs changed predictably.
Consider the case in which a rat that has learned a simple, yet, eﬀective world
model: Leading trials will deliver high-intensity rewards at a price of one second; they
are followed by test trials delivering variable reward intensities and prices that, on
average, provide an intermediate payoﬀ; they are followed by trailing trials delivering
low-intensity rewards at a price of one second and are followed by leading trials. As
the rat is about to begin a trial, the rat can look ahead in the decision tree to the
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correct state it will ﬁnd itself in for the trial to come, identify the series of decisions
it should take in order to maximize the total discounted net reward it will receive by
taking that series of actions, and simply implement this optimal policy. The total
discounted net reward it can expect to receive in any trial state for the trial to come
has been represented somewhere which requires no further updating. The simplest
state transition function, TS→S′ , is a 3x3 permutation matrix with rule “if the last
state was trailing, the next state is leading; if the last state was leading, the next
state will be test; if the last state was test, the net state will be trailing; no other
state transitions are allowed in the world.” The expected value of lever pressing in
each of those states, Vˆ (S ′), is also an easy function to describe: “if the state is a
leading bracket trial, the payoﬀ will be high; if the state is a test trial, the payoﬀ will
be variable and intermediate on average; if the state is a trailing bracket trial, the
payoﬀ will be low.” More complex state transition (T ) and value (Vˆ (S)) functions
are, obviously, also possible. The rat may count the number of trials, expecting a
low payoﬀ every three trials, a high payoﬀ every three trials, and a variable payoﬀ
every three trials. An exhaustive search is also possible: if the last trial was a leading
bracket trial with high payoﬀ, the next trial could be any of the diﬀerent test trials
with varying probability; if the last trial was one of those test trials, the next trial
is a trailing bracket trial with low payoﬀ; if the last trial was a trailing bracket trial,
the next trial will be a leading bracket trial.
We propose that instead of searching an exhaustive tree, the rat forms a state-
transition function for the sequence of trials, thereby eﬃciently using a simple world-
model of the trial sequence to retrieve a cached mean value of the payoﬀ it expects
from lever pressing as well as the variance in payoﬀ (or lack thereof), from the start
of the trial. The overall payoﬀ it expects can then set a policy that governs action
selection before the intensity and response requirements of the electrical reward it
can receive are known.
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3.1.2.3 Characteristics of the post-priming pause
In the randomized-trials design, high-payoﬀ trials are always followed by trials
with varying payoﬀ, which are always followed by trials with low payoﬀ, which are
subsequently followed by high-payoﬀ trials. Each trial is demarcated by the occur-
rence of a ten-second inter-trial interval, during which the overhead house light ﬂashes
and priming stimulation of constant, high pulse frequency is delivered 2s before the
trial begins. At this point in the trial, a rat with no world model whatsoever would
have no idea what the trial’s payoﬀ will be. Since there is no relevant state informa-
tion for re-evaluating the total net reward from lever-pressing, the rat’s best estimate
of the payoﬀ from lever-pressing will be its long-run expected value.
In contrast, a rat with even an elementary world model would have no problem
quickly adjusting the reward it expects from lever pressing. Supposing the rat had
built a world model whereby the state of the world depends on the state of the world
before the ﬂashing house light, the ﬂashing house light signals valuable information
about the total net reward the rat can expect to receive from lever-pressing. There is,
of course, also the possibility that the rat learns a much more complex state-transition
function which requires keeping track of what type of trial the previous trials were,
and inferring what type of trial it is in based on the number of trial types in the
cycle and the current phase. We suggest, instead, a simpler world model: the rat
categorizes the trial types in a way similar to the way we have categorized them,
and acts on its best guess of the current trial type based on a best guess of the trial
type that has just come to pass. Using such a world model allows the rat to rapidly
update the payoﬀ from lever-pressing, thanks to a richer representation of what is
meant by a state, incorporating both observable variables (lever-up, lever-down) and
extrapolated variables (leading, test, trailing). The decision to press or not can thus
be made quickly and without requiring the rat to slowly update the net rewards and
costs inherent to acquiring brain stimulation rewards.
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Once the rat begins pressing, it accumulates information about the objective
price as it holds down the lever. The rat may interrupt its pressing, returning to the
lever after some time, accumulating more information about the objective price until
the work requirement is satisﬁed and the lever is retracted. A reward is delivered,
with some probability that may or may not be 1, a blackout delay elapses, and the
lever extends back into the cage.
The critical period to test the existence of a world model of triad trial struc-
ture is the ﬁrst pause made as the trial begins. It occurs following the priming
stimulation delivered in the inter-trial interval; as a result, we call it the post-priming
pause (PPP). Throughout this period of time, the rat has no information to guide
its behaviour except for the world model it may have developed as a result of being
presented with triads repeatedly for weeks or months.
When the payoﬀ is high, it would behoove the rat to begin pressing as quickly
as possible, because the longer it waits, the fewer rewards it will be able to collect.
When the payoﬀ is low, the rat will beneﬁt much more from doing all the other things
it is possible for the rat to do in the operant chamber, such as exploring, grooming,
and resting. When the payoﬀ is unknown, but intermediate on average, the PPP will
be intermediate.
It follows that the PPP is an ideal period of time to analyze if we are to infer
whether the rat has developed a world model of the triad structure of the session. Not
only can we identify whether the rat behaves as if it has a world model, but we also
have a normative account of how long the duration of the PPP ought to be: short on
leading bracket trials, longer on test trials, and longest (possibly censored by the end
of the trial) on trailing bracket trials. A purely model-free account would make a very
diﬀerent prediction: on leading bracket trials following trailing trials, a PPP based
on the last payoﬀ would be longest; on test trials following leading bracket trials, the
PPP would be shortest; and on trailing trials, the PPP would be inversely related to
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the payoﬀ of the test trial that preceded it.
3.1.2.4 A description of the rat’s world model
On the null hypothesis that the rat maintains no model of the triad structure of
the session, the very ﬁrst pause it makes following the priming stimulation (the post-
priming pause, or PPP) will be independent of trial type. In this case, the duration of
the PPP will be, on average, the same for all trial types. If a model-free reinforcement
learning scheme governed their decision to wait before a press, the PPP will depend
on the payoﬀ of the last trial: long on leading trials (following trailing trials) and
short on test trials (following leading trials). On trailing trials, they will be inversely
related to the payoﬀ of the test trials that preceded them. This is because the rat
using a model-free reinforcement learning scheme will begin the next trial expecting
the payoﬀ it had received on the preceding trial. If, on the other hand, the rat has a
rule upon which to base the payoﬀ on the current trial, the PPP will depend on trial
type in a predictable manner: trial types with a high payoﬀ (leading bracket trials)
will have a short PPP, while trial types with a low payoﬀ (trailing bracket trials) will
have a long PPP. Whenever the payoﬀ of the trial cannot be known beforehand, as is
the case for test trials, the PPP will be independent of the payoﬀ to come—barring
some extraordinary form of rat prescience.
We propose that, rather than slowly updating the reward expected from press-
ing, the rat has a simple internal model of session structure. If there is a simple rule
to be found, it could either involve counting (lead-test-trail-repeat) or comparing (last
trial leading-like/test-like/trailing-like). Errors in either of these processes are cer-
tainly possible. It is not unreasonable to assume that a rat counting trials may lose
track of the trial type it is in while working for brain stimulation rewards. Similarly,
a rat comparing the last trial to its best-ﬁtting category may mis-classify a test trial.
We turn to these potential errors in world-model inference below.
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Assuming the rat is counting trials, errors in the count, and thus uncharacter-
istically long or short PPP durations, will be spread over all trials. On the other hand,
if the rat uses the reward contingency of the previous trial to gauge the current trial’s
type, the PPP will be uncharacteristically short on trailing bracket trials that follow
test trials that resemble the leading or trailing bracket trial. In essence, test trials
that are suﬃciently close in subjective intensity and opportunity cost to the trailing
bracket trial will lead a rat using this comparative rule to infer that the current trial
is a leading rather than a trailing bracket trial, resulting in an uncharacteristically
short PPP. Similarly, test trials that are suﬃciently close in subjective intensity and
opportunity cost to the leading bracket trial will lead a rat using a single trial look-
back rule to infer that the current trial is a test rather than a trailing bracket trial,
resulting in a PPP of equally uncharacteristic duration.
Figure 3.1 shows a diagram of our proposed simpliﬁed world model when work-
ing in a randomized-triads experiment. The rat maintains a simple set of rules, en-
capsulated in the estimated state-transition function TˆS→S′ , that provide the rat with
an estimate of the subjective opportunity cost (Pˆst+1) and reward intensity (Iˆbsrt+1)
on the trial to come based on the cached subjective opportunity cost (Pˆst) and reward
intensity (Iˆbsrt) on the trial that has just elapsed. The expected payoﬀ from the up-
coming trial (E[Ut]) is simply a scalar combination of the estimates provided by the
state-transition function. This expected payoﬀ can then set the duration of the PPP.
When the PPP terminates uncensored, it necessarily terminates on a hold, which
allows the rat to continuously update the subjective opportunity cost of stimulation
for the current trial. When the price is paid and the lever retracts, the objective price
(and therefore, the subjective opportunity cost) is transparently known, at least in
principle. If the reward is delivered with certainty, lever retraction also coincides with
delivery of the BSR, which allows the rat to update its estimate of the intensity of













































Figure 3.1. Diagram of the proposed world model of session triad structure. Over
the course of the trial, the rat obtains an estimate of the subjective opportunity cost
(Ps) and reward intensity (Ibsr) in eﬀect, which together deﬁne the state of a trial
in the session. The rat has learned a state-transition function (TˆS→S′) that describes
how the state of the last trial (S) transitions to the state of a new trial (S′). This
state-transition function allows the rat to make a prediction about the opportunity
cost (Pˆs) and reward intensity (Iˆbsr) that can be expected on the trial to come, cued
by the inter-trial interval. The elements of the state also allow the rat to make a
prediction of the payoﬀ from self-stimulation than can be expected on the trial to
come (E[Ubt ]). Lever-pressing allows the rat to revise its estimate of the opportunity
cost, and reward delivery allows the rat to revise its estimate of the reward intensity,
which could, in principle, be updated continuously throughout the entire trial. By
the end of the trial, the rat uses the estimate of Ps and Ibsr along with the state
transition function to predict conditions on the next trial. Assuming performance
depends on an estimate of the payoﬀ, the period of time between delivery of the
priming stimulation during the inter-trial interval and the ﬁrst lever-press produced
by the rat (post-priming pause, PPP) is an estimate of the expectation the rat has
of the trial to come.
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tion of the previous trial’s subjective opportunity cost and reward intensity (or those
it had inferred if those values were not updated) as well as a representation of the
current trial’s determinants of decision. If the rat begins lever-pressing, these values
are updated as the rat earns a reward. If the rat earns no rewards, the current trial’s
expected opportunity cost and reward intensity are not updated. When the ﬂashing
house light signals a new trial, the most recent estimates of subjective opportunity
cost and reward intensity are used to infer what the opportunity cost and intensity
will be.
To test whether there is any evidence of a world model, we assessed the du-
ration of this PPP as a function of trial type. Moreover, we tested which of the two
rules—counting or comparison—accounted best for the pattern of PPP durations if
this duration was reliably related to trial type. Finally, we gauged the degree to which
the test trial needed to be similar to the leading bracket trial to induce a mistake if
rats indeed used a rule based on comparison. Taken together, the ﬁndings from each
of these analyses provide support for the working hypothesis depicted in ﬁgure 3.1.
3.2 Methods
3.2.1 Behavioural protocol
The data analysed are a subset of the results presented in Chapter 2. Ten rats
were the same as in Chapter 2, and thus underwent the protocol described above.
Since for all of these rats, except MA5, the active lever on risk-based test trials was
diﬀerent than on leading and trailing bracket trials, we focus here on only those triads
for which the probability of reinforcement was one. It would be easy for an animal to
learn the repeating pattern of trial types in a triad when the active lever during test
trials is diﬀerent from the active lever during bracket trials; the results reported here
concern only those trials which could potentially pose confusion to the rats, when
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the active lever is the same for all trial types. All leading trials preceding a test trial
for which the reward was not delivered with certainty, all trailing trials following a
test trial for which the reward was not delivered with certainty, and all test trials for
which the reward was not delivered with certainty were excluded from the analyses
reported here.
The data from the ten subjects of the probability discounting experiment were
supplemented by data from six subjects of a subjective-price study carried out by
Rebecca Solomon. These six rats received implants similar to those in the probability
discounting experiment, using the same surgical and screening protocols as described
in Chapter 2. For animals F3, F9, F12, F16, F17 and F18, a train of electrical
stimulation pulses was delivered when the lever had been held for a cumulative amount
of time deﬁned as the objective price. Throughout a trial, signalled in the same way
as the animals that underwent the probability discounting experiment, the objective
price and pulse frequency delivered were held constant. The duration of the trial was
the larger of 25 times the objective price and 25 seconds.
3.2.1.1 Screening and training
For animals F3, F9, F12, F16, F17 and F18, following surgical implantation
and screening for self stimulation, as described in Chapter 2, animals were presented
with trials during which the price was kept constant at 4s, and the pulse frequency
of the electrical stimulation decreased in constant common logarithmic steps. This
frequency sweep training entailed presenting the same ten trials repeatedly for a
maximum of 4 hours, where the ﬁrst and second trials had identical price and pulse
frequency, and trials 3 through 10 of the series delivered decreasing pulse frequencies
when the lever was held for a cumulative 4 seconds. The current (as high as the rat
could tolerate), train duration (500 ms), and pulse duration (0.1ms) were kept con-
stant throughout all phases of the experiment. Pulse frequencies were adjusted such
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that they spanned the dynamic range of performance, from high frequencies resulting
in asymptotically high performance to low frequencies resulting in asymptotically low
performance. Frequency sweep training was conducted until there was little variabil-
ity in performance from ones series presentation to the next, as determined by visual
inspection.
After frequency sweep training, rats were presented with trials during which
the pulse frequency was kept constant at the highest pulse frequency the animal could
tolerate. The objective price of the electrical stimulation increased in constant loga-
rithmic steps from one trial to the next. This price sweep training entailed presenting
the same ten trials repeatedly for a maximum of 4 hours, where the ﬁrst and second
trials had identical price and pulse frequency, and trials 3 through 10 of the series
required increasing cumulative amounts of time to be spent holding the lever (the ob-
jective price) in order for an electrical reward to be delivered. Objective prices were
adjusted such that they spanned the dynamic range of performance, from low prices
resulting in asymptotically high performance to high prices resulting in asymptoti-
cally low performance, as above. Price sweep training was conducted until there was
little variability in performance from one series of ten trials to the next, determined
by visual inspection.
3.2.1.2 Randomized triads training
Following training, rats were presented with the randomized sweep procedure
described in Chapter 2, drawing test trials without replacement from the following
aggregated list of price-frequency pairs:
the 9 pulse frequencies at an objective price of 4s that were presented at the end of
frequency sweep training (frequency pseudo-sweep),
the 9 prices at the highest pulse frequency the animal could tolerate that were pre-
sented at the end of price sweep training (price pseudo-sweep), and
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9 prices and frequencies arrayed along a line extending from the intersection of the
frequency and price pseudo-sweeps to the presumed coordinates of Fhm and Pe, in
log-log space (radial pseudo-sweep).
The presumed coordinates of Fhm and Pe were estimated at ﬁrst by using
the pulse frequency that produced half-maximal performance during frequency sweep
training (for Fhm) and the price that produced half-maximal performance during price
sweep training (for Pe). The list of price frequencies and pulses was adjusted through-
out this phase of the experiment to ensure each pseudo-sweep drove performance from
maximum to minimum. Triads (leading bracket-test-trailing bracket) were presented
for a maximum of 8 hours per session in this phase; in most cases, presentation of all
the trials in the randomized list (a survey) required only one experimental session to
complete.
Before beginning experimental sessions described below, rats were given a ﬁnal
set of frequency sweep training sessions, conducted as above, but with the objective
price set to 0.125 seconds. This ensured that any competing motor eﬀects did not
interfere with the animal’s performance at this very low price; if the maximum pro-
portion of time an animal could allocate to self-stimulation activities in this condition
was below 0.6, the duration of the blackout delay (during which the reward was de-
livered) was increased from 2s to 4s for only those animals in the 0.125s frequency
pseudo-sweep described below.
3.2.1.3 Randomized triads procedure
In the case of rats DE1, DE3, MA5, DE7, PD8, DE14, DE15, DE19 and DE20,
experimental sessions were arranged in the same triad structure as the preliminary,
three-pseudo sweep randomized design: a leading bracket trial preceded every test
trial, and a trailing bracket trial followed every test trial.
In the case of rats F3, F9, F12, F16, F17 and F18, test trials were chosen to
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maximize a sampling of the parameter space (log-frequency and log-price) in very low
price regions, in order to assess the degree to which decreases in price fail to require
compensatory decreases in frequency to maintain a given level of performance. The
parameters of test trials (price-frequency pairs) for rats F12, F16, F17 and F18 were
sampled without replacement from a list that contained:
14 pulse frequencies at an objective price of 8s (8s frequency pseudo-sweep),
14 pulse frequencies at an objective price of 4s (4s frequency pseudo-sweep),
14 pulse frequencies at an objective price of 2s (2s frequency pseudo-sweep),
14 pulse frequencies at an objective price of 1s (1s frequency pseudo-sweep),
14 pulse frequencies at an objective price of 0.5s (0.5s frequency pseudo-sweep),
14 pulse frequencies at an objective price of 0.25s (0.25s frequency pseudo-sweep),
14 pulse frequencies at an objective price of 0.125s (0.125s frequency pseudo-sweep),
14 objective prices at the highest pulse frequency the animal could tolerate (price
pseudo-sweep), and
14 pulse frequencies and prices arrayed along a ray extending from the intersection
of the 4s frequency pseudo-sweep and the price pseudo-sweep to the presumed coor-
dinates of Fhm and Pe, in log-log space.
For rats F3 and F9, only 9 pulse frequencies were presented, with the central
5 presented twice as often, as described in chapter 2.
An example of the nine pseudo-sweeps from which test trials were sampled
is provided in Figure 3.2. Points along any given pseudo-sweep for rats F12, F16,
F17 and F18 were spaced such that the most extreme two values at each end of the
sweep were spaced twice as far apart as the central ten. While the highest and lowest
two frequencies might be spaced 0.1 common logarithmic units apart, the central ten
would be spaced 0.05 common logarithmic units apart.
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Figure 3.2. Arrangement of pseudo-sweeps in subjective-price study. For rats F12,
F16, F17 and F18, price-frequency pairs were sampled at random from the vectors de-
picted here. Red squares indicate the 4s frequency pseudo-sweep, blue circles indicate
the price pseudo-sweep, and green diamonds indicate the radial sweep. These pseudo-
sweeps are analogous to the three pseudo-sweeps collected from rats in Chapter 2.
Magenta triangles (from bright to black) indicate the extra frequency pseudo-sweeps
collected at low (bright magenta, 0.125s) to high (black, 8s) prices. In the case of rats
F3 and F9, the price-frequency pairs were obtained as in Chapter 2: nine diﬀerent
pairs per pseudo-sweep were obtained, with the middle 5 sampled twice as often as
the extreme 4. In the case of F12, F16, F17 and F18 depicted here, 14 diﬀerent
price-frequency pairs were obtained from each pseudo-sweep, where the extreme 4
were twice as spread as the centre 10. In the example here, the diﬀerence between
the highest and second-highest price of the price pseudo-sweep is 0.27 common log




Rats F3, F9, F12, F16, F17 and F18 encountered a large number of very low
objective prices. As a result, a modiﬁed version of the mountain model was ﬁt to the
data for these animals. Rather than assume that decreases in price in the low range
required compensatory increases in pulse frequency to maintain a constant level of
performance, the model that was ﬁt assumed that the relevant decision variable was
the subjective opportunity cost of self-stimulation. It would indeed be unreasonable
to assume that a change in objective price from 0.001 to 0.002 seconds requires the
same proportional change in pulse frequency as a change from 4 to 8 seconds in
order to motivate the rat to work. As a result, we assumed that the psychophysical
mapping between objective prices and subjective opportunity costs is scalar at high
prices and is constant at very low prices: the subjective opportunity cost of holding
for 0.125 seconds would be equivalent to that of holding for 0.25 seconds, but the
subjective opportunity cost of holding for 8 seconds would be twice that of holding
for 4 seconds. Solomon et al. (2007) have already established that such a mapping can
account for choice between two levers that deliver stimulation of diﬀering price. The
Reinforcement Mountain Model that was ﬁt to the time allocation data generated
by these animals therefore included two extra parameters: the minimum subjective
opportunity cost (SPmin), below which further decreases in objective price do not
change the opportunity cost, and the sharpness of the transition between this region
and the scalar region (SPbend). Estimates of the parameters in the set of equations


















were inferred using the bootstrapping approach described in Chapter 2. Details of the
subjective opportunity cost model have been previously described in Solomon et al.
(2007).
The mapping between objective price and subjective opportunity cost was
then inferred from parameters SPmin and SPbend using the ﬁrst equation above in
rats F3, F9, F12, F16, F17 and F18. The psychophysical mapping of pulse frequency
to subjective reward intensity was inferred from the parameters Fhm and G that
were ﬁt from the Reinforcement Mountain Model using the second equation above.
Payoﬀ was deﬁned as the ratio of the relative subjective reward intensity (Irel) to the
subjective opportunity cost (Ps).
3.2.2.1 Robust Analysis of Variance
To determine whether the rats could detect the type of trial that had just
begun, before any information about the stimulation strength and opportunity cost
of the reward had been revealed, we extracted the duration of the ﬁrst pause at
the start of the trial, immediately following priming stimulation delivered during the
inter-trial interval. This post-priming pause (PPP) reﬂects a period of time before
the animal even begins to work, thereby giving a preliminary indication of the payoﬀ
the rat expects to receive on the trial to come. If the trial began with the rat holding
down the lever, the post-priming pause was assigned 0 duration. Systematic changes
in PPP related to the triad trial types (leading, test, and trailing) would indicate
systematic diﬀerences from trial type to trial type in the animal’s expectancy for the
trial to come. This systematic expectancy forms the basis for what we term the rat’s
world model, in the sense that the rat behaves as if he has a model of the world upon
which to base expectations for the payoﬀ to come.
In some cases, there are many instances of PPPs that were censored by the
end of the trial; the rat simply did not press for the duration of the trial in these
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cases. As a result, we used robust estimates of central tendency and variability, and
performed a one-way robust ANOVA on the PPP durations for each trial type. To
calculate the robust ANOVA, PPP durations were assigned weights according to the
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using a bisquare tuning constant (c) of 4.4685, and the median PPP duration
(y˜) of the trial type, where MAD is the median absolute deviation from the median.
The resulting robust estimate of the mean PPP duration for a trial type was the
weighted sum of the durations divided by the sum of the weights. The grand mean
PPP duration across all trial types was the weighted sum of all durations divided by
the sum of all weights.
The (robust) total sum of squared deviations of PPP durations from the grand
mean PPP duration (SST ) was, similarly, the sum of the weighted squared deviation
of PPP durations from the grand mean duration. The error term is the (robust)
sum of squared deviations of individual PPP durations from their mean trial type
PPP duration (SSS/A), calculated similarly to SST . As total variability (SST ) can be
partitioned into variability due to diﬀerent trial types (SSA) and variability due to
noise in the process that generates PPP durations (SSS/A), the diﬀerence SST −SSS/A
is a measure of the variability that can be attributed to diﬀerences in trial type.















which smoothly varies the degrees of freedom in error for k groups between 0 (when
all weights are 0) to n1 −1+n2 −1+ . . .+nk −1 (when all weights are 1). As a result,
the robust error variance (MSS/A) is the robust SSS/A divided by the robust dfS/A,
where dfS/A is a real (rather than integer) number. The variance in PPP duration
due to trial type is the robust SSA divided by 2, as there were only 3 trial types. The
F test then proceeded as in the non-robust case, taking the ratio MSA/MSS/A, using
a real-valued rather than integer-valued dfS/A.
If the F ratio was found to be statistically signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level, three
Bonferroni-corrected post-hoc tests were conducted: leading trial vs test trial, test
trial vs trailing trial, and trailing trial vs leading trial PPP durations. Each com-
parison used the robust methods described above, calculating the grand mean and
the variance in PPP duration within trial type conditions only across the two groups
being compared.
3.3 Results
3.3.1 Duration of the post-priming pause on each trial type
Figure 3.3 depicts a bar graph, for each rat and in each condition they encoun-
tered, of the relationship between trial type and PPP duration. On leading bracket
trials, the duration of the PPP is often very short, while on trailing bracket trials,
the PPP is generally censored at 25 seconds by the end of the trial. On test trials,
the duration of the PPP is greater than the leading bracket trial (ranging from 0.24
to 12.25 seconds longer). The duration of the PPP on test trials is also always much
shorter than on trailing trials (ranging from 6.2 to 23.7 seconds shorter). Although
there is variability between animals in the mean duration of this pause, there is little
variability in their pattern: on leading bracket trials, the PPP is nearly 0, on trailing
bracket trials, the PPP is usually censored by the end of the trial at 25 seconds, and
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Figure 3.3. Post-priming pauses depend on triad trial type. Top panel shows, for each
rat in each condition, the mean PPP on leading bracket, test, and trailing bracket
trials. In every case, there is a lawful (short, medium, long) relationship between the
payoﬀ on the trial to come and the duration of the ﬁrst pause taken. Lower left panel
shows a box-whisker plot of the durations, with the means indicated with squares.
Lower right panels show examples of the best (bottom, F12, η2 = 1), typical (middle,
DE1, η2 = 0.9) and worst (top, DE3, η2 = 0.44) cases in which trial type predicts the
duration of the PPP in terms of their η2 value. Bar graphs on far right show robust
mean PPP durations with their associated robust standard errors for each trial type.
- 113 -
the PPP on test trials is somewhere between that of the two bracket trials, with a
median 3 seconds longer than on the leading bracket and 19.11 seconds shorter than
on the trailing bracket. Since there is no way for the rat to know the current trial
type without having developed a world model of how the current trial type is related
to previously seen trials, these results provide very strong evidence for the existence
of a world model of the randomized trials design.
The robust ANOVA revealed a statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect of trial type on
PPP duration in all 15 animals tested, and in all conditions the rats encountered
(p<0.0001 in all cases). The magnitude of this eﬀect, as calculated by η2, ranged
from 0.44 to nearly 1.0, indicating that the vast majority of the variance in PPP du-
ration throughout the experiment could be accounted for by diﬀerences in trial type,
for all rats. Bonferroni-corrected post-hoc comparisons of each test trial showed that
each trial type was characterized by a distinct PPP duration, in the expected direc-
tion: PPPs on trailing bracket trials were signiﬁcantly longer than leading bracket
(p<0.0001 in all cases) or test trials (p<0.0001 in all cases), and PPPs on leading
bracket trials were signiﬁcantly shorter than those on test trials (p<0.0001 in all
cases).
The bottom left panel of Figure 3.3 is a box-whisker plot of the mean PPP
on leading bracket, test, and trailing trials. Overlain on the plot is the mean PPP
for each animal in each condition encountered at the start of each trial type. The
pattern seen in the aggregate is equivalent to that seen on a rat-by-rat basis: the
PPP is reliably shorter on leading bracket trials than on trailing bracket trials, and
though mean PPP durations vary greatly between animals on test trials, they tend
to have a duration that is intermediate between leading and trailing bracket trials.
The bottom right panel of Figure 3.3 shows three examples of the mean and
standard errors surrounding the robust estimates of the PPP duration on leading
bracket, test, and trailing bracket trials. The topmost bar graph shows animal DE3 in
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the second phase of the P1vp5 condition (during which the levers mapped to rewards
delivered with certainty and those delivered with a probability of 0.5 are switched
compared to the previous condition). This case represents the series of post-priming
pauses for which trial type accounted for the least variance in PPP duration (η2 was
0.44). For comparison, we also show a typical result (DE1, P1vp75 condition, centre
bar graph; η2 was 0.90) and the data set for which almost all the variance in PPP
duration could be accounted for by trial type (F12, bottom bar graph; η2 was nearly
1.00). The aggregate pattern seen in the upper and lower left panels results from
the same pattern seen in each animal, with variation between subjects only in the
absolute values of the diﬀerent pause durations, but not their overall ordering.
If this is true, there must be some type of rule by which rats use either the
price and pulse frequency in eﬀect on the previous trial or the current position in the
triad to infer the current trial’s payoﬀ. The following section will attempt to answer
what kind of rule they may be using by considering the PPP on trailing bracket trials,
which follows a test trial of variable price and pulse frequency.
3.3.2 Heuristic for trial position
3.3.2.1 Analysis
Two complementary strategies may be used to infer the payoﬀ to be expected
on a given trial in the triad. The ﬁrst and simplest strategy would be to consider
the characteristics of the trial that has just come to pass. Predicting the leading
bracket trial, with its ﬁxed high payoﬀ, is trivial, because it always follows a trailing
bracket trial, with ﬁxed low payoﬀ. However, avoiding this prediction following a
low-payoﬀ test trial would be diﬃcult. Predicting the occurrence of the test trial
(though not its payoﬀ) is similarly easy, because it, too, follows a trial with a ﬁxed
payoﬀ. With enough exemplars of test trial payoﬀs, an expectation can be formed
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for the trial that follows a trial with exceptionally high payoﬀ. However, avoiding
this prediction following a high-payoﬀ test trial would be diﬃcult. Finally, although
predicting the payoﬀ of the trailing bracket trial is easy because it is ﬁxed, the trailing
bracket occurs after a trial with pseudo-randomly selected payoﬀs. If the rat were to
use this one-trial look-back strategy, it could be misled on the trailing trial by the
payoﬀ presented on the test trial. A particularly high-payoﬀ test trial would mislead
the rat into making a post-priming pause on the next (trailing bracket) trial more
characteristic of a test trial, whereas a particularly low-payoﬀ test trial would mislead
the rat into making a post-priming pause on the next (trailing bracket) trial more
characteristic of a leading bracket trial.
Assuming the rat uses a single-trial look-back rule to infer the payoﬀ on the
current trial, there is one set of test trials that will lead the rat to confuse a test trial
for a leading bracket trial: when the price is 1 second and the stimulation delivers a
maximal reward. As a result of confusing the test trial with a leading bracket trial,
the PPP that the rat takes on the trailing bracket trial should be shorter than usual.
The rat will be led to believe that the current trial is a test trial when, in fact, it is
a trailing bracket trial.
Similarly, the rat will confuse a test trial for a trailing trial when the price for
stimulation during the test trial is 1 second and the stimulation is weak. As a result
of confusing the test trial with a trailing bracket trial, the PPP that the rat takes
on the trailing bracket trial should also be shorter than usual. The rat will be led to
believe that the current trial is a leading bracket trial when, in fact, it is a trailing
bracket trial.
A second, more cognitively demanding solution is to maintain a representation
of both the trial type sequence (as above) and the animal’s current position in the
sequence. A rat exclusively using this second strategy may be inaccurate in its count,
resulting in uncharacteristically short pauses on trailing bracket trials that are inde-
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pendent of the payoﬀ on the test trials that preceded them. Whereas using a one-trial
look-back rule for retrieving stored transitions would produce systematic diﬀerences
in PPP duration on trailing bracket trials as a function of test trial opportunity costs
and reward intensities, a counting model would produce no such systematic diﬀer-
ences.
Test trials that resemble the leading or bracket trials will induce an error—
that is, uncharacteristically short PPPs—if the animal is using a single-trial look-back
strategy. To determine whether the payoﬀ on the previous test trial had an impact
on the post-priming pause at the start of the following trailing trial, we conducted a
one-way robust ANOVA on the PPP durations during trailing trials that followed test
trials on which the price was 1s (the price in eﬀect during leading and trailing bracket
trials) for each particular reward intensity for each rat. One-way robust ANOVAs were
also conducted on the PPP durations that followed test trials delivering the highest
pulse frequency of each frequency pseudo-sweep (thereby making them similar to
leading bracket trials delivering high-frequency stimulation at a 1s price), as well as all
those delivering the lowest pulse frequency of each frequency pseudo-sweep (thereby
making them similar to trailing bracket trials delivering low-frequency stimulation
at a 1s price). Bonferroni-corrected post-hoc tests were conducted following each
ANOVA to identify PPP durations that were signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the others
based on the price and frequency encountered on the previous trial.
3.3.2.2 Confusing trials
Figure 3.4 shows the mean (and standard error) estimated PPP on trailing
bracket trials as a function of the subjective reward intensity of the test trial that
preceded it, when that test trial delivered stimulation at a 1 second price (the price of
the leading and trailing bracket trials). In all cases, the robust ANOVA is statistically
signiﬁcant at the 0.0001 level and accounts for a large proportion of variance in PPP
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Figure 3.4. “Leading”-like and “trailing”-like test trials induce an error on subsequent
true trailing trials. The mean PPP duration (±SEM) on the trailing bracket trial is
plotted as a function of the subjective reward intensity in eﬀect on the preceding test
trial, when the price in eﬀect on that test trial was 1s (circles). When the last trial had
a similar price and reward intensity as a leading trial (high reward intensity, 1s price),
rats make uncharacteristically short post-priming pauses on the subsequent trailing
trial that are similar to those made following true leading trials (diamonds). When
the last trial had a similar price and reward intensity as a trailing trial (low reward
intensity, 1s price), rats also make uncharacteristically short post-priming pauses that
are similar to those made following true trailing trials (triangles).
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duration (η2 ranged from 0.44 to 0.82). Most notably, when the test trial presented
rewards of either negligible or nearly maximal magnitude at a 1s price, rats make
reliably shorter PPPs, while at intermediate magnitudes, rats make PPPs typical of
the trailing trial overall. In many cases, the PPPs produced following test trials in
which reward intensity was highest (“leading”-like test trials) and lowest (“trailing”-
like test trials) are comparable to those produced following true leading and trailing
bracket trials. Bonferroni-corrected post-hoc tests on the PPP durations revealed
signiﬁcant diﬀerences (p<0.0001 in all cases) between these PPP durations following
test trials delivering either near-minimal or near-maximal reward intensities at a
1 second price, and the PPP duration following the test trial which delivered an
intermediate (the 5th highest in the case of rats F3 and F9, or the 8th highest in the
case of rats F12 through F18) subjective reward intensity at a 1 second price. In eﬀect,
rats presented with “leading”-like test trials are misled to believe the trailing bracket
is a test trial and make shorter pauses before beginning to work for stimulation they
would otherwise ignore. Similarly, rats presented with “trailing”-like test trials are
misled to believe the trailing bracket is a leading bracket trial and make very short
pauses before working for stimulation they would otherwise ignore. In contrast, when
rats are presented with test trials that are neither “leading”- nor “trailing”-like are
not misled and ignore the weak stimulation they can expect to receive on trailing
bracket trials.
Figure 3.5 is a depiction of the duration of the PPP on the trailing bracket
trial when that trial follows a potentially misleading test trial. In the top panel, the
mean PPP on trailing trials that follow a “leading”-like test trial is plotted in dark
grey for each rat, along with the overall mean PPP on trailing trials (black bars) and
the mean PPP on trials that follow true leading bracket trials (light grey bars). In
the bottom panel, the mean PPP on trailing trials that follow a “trailing”-like test
trial is plotted in dark grey for each rat, along with the overall mean PPP on trailing
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Figure 3.5. Misleading test trials induce unusually short post-priming pauses on sub-
sequent trailing trials. In the upper panel, mean PPP duration for each animal is
plotted as a function of whether it follows a true leading bracket (light), a test trial
that is similar to a leading bracket (dark) or a test trial that is not similar to a leading
bracket (black). In the lower panel, mean PPP duration for each animal is plotted
as a function of whether it follows a true trailing bracket (light), a test trial that
is similar to a trailing bracket (dark) or a test trial that is not similar to a trailing
bracket (black).
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trials (black bars) and the mean PPP on trials that follow true trailing bracket trials
(light grey bars). In all cases, the mean PPP is uncharacteristically short, indicating
some degree of confusion. In 4 of 6 cases, the mean PPP on trailing trials that follow
a “leading”-like test trial is comparable to the mean PPP on test trials that follow
a “true” leading bracket trial. Similarly, in 4 of 6 cases, the mean PPP on trailing
trials that follow a “trailing”-like test trial is comparable to the mean PPP on leading
trials that follow a “true” trailing trial.
These results are consistent with the hypothesis that rats rely a great deal
on the subjective reward intensity and price of the previous trial to infer an as-yet
unknown payoﬀ. Although in 2 of 6 cases the mean PPP is substantially greater
than expected when using only a single trial look-back rule, the mean PPP is still
substantially lower than expected when using only a counting rule. Since these two
rules are not mutually exclusive, a rat could potentially rely on both at any given
time. Alternately, it is possible that the rat can discriminate between the subjective
reward intensity delivered on maximally confusing test trials and the bracket trials
for which they would be confused. If the rat can easily discriminate between a reward
with a subjective reward intensity of 0.01 and one with a subjective reward intensity
of 0.02, the test trial will not suﬃciently resemble the trailing trial to mislead the rat.
If test trials that resemble in price and pulse frequency the leading (or trailing)
bracket trial produce uncharacteristically short post-priming pauses, the question
becomes: to what degree must the price of stimulation on the test trial diﬀer from
the leading or trailing bracket trials to induce this confusion? It is to this question
that we now turn.
3.3.2.3 A Gradient
Given that rats are susceptible to confusing strong-stimulation/low-price test
trials with the leading trial, it would be interesting to determine which prices induce
- 121 -
this confusion and which ones do not. The generalization gradient—that is, the
relationship between the objective price on a test trial and its ability to confuse the
rat into behaving as if the following trial is a test trial—will reﬂect the type of heuristic
used to infer the next trial. As the rat does not have access to the pulse frequency of
the stimulation, any rule for inferring the next trial type will involve the subjective
intensity of the rewarding eﬀect. However, the rat could use the objective price and
subjective intensity in its table lookup strategy, the subjective opportunity cost and
subjective intensity, or the payoﬀ (the scalar combination of subjective opportunity
cost and intensity) of the previous trial to infer the identity of the next trial. In
essence, if the basis for determining whether the last trial was a leading bracket trial
involves a comparison of the last trial’s objective price with the leading bracket trial’s
objective price, then the gradient for generalization will be steep: if the last trial
presented rewards at an objective price that is not reasonably close to one second,
the rat’s hypothesis that the last trial was a leading bracket trial will be accurately
rejected and the rat will not confuse the following trailing bracket trial for a test
trial. However, if the basis for determining the trial type of the last trial is the
subjective opportunity cost of acquiring BSRs, then the gradient for generalization
will be considerably shallower: if the last trial presented rewards at any of a number
of objective prices that leads to the same subjective opportunity cost, the rat will
fail to reject the hypothesis that the last trial was a leading trial and will therefore
confuse the following trailing bracket trial for a test trial.
To investigate this generalization gradient and determine how the objective
price on the preceding test trial relates to the PPP on the trailing bracket trial that
follows it, we performed the same robust ANOVA on the duration of trailing trials
as a function of the price of the test trial that preceded them for test trials that
delivered the highest stimulation frequency available. Bonferroni-corrected post-hoc
tests were then conducted on these data to assess which test trials were followed by
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Figure 3.6. A generalization gradient of the similarity of “leading”-like test trials to
true leading trials. The duration of the PPP (± SEM) taken on trailing bracket trials
is plotted as a function of the objective price in eﬀect on the preceding test trial
(circles), when that test trial delivered very strong stimulation that is similar to that
delivered on a true leading bracket trial (triangles).
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uncharacteristically low PPPs on the trailing trial. In every case, the robust ANOVA
was statistically signiﬁcant at the 0.0001 level, and accounted for 44% to almost 100%
of the variance in PPP duration. These results are summarized in ﬁgure 3.6.
Figure 3.6 depicts this generalization gradient for each rat by plotting the
duration of the trailing trial PPP as a function of the price in eﬀect during the
“leading”-like test trial that preceded it. Figure 3.7 depicts the generalization gradient
by plotting the duration of the trailing trial PPP as a function of the price in eﬀect
during the “trailing”-like test trial that preceded it. In most cases, there is a threshold-
like relationship between PPP and the objective price of the preceding test trial, with
uncharacteristically low PPPs below 4s and the typical, censored PPP following test
trials delivering rewards at a four- or eight-second price.
3.3.2.4 Is this a stimulus or a decision variable discrimination?
It is clear from these data that the objective price is an important determinant
of whether an animal that uses a single trial look-back rule will confuse the test trial
with either of the bracket trials. Nonetheless, it is possible that the animal bases its
heuristic not on a stimulus-discrimination rule (“was the last trial’s price suﬃciently
close to the leading bracket’s price”), but rather, on a decision variable rule (“was the
last trial’s subjective opportunity cost suﬃciently close to that of the leading bracket’s
subjective opportunity cost”). Other groups have shown that rats can discriminate
a 400ms tone duration from a 250ms tone duration (Kelly et al., 2006), and even
random noise bursts in the 10ms to 50ms range (Pai et al., 2011). These results
certainly imply that a 0.25s price can be timed fairly accurately, at least in principle.
A rat that could not distinguish 2s, 1s, 0.5s, 0.25s and 0.125s intervals would certainly
treat these objective prices equivalently, and would certainly be misled by a test trial
delivering nearly-maximal or minimal rewards at any of those prices. Given that
animals can distinguish stimuli of durations much shorter than the prices used, it is
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Figure 3.7. A generalization gradient of the similarity of “trailing”-like test trials to
true trailing trials. The duration of the PPP (± SEM) taken on trailing bracket trials
is plotted as a function of the objective price in eﬀect on the preceding test trial
(circles), when that test trial delivered very weak stimulation that is similar to that
delivered on a true trailing bracket trial (triangles).
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unlikely that the prices used are not discriminable. Instead, we suggest that when
animals treat test trials presenting a 0.125s price as though they had just encountered
a bracket trial, rats do so on the basis of equivalent subjective opportunity cost rather
than the rats’ inability to time short latencies.
Figure 3.8 presents the generalization gradient as a function of the deviation
of the test trial’s subjective opportunity cost from that of the leading (upper left) or
trailing (upper right) bracket trial, rather than the objective price (lower panels). In
all animals showing a clear confusion eﬀect, the generalization gradient is consistent
with a decision variable rule. Whereas there is little confusion at subjective oppor-
tunity costs much greater than that of the leading (or trailing) bracket, when the
subjective opportunity costs are equivalent, rats apt to be misled by the test trial
show considerable confusion regarding whether the trial to come will be a trailing
bracket trial.
3.3.2.5 Is last payoﬀ the relevant heuristic
Given that the generalization gradient is consistent with a decision variable
rule (“the last subjective intensity and opportunity cost were trailing-like”), it would
be tempting to conclude that rats base their decision about whether the test trial that
has just occurred is a leading or trailing bracket on the payoﬀ from the trial. The
payoﬀ is a scalar combination of subjective intensity and opportunity cost, and an
even simpler rule would require a comparison of the payoﬀ on the last trial rather than
each of its individual determinants (subjective intensity and opportunity cost). If the
basis for inferring that the last trial was a leading bracket depends on having a very
high payoﬀ—delivering highly rewarding stimulation at a very low cost—then a test
trial delivering equivalently low-cost, high-intensity stimulation would indeed confuse
the rat. However, because there is only one way for the payoﬀ to be nearly maximal,
it would be impossible to distinguish a rule based only on the payoﬀ (“was the last
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Figure 3.8. The generalization gradient for “leading”- and “trailing”-like test trials is
consistent with a subjective opportunity cost discrimination. The mean PPP during
trailing bracket trials is plotted as a function of the deviation of the variable on the
test trial that preceded it from the variable on true bracket trials. In the top row,
the variable is the subjective opportunity cost, while in the bottom row, the variable
is the objective price. The left-hand column plots the PPP on trailing bracket trials
that followed test trials delivering weak stimulation, as a function of the deviation of
test trial variables from a true trailing bracket. The right-hand column plots the PPP
on leading bracket trials that followed test trials delivering strong stimulation, as a
function of the deviation of test trial variables from a true leading bracket. Diﬀerent
symbols and colours represent diﬀerent animals.
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Figure 3.9. Low-payoﬀ, but diﬀerently priced test trials do not induce confusion. The
left-hand panel shows the duration of the PPP for each rat when the trial follows a
true trailing trial (on leading trials, green), when the trailing trial follows a low-payoﬀ
test trial where the stimulation and price are unlike trailing trials (high intensity/high
price, blue), when the trailing trial follows a low-payoﬀ test trial where the price is
unlike trailing trials (low intensity/high price, cyan), or on trailing bracket trials in
general (red). The right-hand panel shows a box-whisker plot of the PPP durations
on each of these kinds of trials. In all cases, the PPPs on low-payoﬀ trials are unlike
what they would be if the rats were mistaken (at left, in green) and similar to what
they would be if the rats were not mistaken (at right, in red).
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trial’s payoﬀ suﬃciently close to that of the leading bracket trial”) from one based
on the appropriate combination of subjective opportunity cost and reward intensity
(“were both the subjective opportunity cost and intensity of the last trial suﬃciently
close to those of the leading bracket trial”).
Luckily, there are many combinations of intensity and price that will produce
nearly minimal payoﬀs. One could provide inexpensive stimulation that is suﬃciently
weak (as is the case on trailing bracket trials), strong stimulation that is suﬃciently
expensive (as is the case on the highest-priced test trial of the price pseudo-sweep), or
suﬃciently weak stimulation that is also suﬃciently expensive (as is the case on the
highest-priced, lowest-intensity test trial of the radial pseudo-sweep). If the rat used
a purely payoﬀ-based rule to identify the trial it has just encountered, PPP durations
on trailing trials following these low-payoﬀ test trials would be uncharacteristically
low and similar to those on leading trials. If, on the other hand, the rat used a rule
based on the appropriate combination of key decision variables, these low-payoﬀ trials
will fail to confuse the rat, and the rat will produce a PPP that is typical of trailing
bracket trials. To identify whether these types of test trials could confuse the rats,
we plot in the left-hand panel of ﬁgure 3.9 the duration of the PPP on trailing trials
that follow high-intensity but high-priced test trials (the highest-priced test trial of
the price pseudo-sweep) and trailing trials that follow low-intensity and high-priced
test trials (the highest-priced test trial of the radial pseudo-sweep). For comparison,
we include the mean PPP duration on leading trials that follow low-intensity and
low-priced trailing trials, and the mean PPP duration on trailing trials following all
test trials. In all but two animals (in one condition each, for only one of the two
trial types), low payoﬀ trials with subjective opportunity costs and reward intensities
that are diﬀerent from those on the trailing bracket trial induce no confusion about
whether the trial to come is a trailing trial.
The right-hand panel of ﬁgure 3.9 shows a box-whisker plot of the mean PPP
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duration on leading bracket trials, trailing bracket trials that follow a test trial with
highly rewarding but expensive stimulation, trailing bracket trials that follow a test
trial with low intensity and high price stimulation, and trailing bracket trials across all
test trial types. Overlain on the box-whisker plot are individual mean PPPs observed
on each trial type for each rat and condition they encountered. The range of mean
PPP durations on trailing trials following these two kinds of low-payoﬀ trials is no
diﬀerent from those on trailing trials in general, and diﬀers considerably from those
on leading trials, suggesting little or no confusion about whether the trial to come
will be a trailing bracket trial. Therefore, the rat uses the subjective intensity and
opportunity cost individually—not their combination into the payoﬀ—to infer the
identity of the trial to come.
3.4 Discussion
3.4.1 A world model of session structure
Model-free temporal diﬀerence reinforcement learning models imply that rats
learn only the value of a state rather than the full state-transition function. In other
words, the rat using only a model-free learning scheme knows at best that conditions
have changed when the inter-trial interval begins, but because such a rat does not
maintain a model of how the session progresses, it cannot know in what way they
have changed. Consequently, the rat that relies on a model-free learning scheme
will not act on an expectation for the trial to come. When no representation of the
identity of states is maintained, the rat’s performance must be based only on feed-back
mechanisms that map states to their total net discounted reward. In this case, the rat
will expect that conditions on a new trial will be the same as those on the previous
trial; as a result, the duration of the PPP would be longest on leading trials (because
they follow a trial of low payoﬀ), shortest on test trials (because they follow a trial
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of high payoﬀ) and intermediate on average on trailing trials (because they follow a
variable trial). When a world model is maintained, the rat’s performance can be based
on what states it can expect to follow from actions taken in the current state, rather
than just their value. In other words, a world model of the triad sequence allows
performance to operate on a feed-forward mechanism: the rat has an expectation
for the trial to come before it obtains evidence of the consequences of its actions.
For example, a representation of “trailing bracket follows test trial” allows the rat to
ﬂexibly alter the value of lever-pressing without having to uncover that value through
trial and error, and without having to rely on what the value of lever-pressing has
been so far. Indeed, the predictions of a model-free learning scheme are opposite to
the results reported here: the rat takes pauses, before the payoﬀ can be known, that
are indicative of the payoﬀ to come rather than the payoﬀ on the trial that has come
to pass.
Our results imply that well-trained rats behave as though they had a model of
how triads progress based on a look-back rule to the conditions (subjective intensity
and opportunity cost) of the preceding trial. We have presented evidence that rats
indeed form this world model of the triad structure, and a potential heuristic rule
that rats use to infer the current trial type. Post-priming pause durations vary sys-
tematically depending on the trial type to come. Since the price and pulse frequency
on a new trial are not signalled at trial onset, the duration of the post-priming pause
must reﬂect some world model of how the trial types of a triad progress. That the
duration of the post-priming pause on trailing trials, though usually censored by the
end of the trial, can further be related to the price and intensity of the preceding test
trial provides some evidence about the nature of this world model. A rat that sim-
ply counted would be expected to show uncharacteristically short PPPs on trailing
trials regardless of the trial type—it is equally likely to make errors in counting no
matter what the test trial’s objective price and subjective reward intensity happen to
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be. Instead, rats produce uncharacteristically short PPPs following test trials that
closely resemble the leading bracket trial in terms of subjective reward intensity and
subjective price. Moreover, the generalization gradient for how closely a test trial
must resemble a leading bracket trial in order to “confuse” the rat suggests that it
is on the basis of the subjective opportunity cost and reward intensity that the rat
infers which trial type has just occurred and which trial type will follow. Finally, the
discriminative stimulus used to infer the payoﬀ on the trial to come is largely a vector
of the subjective opportunity cost and reward intensity encountered on the previous
trial, rather than their scalar combination (the trial’s payoﬀ). Animals do not confuse
test trials delivering very low payoﬀs, resulting from subjective opportunity costs and
reward intensities that diﬀer from the trailing bracket trial, with a trailing bracket
trial, though they do confuse test trials on which the subjective opportunity costs
and reward intensities are similar to trailing bracket trials with trailing bracket trials.
These results are inconsistent with a purely model-free description of perfor-
mance on this task. One would have to assume one of two results in the purely
model-free approach. The rat could maintain a running average of the net expected
value from pressing across all trials, in which case the rat reaches the end of the trial
without an accurate estimate of the net expected value of lever-pressing. Results from
chapter 2 allow us to rule out this interpretation, since performance is highly payoﬀ-
dependent. Otherwise, if the rat manages to update the value of lever-pressing to the
“correct” level by the end of a trial, a purely model-free approach would assume that
the payoﬀ from self-stimulation expected on trial t is the payoﬀ from self-stimulation
encountered on the previous trial, such that when the rat begins a trailing bracket
trial, it expects to obtain the same reward it had received on the previous test trial.
When the rat begins a leading bracket trial, it expects to obtain the same reward it
had received on the previous trailing trial. Clearly, the pattern of PPP durations is
inconsistent with this: rats behave as though they expect to obtain a reward they
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have not yet seen. Instead of the behavioural inertia predicted by a purely model-free
approach, we observe a striking prescience in the rats’ PPP that can be attributed to
the deterministic progression of leading bracket, test, and trailing bracket trials. The
payoﬀ they expect to receive is a reﬂection of a one-trial look-back rule in a world
model that encapsulates a simple set of syllogisms: if the last trial was suﬃciently
similar (in subjective opportunity cost and reward intensity) to a leading bracket
trial, the next trial is likely a test trial; if the last trial was suﬃciently similar to a
trailing bracket trial, the next trial is likely a leading bracket trial; if the last trial
was diﬀerent from a leading or trailing bracket trial, the next trial is likely a lead-
ing bracket trial. Although basing one’s decision to begin lever-pressing on this set
of syllogisms may sometimes lead to an error, it is considerably less demanding to
implement than a counting rule that requires maintaining an abstract representation
for the counting index while performing an unrelated task. Even following months
of exposure to the randomized-triad design, correct detection of the trailing trial’s
occurrence when it follows a test trial that is suﬃciently similar to either bracket
trial is a very rare occurrence. In a majority of cases, we observe PPP durations that
are consistent with a simple, one trial look-up rule.
Rats appear to behave as though they have the world model depicted in ﬁgure
3.1. On trial t − 1, rats maintain a representation (S) of the subjective opportunity
cost (Ps) and reward intensity (Ibsr) for the trial. When the inter-trial interval begins,
rats infer the subjective opportunity cost (Pˆs) and reward intensity (Ibsr) of the trial
to come (S′). We make this assumption because rats will readily identify the leading
bracket trial following the trailing bracket trial even though the rat rarely ever obtains
a sample of the subjective opportunity cost and reward intensity on trailing bracket
trials. The inference is made on the basis of a simple state-transition function:
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(where P¯s and I¯bsr represent the mean opportunity cost and reward intensity on test


















The expected payoﬀ (E[Ut]) on trial t—which involves a scalar combination
of the relevant key decision variables—can concisely inform the rat of how long its
PPP should last. The PPP is terminated (except on non-ambiguous trailing bracket
trials) with a lever-press, at which point the rat can update the expected subjec-
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tive opportunity cost (revising Pˆst+1), which itself allows the rat to also update the
expected payoﬀ from self-stimulation for the trial. A reward may then be delivered,
which allows the rat to update the subjective reward intensity it can expect to receive
for lever-pressing (revising Iˆbsrt+1), and simultaneously allows the rat to update the
expected payoﬀ from self-stimulation once again. On unambiguous trailing bracket
trials, the rat usually never presses, so the subjective opportunity costs and reward
intensities have not been updated since their expectation ([Pˆst+1 , Iˆbsrt+1 ] = [1s, Imin])
at the beginning of the trial (t + 1), and the rat can still infer that the next trial,
S ′t+2, will be a leading bracket trial. For example, suppose you were asked to identify
whether a dim light appeared red when it is brieﬂy ﬂashed. Following many trials,
you recognize that after a red light, you will be presented with a violet light of varying
red and blue hues; after a violet light, you will be presented with a blue light; and
after a blue light, you will be presented with a red light. If you had blinked and
missed the dim blue light, you would still be able to infer that the next trial would be
red. We propose that the state transition function, formalized by the above if-then
statements, provides the rat with a cached expectation of subjective opportunity cost
and reward intensity which can be revised when the animal begins to lever-press and
obtains an electrical reward. If no revision is made, the rat simply uses this cached
vector to infer the next trial type on the basis of the state transition function, which
then updates the subjective opportunity cost and reward intensity to those predicted
for the next trial when the current trial is over. This diﬀers from counting in the sense
that it is not necessary to maintain a representation of the number of trials in a cycle
and the current phase; instead, the rat only needs to maintain a representation of the
opportunity cost and reward intensity of the current trial type and their relationship
to those that can be expected when the house light ﬂashes again.
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3.4.2 How does the rat learn this world model?
Given that when it ﬁrst encounters the randomized-triad design, the rat cannot
have a world model of how leading bracket trials lead to test trials, test trials lead
to trailing bracket trials, and trailing bracket trials lead to leading bracket trials, the
question becomes: how does this world model arise throughout training?
One possibility is that rats use some variation of the hidden Markov model
(HMM) in which the trial types are latent (or “hidden”) states which present the rat
with subjective opportunity costs and reward intensities according to some underlying
emission probability. The rat’s task is to then infer the hidden state that emitted
the observable decision variables on every given trial. One problem with such an
approach is that it is computationally intensive, requiring inﬁnite memory of the
entire sequence of subjective opportunity costs and reward intensities encountered
on each trial thus far, and requiring the rat to identify across a large set of possible
hidden state sequences that which is most likely. Furthermore, because the number
of hidden trial types, their state-transition function, and the probability that they
“emit” subjective opportunity costs and reward intensities is not known, the animal
must estimate these model parameters on-line. To our knowledge, no group has
provided a truly on-line description of how such a model could be learned.
This description of how the world model is learned must take into account
three ideas, all of which must operate simultaneously. First, the rat must estimate
how many trial types there are. If there are k latent states which present opportunity
costs and reward intensities with some emission probability, the number of underlying
latent states k needs to be estimated. Second, the rat must estimate the mean and
variance of the key decision variables that identify a given trial type, which set the
emission probabilities with which trial types produce subjective opportunity costs
and reward intensities. Finally, the rat must estimate the state-transition function,
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which sets the probability that one trial type proceeds to another. Each of these
estimates is fundamentally interconnected; without some estimate of how many trial
types there are, there is no way to know what types of subjective opportunity costs
and reward intensities they will present or their progression. Regardless of how the
learning process is modelled, it must reﬂect the animal’s remarkable capacity to infer
a fairly complex world model based only on the sequence of subjective opportunity
costs and reward intensities, using limited mnemonic resources.
3.4.3 Representing the world model
Representation of this world model is an equally non-trivial question. Our
results suggest that the rat maintains a representation of the subjective opportunity
cost and reward intensity, which form the basis of the compound “stimulus” that the
rat can use to infer the payoﬀ on the next trial. In the case of the leading and trailing
bracket trial, there is a single subjective opportunity cost and a single subjective
reward intensity for which a representation is needed. However, in the case of the
test trial, the animal will encounter any of a range of opportunity costs and reward
intensities sampled pseudo-randomly from a ﬁnite set. In a strict sense, a model-based
reinforcement learning model would assign each combination of subjective reward
intensity and opportunity cost a state. The rat must then maintain a large state
space and a complex state-transition function whereby the trial state corresponding
to the leading trial leads to any of the possible trial states with equal probability, the
trailing trial state leads to the leading trial state with certainty, and all possible trial
states lead to a trailing trial with certainty.
Instead of this potentially cumbersome and computationally intensive scheme,
we propose that the rat maintains three representations and a simple state-transition
function. One trial state is the leading bracket trial, for which the rat maintains a
representation of high-intensity, low-cost stimulation with minimal variability. One
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represents the trailing bracket trial, for which the rat maintains a representation of
low-intensity, low-cost stimulation with minimal variability. Finally, one represents
the test trial, for which the rat maintains a representation of the central tendency
of subjective reward intensity and opportunity cost along with an estimate of the
variability in intensity and cost. The transition function here is a simple permutation
matrix of the three trial types represented: a leading bracket is followed by a test
trial, a test is followed by a trailing bracket trial, and a trailing is followed by a leading
bracket trial.
Some modellers (Ma et al., 2006; Pouget et al., 2000; Deneve et al., 2007) have
argued that populations of neurons represent a probability distribution over stimulus
values, and that in neurons with Poisson noise, Bayesian inference reduces to a simple
linear combination of population activities. In our procedure, the rat must identify
the upcoming trial type stimulus (s) given various cues (c), such as the subjective
opportunity cost and reward intensity of the trial the rat has just encountered. As-
suming a ﬂat prior and a Gaussian likelihood function for the probability of the cues
given a trial type stimulus, P [c1, c2|s], the reciprocal of the variance (in other words,
the precision) of the posterior distribution of the trial type stimulus given the cues ,







If two populations of neurons now encode the cues as ﬁring rates r1 and r2
using gains g1 and g2 with Poisson-like noise, the sum of the population responses,
P [r1+r2|s] will also have a Poisson-like distribution with variance proportional to the
sum of the gains. As a result, the precision of the sum of the population responses,
P [r1 + r2|s], will equal the sum of the precisions of each population P [r1|s] and
P [r2|s], implying that the sum of the population responses can indeed encode the
- 138 -
posterior probability of the trial type stimulus given the sum of the response rates.
Ma et al. (2006) have established that under a wide variety of conditions, such as
non-Gaussian and non-translation invariant tuning curves, a linear combination of
various populations produces a distribution with properties identical to the posterior
distribution. With such an encoding scheme, representing the relevant statistical
properties of leading bracket, test, and trailing trials in the cortex is inherent in
how the “product of experts” (the linear combinations of multiple contributing sub-
populations) naturally represents the posterior probability of trial type given cues.
3.4.4 The ﬁrst reward encounter
The ﬁndings here paint an interesting picture of the period of time before the
payoﬀ from self-stimulation can be known with certainty. The rat appears to engage
in a leisure bout that is dependent on the payoﬀ expected to come—short if the payoﬀ
is exceptionally high, long if the payoﬀ is exceptionally low, and intermediate (though
short) if the payoﬀ is, on average, intermediate. Since the rat could not know what
the payoﬀ from self-stimulation will be without some model of how the diﬀerent trial
types progress, our results imply that, from the very start of the trial, the rat has,
either directly or indirectly, a representation of the expected payoﬀ.
If the rat begins the trial with an expectation of the payoﬀ from self-stimulation,
then as soon as the rat begins holding the lever, it ought to revise that payoﬀ. On
true leading bracket trials, no revision will be necessary, as there is no variance in
the decision variables that contribute to the payoﬀ from self-stimulation. On true
trailing bracket trials, the rat virtually never presses, so no update can be performed.
On test trials, and trailing trials following test trials resembling either bracket, the
rat ought to continuously update its estimate of the subjective opportunity cost as
it holds the lever for longer periods of time. As a result, the estimate of the payoﬀ
ought to improve as the rat continues to lever-press: after 6s of pressing, the rat
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knows the subjective opportunity cost must be at least that of 6s, which narrows the
set of possible prices. As soon as the rat has completed the response requirement, a
reward is delivered (on non-probabilistic trials), which then makes the payoﬀ entirely
deterministic.
Two issues are of importance here. First, the rat may want to signiﬁcantly
reduce its uncertainty about the expected payoﬀ on a given trial. This is not a concern
on leading and trailing bracket trials, where uncertainty surrounding the payoﬀ would
be virtually zero (as suggested by the exceptionally short and low-variance PPP on
leading bracket, and typically long censored and low-variance PPP on trailing bracket
trials). On test trials, however, where the rat can expect to encounter any one of a
fairly large range of objective prices (roughly 2.5 common logarithmic units in the case
of F rats) and subjective reward intensities (roughly 1 common logarithmic unit), the
rat could indeed be driven to reduce this uncertainty so that it may better exploit the
alternative providing the greatest net return on its time investment. If there is such
a principle at work, the usually competing interests of exploration—seeking out the
payoﬀs from the diﬀerent sources of reward that may be available—and exploitation—
pursuing the goal that will provide the greatest payoﬀ—are aligned. On bracket trials,
where exploration can be thought of as negligible, the rat clearly exploits the most
attractive alternative: BSR in the case of leading, and “other” activities in the case
of trailing bracket trials. On test trials before the payoﬀ is known with any certainty,
exploration is synonymous with pursuing the goal of acquiring BSRs, or exploitation.
This principle may explain why PPPs on test trials are much closer in duration to
those emitted on leading bracket trials than simply the halfway point between leading
and trailing bracket trials.
Second, the rat may, at least in principle, have a virtually error-free represen-
tation of the payoﬀ for the trial as soon as it has earned a reward. If this is true,
the rat does not need to update its estimate of the payoﬀ in the slow, incremental
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manner that is described in model-free reinforcement learning models. It may—as
we shall demonstrate in Chapter 4—have yet another world model of how rewards
progress within a single trial: from the time an inter-trial interval ends to the time
a new inter-trial interval begins, the payoﬀ from self-stimulation will be constant.
With such a model, the rat need not slowly update the values of lever-pressing states
leading up to reward delivery in a model-free reinforcement-learning process. The
rat only needs to keep track of the payoﬀ from self-stimulation it can transparently
obtain from the subjective opportunity cost and reward intensity of the ﬁrst reward it
receives in a trial. As a result, the period of time in the trial before the delivery of the
ﬁrst reward is, in a sense, distinct from the period of time in the trial following the
ﬁrst reward delivery. It is to this question that we shall return in the next chapter.
3.4.5 Final remarks
Our results pose certain constraints on the neural machinery that underlies
action selection. First, we would expect to ﬁnd neurons involved in the representation
of not only the key decision variables controlling performance, such as subjective
opportunity cost and reward intensity, but also in the representation of trial type.
Second, the populations of neurons involved in representing trial type would need to
encode trial type as particular combinations of key decision variables. Finally, there
must exist a mechanism by which the previous trial type provides a signal for the
trial type to come, and that signal may require computation of the expected payoﬀ
from lever-pressing in order to choose a PPP of appropriate duration. In essence, the
rat needs machinery that can implement the world model by which they appear to
base their decision to begin pressing following a cued inter-trial interval.
It has been argued (McDannald et al., 2012) that neurons in orbito-frontal
cortex participate in model-based learning mechanisms. If so, a rat devoid of its
orbito-frontal cortex would presumably be incapable of forming this world model,
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and would thus produce PPPs that do not systematically vary with the identity of
the upcoming trial in the randomized-triad design. However, even if this were the
case, there are multiple means by which to interfere with the apparently model-based
performance we describe here. Neurons of the orbito-frontal cortex may indeed be
involved in implementing the state-transition function or representing the various
trial states. Additionally, they may be involved in representing the payoﬀ expected
on the trial (FitzGerald et al., 2009), or they may implement the mechanism by
which the key decision variables are updated throughout the trial (Noonan et al.,
2010). Lesions to rat orbito-frontal cortex would not provide suﬃcient evidence that
the region is involved in the implementation of model-based learning in this paradigm,
since interference with any of these functions would result in altered PPP durations.
Similarly, ventral striatum has been implicated in a wide range of action-selection
tasks (reviewed in van der Meer and Redish, 2011; McDannald et al., 2011; Yacubian
et al., 2007; Prévost et al., 2010; Beyene et al., 2010), but it would be impossible to
tell, on the basis of lesion studies alone, what its role would be in the model-based
decision-making apparent in selecting PPP durations.
Electrophysiological recordings may provide complementary evidence about
what role, if any, the orbito-frontal cortex and ventral striatum play in selecting a
PPP duration. Neural correlates of the subjective opportunity cost to come, regard-
less of subjective reward intensity, or of the subjective reward intensity, regardless of
subjective opportunity cost, active before the rat has had a chance to update these
values, would provide evidence of how and where the expected trial parameters are
encoded. Furthermore, if activity in these neurons changes as a function of our pre-
sumed updating process—that is, those encoding subjective opportunity cost changed
in activity with ongoing lever-pressing and those encoding subjective reward intensity
changed in activity with ongoing reward delivery—then the same populations that
encode the most recent estimates would provide the appropriate basis for inferring
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the next trial type, as predicted by the model laid out in ﬁgure 3.1. Importantly,
if there are populations of neurons in charge of implementing the rule as we have
described it, their activity should accurately anticipate the subjective opportunity
cost and reward intensity that would be predicted to follow the previous trial during
the inter-trial interval.
New opto-genetic methods (Boyden et al., 2005; Han, 2012) have emerged
that permit causal manipulations to be made at time scales as ﬁne as discussed here.
Neurons involved in the formation of a world model of the session’s triad structure
would be prevented from doing so when they are speciﬁcally silenced in the training
phase of the experiment. In contrast, if one were to silence the neurons involved in
switching between maps of trial types (that is, those that implement the syllogism),
the rat would be expected to emit a PPP that is more typical of the last trial’s post-
reinforcement pause than the new trial type. In other words, if the rat is prevented
from updating its world model following an unambiguous test trial, the ﬁrst pause
it makes when the inter-trial interval ends and a trailing bracket trial begins will be
typical of the ﬁrst pause it takes following lever extension on the previous trial rather
than of the ﬁrst pause it takes at the start of a trailing bracket trial.
Irrespective of which structures are involved in the model-based elements of the
randomized-triad design and how they may contribute, our results provide evidence
that well-trained rats behave as though they have developed a non-trivial model of
how trials in the triad proceed. In light of these ﬁndings, it is quite possible that under
slightly diﬀerent conditions, when there more than 3 diﬀerent trial types, rats are
capable of inferring at least the payoﬀ for the trial to come. It is quite possible, indeed,
that when there are many trial types in simple ascending-pattern (as is the case on
progressive ratio schedules of reinforcement) or descending-pattern (as is common in
the curve-shift paradigm) sequences, rats easily learn a world model in which there
are only two rules. If the last trial delivered rewards at a suﬃciently high subjective
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opportunity cost or with suﬃciently negligible intensity, the next trial will deliver
rewards appropriately minimal opportunity cost or maximal intensity. If not, the
next trial will deliver rewards at a slightly greater cost or lower intensity. In both this
systematic-sequence and the randomized-triads designs, the state-transition function
can be thought of as a simple permutation matrix for which the trial encountered at
time t is a deterministic function of the trial encountered at time t−1. Assuming rats
have a world model during these systematic sequences that closely resembles (at least
in spirit) the world model depicted in ﬁgure 3.1, our model makes two empirically-
testable predictions. First, the subjective opportunity cost and reward intensity trials
in the sequence are cached and updated only when the rat lever-presses. When the rat
does not press, it does not update these values, and they remain unchanged from the
cached value predicted from the state transition function. The sequence of trials can
still progress according to the deterministic world model in well-trained rats, thereby
allowing them to predict with reasonable accuracy when the sequence will return to
its highest-payoﬀ value even when they have not pressed in multiple trials. Second,
assuming a single trial look-back rule for the randomized-triads design, inserting a
probe trial with particularly low payoﬀ anywhere in the sequence will “trick” the
rat into believing the next trial will have a high payoﬀ, regardless of their current
position in the repeating sequence. It remains to be seen whether the principle of a
world-model with a single trial look-back rule operates under a wider variety of testing
procedures, or whether it is an artefact of the randomized-triads design. Nonetheless,
we believe the principles at work can be generalized to multiple contexts. Further
studies are needed to establish the conditions under which rats develop a world model
such as that observed here. For example, rigorous simulation studies of our proposed
world model would have to be conducted to deeply understand the implications,
suﬃciency, and predictions of our account.
In conclusion, our results provide evidence of the existence of a trial-type
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based world model in the randomized-triad design, as well as a potential heuristic
by which animals would implement this world model. The apparent behaviourally-
derived rules used to implement this world model provide some constraints on how
the brain represents its various pieces. We propose that the key decision variables in
eﬀect on a particular trial are inferred on the basis of a single trial look-back rule,
and that these key decision variables are updated throughout the trial if necessary, a
process which may or may not involve model-free reinforcement learning systems.
It is clear that the well-trained rat begins a trial with an expectation of what
the payoﬀ will be in the randomized-triads experimental procedure, and at least
during test trials, will have to revise its estimate as it acquires more information
about the subjective opportunity cost and reward intensity. Although the rat may
have a good estimate of the type of trial it can reasonably expect based on the trial
that just elapsed, there will be variability in the payoﬀ that is actually delivered on
test trials. The rat can update its estimate of the subjective opportunity cost of the
reward as it holds down the lever; as it harvests rewards, it can similarly update its
estimate of the subjective reward intensity. As the payoﬀ is the scalar combination
of reward intensity, opportunity cost, probability, delay, and eﬀort cost, the payoﬀ
can also be revised as the rat obtains more information about the determinants of
decision-making. We shall now turn to the rapidity and time scale over which this
update occurs in the next chapter.
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Chapter 4
The rat’s world model of trial structure
4.1 Introduction
Matching refers to the general observation that the relative rate of responding
for one option compared to its alternatives is equal to the relative rate at which
that alternative provides reinforcement (Herrnstein, 1961). On concurrent variable-
interval schedules, for example, pigeons will typically allocate their pecks to a given
pecking key in proportion to the relative rate at which that manipulandum delivers
grain pellets. This is a near-optimal strategy in the sense that other strategies will
not provide substantially higher overall rates of reinforcement (see Heyman and Luce,
1979, for a description of the true maximizing strategy); it is nearly optimal because
the variable-interval holds the reward for the animal indeﬁnitely as soon as it is
armed. If one pecking key provides rewards at an average rate of 1 per second, and
the alternative pecking key provides rewards at an average rate of 1 per 3 seconds, on
average, after pecking at the ﬁrst key for 3 seconds, the second key will be armed and
ready to deliver a reward. As the probability that a reward will be waiting for the
animal increases as it pursues other goals, the optimal strategy is to alternate between
the two experimentally available activities, allocating one’s time to each goal in direct
relation to the rate at which that goal delivers rewards. In other words, the animal
ought to match its responding to the relative rate of reinforcement.
The process by which this matching behaviour occurs has long been believed
to require a feed-back mechanism. Reward receipt, the consequence of instrumental
responding in these procedures, would feed back onto its perceived cause, thereby
strengthening the association between response and outcome. Thorndike (1898) was
ﬁrst to describe this Law of Eﬀect, whereby instrumental conditioning occurred be-
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cause of a gradual strengthening of the association between the experimenter-desired
response and a subject-desired stimulus. This principle was further formalized by Sut-
ton and Barto (1981), using the temporal-diﬀerence reward prediction error (RPE) as
the critical signal driving instrumental learning. The RPE represents the discrepancy
between the total reward at time t + 1 that is expected at time t and the actual
reward delivered at time t+1; a large (positive or negative) RPE results from a large
discrepancy, which consequently adjusts the total reward expected at that time in
proportion to the magnitude of the RPE. With suﬃcient training, the RPE disap-
pears, as the expected total reward begins to approach the true total reward. This
computational framework has been useful in designing intelligent machines and has
been used to describe the activity of phasic dopamine activity in the ventral tegmental
area (Montague et al., 1996).
Purely model-free descriptions of instrumental responding rely heavily on this
temporal-diﬀerence reinforcement learning model. Performance is the result of im-
plementing a behavioural policy that uses the total future expected reward at every
time instant, whereby the value of taking a particular action in a particular trial state
is the maximum temporally-discounted reward that can be expected by taking that
action in that trial state and assuming one pursues an optimal strategy from there
on. The total future expected reward of any given action-trial state pair is gradu-
ally updated as the animal engages with its environment; when the RPE associated
with the total future expected reward of action-trial state pairs is nil, the animal is
said to have “learned” the task. In this description of the task of a rat responding
for electrical brain stimulation in the randomized-triads design, the rat begins a new
trial expecting the value of lever-down states to be the same as those it was expect-
ing at the end of the last trial. When those expectations are violated because the
price-frequency pair in eﬀect have changed, a purely model-free description predicts
that the set of expectations—and the behavioural policy they collectively set—will
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change gradually as the rat obtains more and more rewards.
In contrast, model-based descriptions imply a sort of feed-forward mechanism.
Just as the rat has a world-model of how trials within a triad progress throughout the
session (Chapter 3), the rat may have a world-model of how reward deliveries progress
throughout the trial. On this view, an internal representation of the constancy of the
price and pulse frequency from the time the house lights cease to ﬂash to the time they
begin ﬂashing again would not require gradual changes to the expected total future
rewards within a trial. Instead, the rat would know that conditions will be stable,
and will be able to set these expectations in a single, step-wise change following a
suﬃcient number of exemplars, as soon as it has information about the subjective
opportunity cost and reward intensity of the electrical stimulation on oﬀer. As a
result, the rat’s behavioural policy, both in terms of the duration of the pause it
decides to make following each reward delivery and in terms of the overall proportion
of time it decides to allocate to harvesting those rewards, will cease to change as soon
as the payoﬀ from self-stimulation is known.
The idea of a feed-forward model is not new. Mark and Gallistel (1994) found
that rats adjusted their performance quickly (within one or two reward deliveries)
to signalled changes in the rate of reinforcement on concurrent-interval schedules of
reinforcement. Mazur (1995b) found that pigeons adjusted much more slowly, on the
order of tens of minutes, to an unsignalled change, but the time scale over which
the rates of reinforcement on each pecking key were stable was also on the order
of many days. Gallistel et al. (2001) resolved this apparent discrepancy by showing
that rats adjusted to unsignalled changes as quickly as would be expected by an ideal
detector. Rats took a long time to adjust to an unsignalled change in average rates on
a concurrent variable-interval schedule delivering moderately high pulse frequencies
when the average rate of reinforcement on each of the two levers was stable for long
periods of time. When the average rates were only stable over short periods of time,
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rats adjusted to unsignalled changes within one or two reward deliveries. This implies
that rats adjust the duration of time spent working for an alternative as soon as a
change in the rate at which the alternative delivers rewards can be detected.
The following chapter provides evidence that in the case of rats working for
electrical brain stimulation, for which the reward is delivered after the lever has been
held for a ﬁxed cumulative period of time and whose subjective opportunity cost
and reward intensity is constant throughout a signalled trial, rats behave as though
there has been a single, step-like change to their behavioural policy. Furthermore,
we provide evidence that, consistent with the ideal-observer description, this step-like
change predominantly occurs as soon as theoretically possible: following delivery of
the ﬁrst reward.
4.1.1 A world model of the reward encounter
The deﬁning feature of a trial in the curve-shift (Miliaressis et al., 1986) method
is that the response requirement and reward magnitude are ﬁxed. The trials are
usually cued in some way, and the animal may harvest as many rewards as trial
and schedule constraints allow in exchange for fulﬁlling the response requirement.
Although we have previously shown in Chapter 3 that the rat readily forms a world
model of how the subjective opportunity cost and reward intensity change from trial
to trial, the rat may have an additional model of how the subjective opportunity
cost and reward intensity remain constant throughout a single trial. We deﬁne the
reward encounter as the period within a trial, from the time the lever extends into
the operant chamber to the time the lever retracts from successful completion of the
response requirement or the end of the trial. On trials when the payoﬀ—a scalar
combination of the key decision variables—is high, there may be many such reward
encounters, as the rat earns many rewards. On trials when the payoﬀ is low, there
may be very few reward encounters, as the rat earns very few rewards. Just as the rat
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has formed a representation of how trials lead to each other in a predictable way, as
demonstrated in Chapter 3, the rat may also form a representation of how successive
reward encounters are predictably identical with respect to the subjective opportunity
cost, reward intensity, and probability of reinforcement.
We describe this world model—one regarding the stability of key determinants
of decision within the trial—as a world model of the reward encounter. Without such
a world model, the rat would need to slowly extract and update an estimate of the
payoﬀ. In the standard model-free reinforcement learning approach, the rat updates
its estimate of the total net reward from lever-pressing according to a delta rule
(Dayan and Abbott, 2001) that speciﬁes the degree to which the current total net
reward diﬀers from the current estimate.
In the randomized-triads design, the cumulative amount of time the lever
must be held in order to harvest a reward (the price) and the pulse frequency of the
stimulation in eﬀect during a test trial are drawn pseudo-randomly from a ﬁnite set
of price-frequency pairs. It has already been established, in Chapter 3, that the rat
behaves as if it had an expectation regarding the subjective opportunity cost and
subjective reward intensity for the trial to come. This expectation, on test trials,
is usually diﬀerent from the subjective opportunity cost and reward intensity of the
BSR to come because of the random sampling method in force. A rat using purely
model-free reinforcement learning mechanisms would have to gradually update its
estimate of the subjective opportunity cost and reward intensity associated with self-
stimulation over multiple reward encounters before it obtained an accurate estimate
of the payoﬀ it can expect from self-stimulation.
In contrast, a rat using a model that states that the subjective opportunity
cost and intensity of the reward is ﬁxed for the duration of a trial would only need
a small number of exemplars—possibly a single reward delivery—before it updated
its estimate of the payoﬀ from self-stimulation in a single step. Since there is no
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variability in subjective opportunity cost or reward intensity throughout the trial,
the rat can simply “ﬁll-in” the appropriate value for the payoﬀ and immediately
implement a single policy.
It is clear that at the onset of any test trial in the randomized-triads design, the
rat cannot know how long the lever will need to be depressed in order for the reward
to be delivered or how strong the stimulation will be when the reward is delivered.
As established in Chapter 3, the duration of the pause that begins the trial (the
post-priming pause, PPP) is, in part, a function of the payoﬀ from self-stimulation
that can be expected for that trial: shortest on leading bracket trials, longer on
test trials, and longest (usually censored) on trailing bracket trials. Given that the
payoﬀ from self-stimulation on test trials is variable, we focus here on the duration of
pauses within this trial type. On leading and trailing bracket trials, the rat need not
update its estimate of the payoﬀ. The rat begins the test trial with an estimate of
the payoﬀ that will often be inaccurate, and produces a PPP that partly reﬂects the
rat’s estimate of the average payoﬀ to come. Following delivery of the ﬁrst reward of
the test trial, the payoﬀ from self-stimulation will usually require revision. Once the
blackout delay, a period of time when the lever is retracted from the chamber and the
reward is delivered, elapses, the rat takes a (possibly zero-duration) pause. As this
pause follows reinforcement, we call it the post-reinforcement pause (PRP).
Any gradient descent scheme, such as model-free reinforcement learning, will
require a gradual change in the PRP. In its classical formulation (Montague et al.,
1996), model-free operant conditioning is similar to classical conditioning: the ma-
nipulandum represents a stimulus for which an action (like lever-pressing) will lead
to a total discounted net reward. At time step t, the value of the lever-down state
(Vˆt) is the reward delivered at time step t (Rt) and the value of the next time step
(Vˆt+1) discounted by a factor γ: Vˆt = Rt + γVˆt+1. When a reward is delivered that
violates expectation, there is a reward prediction error (δt), formalized as the dif-
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ference between the current value and the rewards predicted to come. The current
estimate of the value of a state at a point in time is updated in proportion to the
magnitude of this reward prediction error: when δt is a large positive number, the
animal has obtained a much larger reward at time t than expected, and when δt is a
large negative number, the animal has obtained a much lower reward at time t than
expected.
The crux of model-free reinforcement learning schemes is in this reward pre-
diction error signal. Over multiple reward deliveries, the value of a lever-down state
is modiﬁed according to an update rule whereby the old value is increased (when δt
is positive) or decreased (when δt is negative) by a factor α:
Vˆtnew ← Vˆtold + αδt
where δt = Rt + γVˆt+1old − Vˆtold . For example, suppose a reward R delivered at t = 10
time steps is 1 arbitrary unit, when no reward was expected (Vˆt=20 = 0). The ﬁrst
time such a reward is delivered, it induces a positive reward prediction error, since
δt=10 = Rt=10 + γVˆt=11 − Vˆt=10 = 20 + 0 − 0 = 1,
so the value of the lever-down state becomes
Vˆt=10 ← Vˆt=10 + αδt=10 = 0 + α × 1 = α.
The next time the manipulandum extends into the chamber, all values up to 9 steps
have not changed, but the value of a lever press at 9 time steps violates expectation,
since in this second time around,
δt=9 = Rt=9 + γVˆt=10 − Vˆt=9 = 0 + γα − 0 = γα.
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The third time the manipulandum extends into the chamber, the value of a lever
press at 8 time steps violates expectation, and is similarly updated. Every time the
manipulandum extends into the chamber, the value of lever-pressing is updated for
one time step earlier, until the ﬁrst time point at which the reward can be predicted.
In the classical conditioning case, the conditional stimulus that predicts reward is
presented at random intervals, and thus the ﬁrst time a reward can be predicted is
the onset of this conditional stimulus. Operant conditioning accounts of performance
presume that the conditional stimulus is the manipulandum, and the value of action-
state pairs is learned as in the classical conditioning case.
Even when the learning rate (α) is one—that is, the value of lever-pressing
is updated immediately to its new value—gradient descent models like model-free
reinforcement learning imply that performance will change gradually. In the above
example, the ﬁrst time a surprising reward of 1 arbitrary unit is delivered at t = 10
time steps,
δt=10 = 1 + 0 − 0 = 1, and
Vˆt=10 ← 0 + 1 = 1.
The next time the manipulandum extends into the chamber, although Rt+γVˆt+1 − Vˆt
does not change from time steps 1 through 8, at time step 9,
δt=9 = 0 + γ × 1 = γ, and
Vˆt=9 ← 0 + γ = γ.
Thus, even when the value of a state is updated to the last reward delivered, this
value must back-propagate, one time step at a time, to the earliest time a reward
can be predicted: presentation of the conditional stimulus, in the case of classical
conditioning, or extension of the manipulandum into the operant chamber, in the
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case of operant conditioning.
From this description, it is clear that changes in performance must be grad-
ual when feed-back mechanisms are at work. The back-propagation model works in
the classical conditioning and simple, punctate lever-pressing situations because the
stimulus onset is itself unpredictable. On repeated stimulus (or manipulandum) pre-
sentations, the discrepancy back-propagates to the earliest time the reward can be
predicted. Indeed, for the animal to solve the assignment of credit problem—that is,
identifying the state-action pair that led to reward—classical model-free formulations
(Montague et al., 1996) require back-propagation, which gradually updates the value
of all state-action pairs that led to a temporally distant reward. Until this back-
propagation is complete, the rat’s decision to press must be based on a mechanism
that updates the value of a lever-press one time step at a time. Once the value of all
state-action pairs no longer needs an update—that is, the back-propagation mech-
anism has collided to the ﬁrst possible time step at which reward can be predicted
over possibly many reward deliveries—the rat can pursue an action selection policy
based on a stable estimate of the discounted total net reward to come.
However, if the rat has a world model of the reward encounter, the rat will
not need to update its estimate of the payoﬀ from self-stimulation gradually. After
it has obtained a suﬃciently large number of exemplars, the payoﬀ can be updated
as a step function, producing a step-like change in both the duration of the PRP and
the proportion of time it allocates to self-stimulation activities. Whereas a rat using
model-free reinforcement learning principles can only represent the value of lever-
pressing, a rat using model-based reinforcement learning principles also represents
how states are interrelated. In the case of a world model of trial structure, the rat
maintains a representation of the stability of the price and reward intensity in eﬀect
on a trial: every time the lever extends into the operant chamber, from the time
the house lights ﬂash until they ﬂash again, the price and intensity will be constant.
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As the function that maps the transition of one trial state (from lever-extension to
lever-retraction) to the next is an identity function, the rat can eﬀectively update the
payoﬀ from lever-pressing in a single step. Without such a state-transition function,
the rat must gradually update the value of lever-pressing on every trial.
To test which of these two accounts best described the behaviour of rats, we
compared two models of the evolution of PPPs and PRPs throughout the test trial.
One model, the gradual change model, implies that pauses (both PPP and PRP)
are sampled from a distribution of ﬁrst-pauses whose mean changes smoothly over
multiple reward encounters and whose mean remains stable following this suitably
long transition. The second, the step model, implies that pauses are sampled from
one distribution of ﬁrst-pauses for the ﬁrst n reward encounters, and sampled from a
single distribution of pauses for subsequent reward encounters.
We further tested the hypothesis that the rat’s estimate of payoﬀ from self-
stimulation is updated incrementally by considering the total proportion of time al-
located to self-stimulation within each reward encounter. If the estimate changed
gradually, as the result of a hill-climbing mechanism, the proportion of time allo-
cated to self-stimulation would gradually reach a steady point. If the estimate had
changed abruptly, the proportion of time allocated to self-stimulation would also
change abruptly. By looking at the ﬁrst derivative of time allocation during reward
encounters with respect to the number of rewards earned, it is possible to determine
whether well-trained rats behave according to a purely model-free mechanism (with
consistent, gradual changes that slowly reach a derivative of 0) or a partly model-
based mechanism (with an abrupt change followed by a derivative of 0). If the rat
behaves as though the payoﬀ is updated by small iterative changes, this analysis will
also show the time scale over which learning the payoﬀ from self-stimulation for a
given trial occurs. If the rat behaves as though the payoﬀ is updated step-wise, this




Prior to the delivery of the ﬁrst reward, there is no reason to believe per-
formance is completely dictated by the payoﬀ from self-stimulation. Indeed, post-
priming pauses on test trials (Chapter 3) are often closer to those on leading bracket
trials than halfway between leading and trailing bracket trials. It is possible, then,
that something in addition to the expected payoﬀ drives performance prior to the
trial’s stable period. Our hypothesis for the period of time prior to the delivery of the
ﬁrst reward is that both expected payoﬀ and the desire to uncover the payoﬀ drive
time allocation in this period of time to a high value. In other words, when the rat is
still unsure of the payoﬀ it can expect from self-stimulation, the goal of exploitation
(taking advantage of the source of reward with the greatest payoﬀ) is aligned with
the goal of exploration (identifying the payoﬀs from all possible sources).
To verify this, we determined the number of corrected work bouts, which
include holds and all releases lasting less than 1s that return to a hold, on all trials
of all payoﬀs in the period of time before the payoﬀ is known. We hypothesize that
in this period of time, the rat will tend to earn its ﬁrst reward in a single, continuous
work bout. A similar analysis was conducted on the number of corrected work bouts
emitted from the time the ﬁrst reward is delivered onward. When the price is low, the
animal will necessarily earn its rewards by engaging in a single, continuous work bout,
regardless of whether a reward has been delivered during the trial. At higher prices,
the rat may partition its time among work and true leisure bouts. If the period of
time prior to the ﬁrst reward delivery is in some sense “special,” we hypothesize that
the price at which the rat begins to engage in multiple work bouts will be higher for
these reward encounters than on subsequent reward encounters, after the rat knows
(in principle) the subjective opportunity cost and reward intensity of the stimulation
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it is to receive.
4.2 Methods
4.2.1 Behavioural protocol
The rats were the same as in Chapter 3. The data reported here were collected
during the test trial type in the randomized-triads design already described. Test
trials were preceded by leading bracket trials, during which the pulse frequency was as
high as the animal would tolerate without interfering eﬀects, such as forced movements
and vocalizations, and the price was 1 second. Test trials were followed by trailing
bracket trials, during which the pulse frequency was too low to support responding
(10Hz) and the price was 1 second. Trials were cued by a 10 second inter-trial interval;
2 seconds before the end of the interval, a train of priming stimulation of pulse
frequency equal to that delivered on leading bracket trials was delivered. The price,
pulse frequency, and probability of reinforcement in eﬀect for the test trial was drawn
pseudo-randomly from a list, as has been described before.
Following successful completion of the work requirement—the lever was held
for a cumulative amount of time deﬁned as the price—the lever retracted, the trial
clock stopped, and a BSR was delivered. Two seconds after lever retraction, it was
extended again into the cage and the trial clock re-started. This period is deﬁned as
the blackout delay. The duration of the trial, without blackout delays, was set to the
greater of 25 seconds or 25 times the price, allowing the rat to harvest a maximum
of 25 rewards if it had been holding the lever continuously for the entire trial. Often,
the rat obtained many fewer than 25 rewards, because it did not continuously hold
the lever for the entire trial.
In the case of rats MA5, DE1, DE3, DE7, PD8, DE14, DE15, DE19 and DE20,
probabilistic test trials were drawn pseudo-randomly along with test trials for which
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the probability of obtaining a reward following successful completion of the work re-
quirement was 1. Test trials for which the probability of reinforcement was less than
1 have been excluded from the present analysis for simplicity. For all rats but MA5,
the active operant on probabilistic trials was mapped to a diﬀerent lever, provid-
ing additional prior information about the payoﬀ on the trial. Furthermore, reward
encounters in the probabilistic case do not cleanly map onto identical exemplars of
the payoﬀ to be expected from lever-pressing. To simplify performance comparisons
across rats, we focus here on the case that is universal to them all: trials on which
the probability of reinforcement is 1, but whose payoﬀ is still uncertain because it
may take on any of a list of values.
4.2.2 Statistical analysis
When using a model-free reinforcement learning scheme, a reward prediction
error will appear at earlier and earlier time steps following each reward encounter,
until the prediction error reaches the ﬁrst time step at which a reward can be pre-
dicted. In the period of time when this reward prediction error is back-propagating,
an animal using model-free reinforcement learning mechanisms will base its action
selection policy on state-action values that change from reward encounter to reward
encounter. As soon as the reward prediction error reaches the ﬁrst point at which
a reward can be predicted, and the values of each state-action pair converge, the
rat’s action selection policy will no longer change from reward encounter to reward
encounter.
When using a feed-forward scheme, the rat can simply “ﬁll-in” a payoﬀ, rapidly
updating the value of state-action pairs as soon as the payoﬀ can be known. In the
period of time before the current trial’s payoﬀ can be ﬁlled in, an animal using model-
based reinforcement learning mechanisms will base its action selection policy on state-
action values that have not yet been updated; as soon as the payoﬀ is known, there
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is no need to slowly update the value of state-action pairs. The rat simply revises its
action selection policy according to the new, rapidly-updated payoﬀ.
To determine which of the two descriptions of the rat’s performance throughout
the trial best captured the behavioural data, we compared two models of the durations
of post-priming and post-reinforcement pauses following each lever extension into the
cage during test trials. In one of them, pauses are modelled as samples drawn from a
distribution with an unstable mean, that is, with a mean that begins at some value
for the ﬁrst reward encounter, ends at some value for the last m reward encounters,
and transitions smoothly between the two for at least 1 reward encounter. In the
other, pauses are modelled as samples drawn from two distributions, that is, from
one with a particular mean for the ﬁrst n reward encounters and one with a diﬀerent
mean for the subsequent reward encounters n + 1 to the end.
In addition, we examined the proportion of time allocated to self-stimulation
during each reward encounter, from the time the lever extended into the cage to the
time it was retracted, either because the response requirement had been fulﬁlled or
because the trial had come to an end. A purely model-free account of performance
throughout the trial would predict a gradual change in time allocation across reward
encounters until the rat’s internal estimate matched the putative “true” value. A
partly model-based account would predict no change until a suﬃcient number of
reward exemplars had been delivered, followed by an abrupt change when the update
was made, followed by no change.
4.2.2.1 Modelling gradual and step-like changes in PPP and PRP
To determine which of the two descriptions better accounted for performance,
we ﬁt two models of the post-priming and post-reinforcement pauses by maximum
likelihood. Figure 4.1 provides an example of the two models, gradual-change (dotted
red line) and step-change (solid black line) models. The ﬁgure shows the value of the
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Figure 4.1. Comparison of gradual and step changes in distributional parameters
across successive reward encounters. Parameters of the distributions generating post-
priming (following 0 rewards) and post-reinforcement pauses (following rewards 1
through n) can either change gradually (red dashed line) or abruptly (solid black
line). Here, Θ subsumes all parameters of the stochastic process that generates the
pause, which in the case of a gamma distribution, would be the mean and standard de-
viation. Assuming the post-priming pause is drawn from a distribution parametrized
with Θ1 = {μ1, σ1}, and the last post-reinforcement pause is drawn from a diﬀerent
distribution parametrized by Θ2 = {μ2, σ2}, we have modelled the non-stationarity in
two diﬀerent ways: either the parameters change gradually over m rewards, or there
is a step change following m rewards. The initial segment refers to the period of time
before the parameters of the process that produces post-reinforcement pauses reach
their ﬁnal Θ2 values.
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parameters of the distribution of post-priming and post-reinforcement pauses as a
function of the number of rewards that have been earned in the trial. The ordinate
is a place-holder for the parameters of the distribution of pauses, which in the case
we have modelled below, subsumes the mean and standard deviation (in other words,
Θ = {μ, σ}).
The dashed red line provides an example of the ﬁrst model, a gradual-change
model. According to the gradual-change model, the ﬁrst pause (the post-priming
pause) is drawn from a gamma distribution with mean μ1 and standard deviation
σ1 (i.e., Θ begins at some initial value). Pauses m (m = 6 in the ﬁgure, after 5
rewards have been earned) to the end of the trial are drawn from a separate gamma
distribution with mean μ2 and standard deviation σ2 (i.e., Θ reaches a ﬁnal value).
Pauses in between, from 2 to m−1 (in the ﬁgure, m−1 = 5, after 4 rewards have been
earned), are drawn from a gamma distribution whose mean and standard deviation
are straight-line functions of the reward encounter, starting at μ1 for the pause on
reward encounter 1 and ending at μ2 for the pause on reward encounter m (i.e., Θ
gradually changes from its initial to ﬁnal value).
Pauses censored by the end of the trial were excluded from the analysis; if the
rat had only ever collected one reward, we considered this to be inﬁnite evidence in
favour of a step-change model, since there was no way a gradual change model could
account for this pattern of behaviour. The very infrequent case of a post-priming
pause censored by the end of the trial, indicating that the rat simply never bothered
to obtain a sample of the payoﬀ, were excluded entirely from the analysis, as it would
be impossible to arbitrate between the two models which was better at explaining the
data. In total, only 459 trials (of 16007, or under 2.8%) across all animals, conditions,
and price-frequency pairs were excluded.
The solid black line of ﬁgure 4.1 provides an example of the second model, the
step-change model. According to this model, the ﬁrst n pauses (n = 5 in the ﬁgure,
- 161 -
after 4 rewards have been earned) are drawn from a gamma distribution with mean
μ1 and standard deviation σ1 (in other words, Θ begins at an initial value). Pauses
n + 1 (in the ﬁgure, n + 1 = 6, starting on 5 rewards earned) to the end of the trial
are drawn from a separate gamma distribution with mean μ2 and standard deviation
σ2 (in other words, Θ reaches a ﬁnal value). There are no transitional pauses.
In the case of a gradual change, we deﬁne an initial segment, extending from
the PRP following reward 1 to the PRP following reward n. Throughout this ini-
tial segment, the parameters of the distribution from which PRPs are sampled varies
smoothly as a straight-line function from the parameters that describe the distribu-
tion of PPPs to those that describe the stable segment that extends from the PRP
following reward n + 1 to that following the very last reward. For the step-change
model, we can deﬁne an initial segment (from the post-priming pause, following re-
ward 0, to the post-reinforcement pause following reward n), and a stable segment
(from reward encounter n + 1 to the last reward encounter).
In the case of the step-change model, for each initial segment of length S,
from a length of one (that is, only the PPP is included in the initial segment) to
two less than the maximum number of rewards delivered for trials on which each
price-frequency pair was in eﬀect, we identiﬁed the maximum-likelihood estimates
of the parameters of a gamma distribution from which the pauses within the initial
segment were drawn as well as the maximum-likelihood estimates of the parameters of
a gamma distribution from which all pauses following the initial segment were drawn.
These estimates provide the necessary information for calculating the probability of
observing all pauses in the trial, assuming a step-like change, for an initial segment
of length S.
In the case of the gradual-change model, for each initial segment of duration
S +1, we identiﬁed the maximum-likelihood estimates of the parameters of a gamma
distribution from which all pauses within the stable segment were drawn, as well as
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the maximum-likelihood estimates of the parameters of a gamma distribution from
which all post-priming pauses were drawn. These estimates provide the necessary in-
formation for calculating the probability of observing all pauses in the trial, assuming
a gradual change, for a transition of duration S + 1. We then noted, for each initial
step-change segment of duration S and initial gradual-change segment of duration
S+1, the probability of the data assuming a step-like change (in the case of an initial
segment of duration S), as well as the probability of the data assuming a gradual
change (in the case of a transition segment of duration S + 1).
To compare the two models—gradual or step-like—we marginalized the likeli-
hood of each model with respect to initial segment lengths and transition durations.
We summed the probability of the data, assuming a step-like change, across initial
segments of all lengths S, and the probability of the data, assuming a gradual change,
across transition segments of all durations S+1. As a result, the ﬁrst calculation pro-
vides the overall probability of the data, assuming a step-like change, when the initial
segment contains 1, 2, or N reward encounters. The second calculation provides the
overall probability of the data, assuming a gradual change, when the transition takes
1, 2, or N − 1 reward encounters to occur.
The ratio of the two probabilities provides the Bayes factor for one model
compared to the other. The ratio of the probability of the data, given a step-change
model, to the probability of the data, given a gradual-change model, for example, is
the odds in favour of a step-change model. If this number is large (or, alternately,
its logarithm is positive), then regardless of the duration of the initial segment of
either model, a step-change model better accounts for the data than any gradual-
change model. If this number is vanishingly small (or, alternately, its logarithm is
negative), then regardless of the durations of the initial segment of either model, a
gradual-change model better accounts for the data than any step-change model.
Following calculation of the Bayes Factor for each price-frequency pair in each
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non-probabilistic condition for each rat, we extracted the value of S (if the common
logarithm of the Bayes Factor was positive) or S +1 (if the common logarithm of the
Bayes Factor was negative) for which the data were maximally likely. These values
represent the maximum-likelihood estimate of the number of rewards the rat earned
strictly before pauses could be said to be sampled from a single gamma distribution;
this number therefore indicates the maximum-likelihood estimate of how many reward
deliveries were necessary before behaviour could be said to have stabilized.
4.2.2.2 Time allocation diﬀerence
To describe the evolution of pauses in the trial, we computed the discrete
equivalent of the derivative of the proportion of time allocated to self-stimulation in
each reward encounter. For each reward encounter, deﬁned as the period of time
from lever extension (the end of the inter-trial interval or blackout delay) to lever
retraction (the start of a new inter-trial interval or blackout delay), we summed the
total time the lever was held with the total time the lever had been released for less
than one second to obtain an estimate of the amount of time spent working for the
BSR during the reward encounter. This work time was divided by the total duration
of the reward encounter, including the total time the lever was depressed and the
total time the lever was released, to obtain an estimate of time allocation for the
reward encounter.
The time allocation diﬀerence was then calculated as the diﬀerence between
time allocation on reward encounter n and time allocation on reward encounter n−1,
the immediately preceding reward encounter, from the second reward encounter on-
wards. According to a model-free description of how the rats update the subjective
opportunity cost and reward intensity in eﬀect on a trial, this diﬀerence should grad-
ually reach 0 over multiple reward encounters. If the rat has an estimate of the payoﬀ
based on the value of these key decision variables at the start of the trial, purely
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model-free mechanisms would update this estimate incrementally as more rewards
are earned. For example, time allocation might be relatively high on the ﬁrst reward
encounter from overestimating the payoﬀ. When the ﬁrst reward is earned, the pay-
oﬀ may be revised downward, producing a slightly lower time allocation. After n
rewards, the rat’s payoﬀ estimate would reach the true payoﬀ, and time allocation on
all subsequent reward encounters would be the same. Taking the diﬀerence of time
allocation with respect to reward encounter, a negative diﬀerence would be seen for
the ﬁrst n+1 reward encounters, reaching a value of 0 when the estimate of payoﬀ
became accurate.
In contrast, according to a model-based description, this diﬀerence will not
be a smooth, continuous function. For the ﬁrst n (where n could be as small as 1)
reward encounters, time allocation will be constant, yielding a diﬀerence of 0. As
soon as the payoﬀ has been updated, time allocation will change, producing a large
positive or negative number. Finally, for all reward encounters after the change,
time allocation will be constant again, reﬂecting the new (accurate) payoﬀ estimate,
yielding a diﬀerence of 0 again.
4.2.2.3 Work bouts before and after the ﬁrst reward is delivered
The above analyses imply two distinct periods of the trial: an adjustment
period (when pauses can be understood as realizations of a stochastic process with
distributional characteristics Θ1 that are either stationary or non-stationary), followed
by a stable period (when pauses can be understood as realizations of a stochastic pro-
cess with stationary distributional characteristics Θ2). At the boundary between the
two, some process has occurred—either as a gradual or a step function—that has
altered behaviour. It is natural, then, to ask whether the patterning of work bouts
also diﬀers between two periods of trial time we will demonstrate are diﬀerent: prior
to the delivery of the ﬁrst reward, when the key determinants of decision-making
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have not yet been revealed, and following the delivery of the ﬁrst reward, when those
key determinants have, in principle, been uncovered. Indeed, when trial parame-
ters are not yet known, the usually competing goals of exploration and exploitation
are aligned: exploration of the mapping between actions and rewards requires the
rat to lever-press, thereby appearing no diﬀerent than exploitation of the rewards
derived from lever-pressing. Following the ﬁrst reward delivery, the payoﬀ from self-
stimulation can (in principle) be known completely, so exploitation and exploration
are once again antagonistic: he may greedily exploit the option (self-stimulation or
extraneous activities) with the better reward, or sub-optimally explore whether the
foregone option has increased in value.
To test whether the rat’s willingness to work prior to the delivery of the ﬁrst
reward of a trial is diﬀerent from that in subsequent periods of the trial, we extracted
the number of corrected work bouts (holds and releases lasting less than 1s together)
emitted by the rat resulting in a reward delivery, for either the time prior to or
following the delivery of the ﬁrst reward. This allows us to examine whether there
are diﬀerences in how vigorously an animal will work for a reward it has not yet
received, compared to when it knows what the payoﬀ from self-stimulation will be.
On each reward encounter that resulted in a reward delivery, both the objective price
and the number of corrected work bouts (holds and taps, together, uninterrupted
by a TLB) was recorded. For each objective price tested and in each of the two
periods of trial time considered, the maximum-likelihood estimate of the mean and
conﬁdence interval of a Poisson process that generated the number of work bouts
was determined. The conﬁdence level for the intervals was adjusted to maintain a
5% family-wise error rate for the number of comparisons that were made: one for
each unique objective price. As a result, the width of the conﬁdence interval around
each estimated number of work bouts per delivered reward was (0.95)(1/c), where c
is the number of unique objective prices tested. We then determined the highest
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price for which the maximum-likelihood estimate was signiﬁcantly less than (that is,
the upper bound on its conﬁdence interval was strictly less than) 2 corrected work
bouts per reward delivery. In other words, a 95% conﬁdence interval about the mean
number of bouts extending from 1.2 to 2 would indicate that on 97.5% of reward
encounters resulting in a reward, that reward was obtained in fewer than 2 corrected
work bouts. The highest price at which the 95% conﬁdence interval (corrected for
multiple comparisons) is strictly less than 2 provides the highest price at which the
rat earns rewards in a single, continuous press. Any higher, and the rat unequivocally
allocates at least two presses to obtaining the reward; any lower, and the rat cannot
be unequivocally said to require multiple corrected work bouts to obtain a single
reward.
4.3 Results
4.3.1 Two models of post-priming/reinforcement pauses
Figure 4.2 is a histogram of the common logarithm of the Bayes Factors,
including those for which the Bayes Factor was inﬁnite. In these latter cases, the
animal only ever collected one reward before ceasing all responding, producing a
single uncensored post-priming pause. In the upper inset, the region from -3 to 3 is
highlighted. Commonly, Bayes Factors from 1 to 3 (common logarithms from 0 to
0.47) are considered trivial evidence, from 3 to 10 (common logarithms from 0.47 to
1) are considered substantial evidence, from 10 to 30 (common logarithms from 1 to
1.47) are considered strong evidence, from 30 to 100 (common logarithms from 1.47
to 2) are considered very strong evidence, and over 100 (common logarithm greater
than 2) are considered decisive evidence (Jeﬀreys, 1998).
The median Bayes Factor was found to be 2.881 (common logarithm of 0.46),
which indicates that regardless of how many transitional or initial post-reinforcement
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Figure 4.2. Bayes factors comparing step- to gradual-change models of pauses. His-
togram of Log10[Bayes Factors] observed in all price-frequency pairs of test trials of
all animals in all conditions. Inﬁnite Bayes Factors indicate that the rat collected a
single reward and ceased responding, as the post-reinforcement pause following the
ﬁrst reward is censored by the end of the trial. The insets show the histogram in the
region around a Log10 of 0 (top) in addition to a coarse grouping showing the number
of Bayes Factors providing at least substantial evidence in favour of a gradual-change
model (< −0.5), trivial evidence (−0.5 to 0.5), or at least substantial evidence in
favour of a step-change model (> 0.5).
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pauses one considers, a model according to which the distribution of pauses changes in
step-wise fashion is just under 2.9 times more likely than a model according to which
the distribution of these pauses changes gradually. This value of the Bayes Factor is
just under what would be considered substantial evidence. Although many (533, or
43.2%) Bayes Factors are in the trivial range (with common logarithms ranging from
-0.5 to 0.5), many (482, or 39.0%) also decidedly favour the step-change model, and
a vanishingly small number provide any evidence that favours the gradual-change
model. This is more clearly shown in the lower inset of ﬁgure 4.2, which depicts
the proportion of price-frequency pairs that fall within the trivial and substantial-
or-better ranges in favour of either the gradual-change model (negative values) or
the step-change model (positive values). A considerable proportion of Bayes Factors
provide at least substantial evidence in favour of a step-change model, while virtually
none provide any evidence (trivial or better) in favour of a gradual-change model.
Indeed, 698 (56.6%) price-frequency pairs represent at least substantial evi-
dence in favour of a step-change model, and only 2 represent substantial evidence in
favour of a gradual change model, while no price-frequency pairs revealed strong or
greater evidence in favour of gradual change. Figure 4.3 is a bar graph that depicts the
number of price-frequency pairs for which the Bayes Factor falls into each qualitative
category, for either the gradual-change (left) or step-change (right) models.
Finally, ﬁgure 4.4 is a histogram of the maximum-likelihood estimates of the
number of reward deliveries required before pauses can be said to have been sampled
from the same, underlying gamma distribution. Overwhelmingly, that estimate is
1: the median of the maximally likely number of reward deliveries required before
the pauses the rat makes all come from the same (possibly payoﬀ-dependent) gamma
distribution is just one. Indeed, in only 32.3% of cases is the maximum-likelihood
estimate greater than one reward delivery. The data provide a preponderance of
evidence in favour of a step-change in post-priming and post-reinforcement pauses,
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Figure 4.3. Qualitative categories of Bayes factors comparing step- and gradual-
change models of pauses. Using Jeﬀreys’ (1998) qualitative descriptions of Bayes
factors comparing step- and gradual-change models of ﬁrst-pause durations, there is
little evidence to support a gradual-change model, very often trivial evidence to sup-
port a step-change model, and a preponderance of substantial, strong, very strong,
or decisive evidence to support a step-change model.
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Figure 4.4. Maximum-likelihood estimate of the number of pauses in initial segments
of either step- or gradual-change models. Histogram of the number of rewards re-
quired before a step- or gradual-change (the model with the best evidence) has been
completed. The estimate is preponderantly one reward before performance changes,
with comparatively very few instances of two or more rewards.
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and the maximally likely time at which the step-change occurs is following the ﬁrst
reward delivery. It is still possible that although the post-reinforcement pauses are
constant throughout the trial, the rat’s behavioural policy may gradually change
regardless. For example, the rat may interrupt its self-stimulation activities for longer
and more frequent periods of grooming and exploring as its estimate of the payoﬀ is
gradually revised downwards, or shorter and fewer periods as the estimate is gradually
revised upwards. It is to this question we shall now turn in identifying whether rats
make a single, step-wise change to their behavioural allocation policy following a single
exemplar of the payoﬀ, or they make gradual changes throughout the trial as they
update their estimate of the reward they can expect to receive and the opportunities
they will have to forgo as they pursue electrical rewards.
4.3.2 Change in time allocation from reward encounter to
reward encounter
The model comparison outlined above provides overwhelming evidence in
favour of a step-change mechanism rather than a gradual-change mechanism. The
natural next question becomes: how few reward deliveries are necessary before the rat
behaves as though the estimate of payoﬀ had been abruptly updated? We conducted
an ANOVA on the diﬀerence in the proportion of time allocated to self stimulation
with respect to reward encounter for every animal, for each combination of pulse
frequency and price that was encountered on test trials. The step-change model
implies that there will be a single reward encounter at which the change in time al-
location is statistically diﬀerent from zero, and will be zero otherwise. The reward
delivery corresponding to that single reward encounter is the number of exemplars
necessary before payoﬀ is updated. For example, if the change in time allocation is
statistically diﬀerent from 0 following two rewards, and nowhere else, then the rat
behaves as though it requires two exemplars of pulse frequency and price before it
- 172 -
abruptly updates its estimate of the payoﬀ for the remainder of the trial. If, as will
be demonstrated below, the change in time allocation is statistically diﬀerent from
0 only following one reward, and nowhere else, then the rat behaves as though it
requires a single exemplar of pulse frequency and price before it abruptly updates its
estimate of the payoﬀ for the remainder of the trial.
Figure 4.5 shows the mean absolute value of the diﬀerence of time allocation
with respect to reward encounter number, from the ﬁrst reward delivery to the tenth,
for all animals. The general pattern, viewed across all animals, is consistent with
the maximum-likelihood estimates of the step-change model derived above: time
allocation changes suddenly (either becoming greater or smaller) between the ﬁrst
and second reward encounters, but ceases to change systematically from the second
reward encounter onward. A within-subjects ANOVA conducted on the unsigned
diﬀerence in time allocation with respect to reward number conﬁrms this visualization,
revealing a signiﬁcant eﬀect of reward encounter on the change in time allocation
(F (9, 106313) = 1792.3, p << 0.05, η2 = 0.128).
We further tested at which point time allocation ceased to change by conduct-
ing a series of comparisons between the change in time allocation following reward
encounter n and all subsequent reward encounters. In other words, we compared the
change in time allocation following the ﬁrst reward delivery to the mean change fol-
lowing the second through tenth reward deliveries, then the change in time allocation
following the second to the mean change following the third through tenth, and so
on. To maintain a 5% family-wise error rate, we calculated the exact per-comparison
probability for 9 comparisons as 1 − (1 − 0.05)(1/9), or 0.0057. Although the change
in time allocation following the ﬁrst reward delivery was signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from
all subsequent reward deliveries (F (1, 106313) = 13.63, p < 0.05 family-wise), time
allocation ceased to change from the second reward delivery onward (F ranged from
6.6 × 10−4 to 0.38). Figure 4.6 depicts the mean squared deviations associated with
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Figure 4.5. Absolute diﬀerence in time allocation for all animals. Mean unsigned
change in time allocation from one reward encounter to the next as a function of
the number of rewards earned, for the ﬁrst 10 reward deliveries, for each rat. Time
allocation changes drastically following the ﬁrst reward delivery, but ceases to change
thereafter.
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Figure 4.6. Post-hoc test of the within-subject change in time allocation across suc-
cessive reward encounters. Mean squared deviation of each comparison (± SEM)
as a function of the orthogonal comparison being made. While the change in time
allocation following one reward delivery is signiﬁcantly greater than the mean of all
subsequent changes in time allocation, the change in time allocation following the
second and subsequent reward deliveries are no diﬀerent than each other and not
reliably diﬀerent from 0.
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each single-df comparison (1 vs 2 through 10, 2 vs 3 through 10, etc.) along with
their standard error. The mean squared deviation in the absolute value of the time
allocation diﬀerence following one reward compared to the ten rewards that follow is
signiﬁcantly greater than 0, while the mean squared deviations of unsigned time allo-
cation diﬀerences following two through nine rewards compared to those that follow
are, for all intents and purposes, zero.
4.3.3 First reward encounter is diﬀerent from subsequent re-
ward encounters
Figure 4.7 provides a comparison of the crude estimates of the vigour with
which a rat will work for electrical rewards before and following the ﬁrst reward
delivery. The upper left-hand panel is the mean number of corrected work bouts
(per lever retraction) one representative rat engages in, for each price, before any
rewards are delivered. Also indicated is the associated, 95% family-wise conﬁdence
interval. Asterisks indicate means that are signiﬁcantly below 2 (maintaining a 0.05
family-wise error rate across all prices). The upper right-hand panel is the mean
number of corrected work bouts (per lever retraction) that rat engages in from the
ﬁrst reward delivery onward. As with the left-hand panel, asterisks indicate means
that are signiﬁcantly below 2. Our crude estimate of the vigour is the highest price
for which the estimated number of corrected work bouts is signiﬁcantly less than 2:
at lower objective prices, the rat usually (though not exclusively) engages in a single
work bout to obtain a single reward, but at higher prices, the rat is always most likely
to obtain the reward after two or more bouts. Dotted lines indicate, in each case,
this crude estimate of vigour: the highest price at which the rat obtains rewards in a
single bout of work.
The bottom panel of Figure 4.7 depicts the mean logarithm of the highest
price at which the number of corrected work bouts per lever retraction is signiﬁcantly
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Figure 4.7. Number of work bouts required to obtain a reward. The top left panel
shows the maximum-likelihood estimate (± 95 % conﬁdence interval, family-wise)
of the number of corrected work bouts (holds interrupted only by releases lasting
less than 1s) required to obtain a reward as a function of the objective price, prior
to the delivery of the ﬁrst reward, for a single animal. The top right panel shows
this estimate as a function of the objective price following the ﬁrst reward delivery.
Asterisks indicate estimates that are signiﬁcantly less than 2 (two tailed, family-wise
correction). Dotted lines indicate the highest price at which rewards are earned in
signiﬁcantly fewer than two bouts. The bottom panel is a bar graph of the highest
price at which rewards are earned in fewer than two bouts for all animals. The
asterisk here indicates a statistically signiﬁcant within-subject diﬀerence in this price
(p < 0.05).
- 177 -
less than 2 for all animals in all conditions, before and following the ﬁrst reward
delivery. A paired-samples t-test was performed on the diﬀerence in the logarithm
of the highest price at which the number of corrected work bouts is signiﬁcantly less
than 2, to identify whether there was an eﬀect of the ﬁrst reward delivery. The t-
test revealed a signiﬁcant eﬀect of the ﬁrst reward delivery on this crude estimate
(t(26) = 2.77, p < 0.05), indicating that rats were willing to work for higher prices
before the payoﬀ was completely known compared to after it was transparent in
principle, across all conditions they encountered. This result, combined with the
above two results concerning the model comparison and time allocation diﬀerence,
implies that there are indeed two distinct periods of time, the boundary of which can
be delineated by the delivery of the ﬁrst reward of the trial.
4.4 Discussion
4.4.1 Stable trial responding
In our hands, performance for rewarding brain stimulation is remarkably sta-
ble following a step change between the time the payoﬀ from self-stimulation cannot
be known to the time it is (in principle) completely transparent. A contrast of two
models—one in which performance in some initial period switches abruptly to a sta-
ble period to one in which performance changes gradually over a number of price-
frequency exemplars until it is stable—provides evidence that, no matter how long
or short the initial or transitional periods are, the model for which the data are more
likely is generally the step-change model. The median Bayes Factor, across all price-
frequency pairs encountered in all conditions for all rats, is just under what would
be considered substantial evidence, with a considerable proportion of price-frequency
pairs providing what we have termed “inﬁnite evidence” in favour of a step change
model. As soon as the rat “knows” what the subjective opportunity cost and reward
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intensity of the electrical brain stimulation will be, the animal rapidly switches to a
behavioural policy that reﬂects that payoﬀ, rather than gradually adjusting it over
a number of trials. The maximum likelihood estimate of the number of reward de-
liveries required for the animal to perform this switch is an equally overwhelming
answer: following just one reward delivery, pauses can be said to come from a sin-
gle, underlying distribution for the remainder of the trial, for the great majority of
price-frequency pairs across all animals.
One could imagine that despite stable post-reinforcement pauses following the
ﬁrst reward encounter, overall performance reﬂecting an underlying behavioural pol-
icy could change gradually as the rat obtains more exemplars of the payoﬀ from self-
stimulation. For example, the rat may opt to maintain a constant post-reinforcement
pause but interrupt its lever-pressing with more and longer bouts of leisure activi-
ties, such as grooming, resting and exploring as its estimate of the payoﬀ from self-
stimulation was revised to lower and lower values over a number of rewards. When
the payoﬀ is better than expected, the rat may opt to interrupt its lever-pressing with
fewer and shorter bouts of non-lever pressing activities it can engage in throughout
the trial. Such a behavioural policy would make the proportion of time allocated
to lever-pressing change gradually as more rewards were delivered. Further conﬁrm-
ing the model-comparison results and maximum-likelihood estimates extracted from
them, the change in time allocation from reward encounter to reward encounter was
signiﬁcantly greater following the ﬁrst reward delivery compared to all subsequent
reward deliveries, and was no diﬀerent for all subsequent reward deliveries.
Moreover, an animal’s willingness to work is diﬀerent from the time the reward
is unknown to the time it is delivered. Whereas an animal will engage in a single,
continuous work bout (releasing the lever only for a very short period of time to
tap) up to high prices when the subjective opportunity cost and intensity have not
yet been revealed, the same animal will engage in a continuous work bout up to a
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signiﬁcantly lower price when the subjective opportunity cost and intensity have been
revealed compared to when they have no yet been revealed.
Taken together, these results imply that the rat can maintain a world model
of the constancy of the payoﬀ if that constancy is cued. As a consequence of this
world model, if the payoﬀ is not known when the trial begins, the rat can update its
estimate of the payoﬀ in a single step-like change following the delivery of a single
reward. This would not be true if the rat had no world model of the constancy of the
payoﬀ throughout the trial: the rat would need to learn de novo what the subjective
opportunity cost and reward intensity of the electrical reward are every time a new
trial was presented.
The idea of world models in rodents is certainly not new. As a world model
refers to a representation of how states transition to each other, this description is
an extension to the operant conditioning domain of Tolman’s original concept of a
cognitive map. In Tolman’s (1948) formulation of cognitive maps, the rat does not
simply evaluate the net reward associated with an action. Instead, the rat forms a
representation of the relationship between external environmental cues and the path
that has been taken through them. For example, consider a hungry rat that is allowed
to explore a Y-maze in which one arm was baited with water and the other with food.
Assuming a purely model-free learning mechanism, the total net reward from visiting
the water arm of the Y-maze is 0, and thus, no reward prediction error is made:
the rat expects no reward, receives no reward, and does not update the value of
heading to the water-baited arm. The total net reward from visiting the food arm
comes as a surprise: the rat expects nothing at the end of the arm, receives food, and
updates the value of heading to the food-baited arm. Such an animal cannot know
what the state will be when it heads left or right, because that information is neither
learned nor represented. Despite this, rats trained in this way were found to quickly
head toward the water-baited arm of the Y-maze when subsequently water deprived,
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indicating that they had a cognitive map of where to ﬁnd food and water. The idea
of a cognitive map is isomorphic to a model-based, feed-forward model of operant
performance: the rat acts based on a mapping, not of food and water locations, but
rather, of the varying demands that will be placed on the rat to obtain rewards of
varying strength.
If rats indeed behave as though they have a model of the constancy of the
subjective opportunity cost and reward intensity throughout the trial, then this model
must be learned from the time the animal ﬁrst encounters the ﬂashing light of a
trial. When the rat is ﬁrst placed in an operant chamber for training, the ﬂashing
house lights are necessarily meaningless, as the rat has never seen the house light cue
before. Over the course of multiple reward deliveries, the rat forms a representation
of the amount of time the lever will have to be held and of the magnitude of the
reward to be delivered, in addition to representations that may or may not change
like the probability of reinforcement. As a new trial begins, the house light cue is
presented again, and the rat must maintain a new representation of the new subjective
opportunity cost and reward intensity in eﬀect for the new trial. Given that the
subjective opportunity cost, reward intensity, and (in the case of rats undergoing the
probability experiment) probability of reinforcement vary considerably from trial to
trial, the only reliable signal provided by the ﬂashing house light is that a change in
any of the key determinants of decision may have occurred, and the variance in those
key determinants will be zero from the oﬀset of the ﬂashing house light to its onset
at trial’s end. It is possible that the rat maintains a representation of this change (as
implied in Chapter 3) and a representation of the non-variance in the determinants
of the payoﬀ from self-stimulation.
Testing where this representation is maintained is a straightforward empirical
question in principle, provided one were recording in the correct location. Rats could
be presented with trials diﬀering with respect to the variability of an easily controlled
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determinant of the payoﬀ: the subjective opportunity cost. Rats would be presented
with the randomized-triads design, though in addition to the pseudo-random selection
of the test trial from a list of prices and pulse frequencies, any given trial in the
sequence could require a ﬁxed or variable work requirement before a reward was
delivered. In other words, an appropriately-cued lead, test, or trailing trial would
deliver stimulation when the lever had been held for a ﬁxed, cumulative amount of
time (as is the case for the present experiment), or for a variable, cumulative amount
of time. Assuming a suﬃciently well-trained rat, putative neurons responsible for
signalling that the payoﬀ may have changed would predictably ﬁre at the start of
every trial type regardless of the variability in opportunity cost. Putative neurons
responsible for signalling the variance (or lack thereof) in opportunity cost would show
diﬀerential activity following each cue type. Actually conducting such an experiment,
however, would be a herculean task, as the number of price exemplars the rat would
need to sample before it had a reasonably accurate estimate of the average subjective
opportunity cost on any given trial is very large indeed. Nonetheless, the question
is empirical and would provide a mechanism for the neural basis of model-based
decision-making.
4.4.2 Fast learning or ﬁlling in?
Given that rats require only one exemplar of the payoﬀ on a particular trial
in order to set a behavioural policy that will guide performance for the remainder of
the trial, it is unlikely any feed-back mechanism can explain these data. Either each
time step is so large that it is meaningless (there is only one time step for which to
update the value of state-action pairs), or there is truly a simple representation of
within-trial stationarity somewhere in the brain: if the house light begins to ﬂash,
then the key determinants of the decision will stay constant until it ﬂashes again.
Much like the previously-described world model of the triad structure of the session,
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we have presented considerable evidence here that the rat behaves as though it has a
world model of the constancy of the key determinants of its decision to press within
a trial.
Our results are closely related to and extend ﬁndings regarding performance
for brain stimulation rewards in the rat when those rewards were delivered at rates
that changed in either a cued or un-cued fashion (Gallistel et al., 2001; Mark and
Gallistel, 1994; Mazur, 1995a). Gallistel et al. (2001) found that when the average
rate of reward changed in un-cued fashion following either long (weeks) or short
(hours) periods of time, rats’ stay durations at each of the levers of a concurrent
variable interval schedule tracked fairly closely the performance of an ideal, Bayesian
observer. When changes in the average rates occurred on the order of hours, rats
adjusted phenomenally quickly to the new contingency, while when the average rates
of each lever were stable on the order of days and weeks, rats adjusted considerably
more slowly. Their analyses also demonstrate that performance does not track the
immediately local rate as suggested by Mark and Gallistel (1994), per se, but rather,
reﬂected the average rate.
One way that model-free reinforcement learning could arguably account for
this step-like change is by assuming that the payoﬀ from self-stimulation acts as a
discriminative stimulus. In this case, the rat has learned over the course of training
every combination of subjective opportunity cost and reward intensity it is likely to
encounter, extracted the appropriate total future reward from taking every action in
every trial state, and implements that pre-learned behavioural strategy as soon as it
encounters the combination again. Given the combinatorial explosion that would be
involved, and previous results implying that rat performance approximates an ideal
detector of change in concurrent variable-interval schedules (Gallistel et al., 2001), we
ﬁnd this proposition unlikely. As we argue below, a more satisfying account of the
process underlying the observed step-change from post-priming to post-reinforcement
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pause, as well as from overall performance before the ﬁrst reward delivery to following
ﬁrst reward delivery, can be found in a feed-forward, “ﬁlling in” model.
4.4.3 An extension of ideal-detector theory
When conditions are stable, it would behove an animal working under a
variable-interval schedule of reinforcement to require a large number of exemplars
before inferring that the average rate has changed, since the experienced rates of re-
inforcement are the result of an exponential process. When conditions are unstable, a
small number of exemplars ought to be necessary. The duration for which conditions
have been stable places a high prior probability for the average rate of reinforcement.
In order to infer that these rates have changed, an animal would require substantial
evidence before the mean was updated. In contrast, variable conditions place a ﬂatter
prior probability for the average rate of reinforcement, which require less evidence to
infer that there has been a change in rate. When there is a great deal of evidence
that a patch should deliver berries at a rate of 3 per minute, a few anomalous obser-
vations should not lead a foraging animal to infer that a change in rate has occurred.
Similarly, when conditions change rapidly, and there is no evidence of a particular
rate of reinforcement, less evidence should be necessary for an animal to infer that a
change in rate has occurred.
In the present experiment, an ideal detector of change would necessarily require
a single exemplar of the payoﬀ to infer that a change has occurred. As there is
no variability in the work requirement, and therefore in the rate during work, any
change, even if it were unsignalled, would require only one reward to be detected.
This is a proposition that could be, in principle, tested empirically: if the price of the
electrical reward, which sets the reciprocal of the rate of reinforcement during work,
were to abruptly change midway through the test trial, but remain constant for the
remaining duration of the trial, the rat would re-adjust its performance in step-wise
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fashion. Similarly, if the subjective intensity of the electrical reward were to change
step-wise midway through the test trial, and then remain constant, the rat would
re-adjust its performance in an equally step-wise fashion. In this sense, our proposal
that rats in the randomized-triads design develop a world model of the constancy of
the trial from reward encounter to reward encounter is simply a special case of the
proposal that rats behave as though they are ideal detectors of change.
Since both initial pauses and overall performance change in step-like fashion
following the ﬁrst reward, the question becomes: what do these behavioural mea-
sures reﬂect about the rat’s policy? Model-free learning mechanisms require a back-
propagating mechanism to the earliest point a reward can be predicted, which would
result in gradual changes in the animal’s action selection policy. It is therefore un-
likely that our results can be explained by a simple hill-climbing process that updates
the estimate of reward over multiple reward deliveries, revising the magnitude of the
reward to the same degree on every iteration and the subjective opportunity cost as
the lever is held for the required cumulative amount of time. Instead, we propose
that if such an update occurs, the rat takes into account statistical properties of the
environment to tune the rate at which estimates of key determinants of decisions are
revised. In the case of brain stimulation rewards delivered in cued trials for which
these determinants are constant, the statistical properties of this environment (for-
malized here as a world model of the reward encounter) allow the rat to update its
estimates of the determinants that matter in a single step.
If we assume that rats use a strategy that is at least partly model-based, then
there is necessarily a “ﬁlling in” mechanism driving the rat’s behavioural policy: as
soon as the payoﬀ is known completely and with certainty, as it is following the ﬁrst
reward delivery, the rat can simply “ﬁll in” this payoﬀ into what it ought to do, from
the moment the lever extends back into the cage at the end of the blackout delay. Prior
to this point in time, before the payoﬀ is completely known, the rat may have updated
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its estimate of the subjective opportunity cost as it held the lever and adjusted how it
partitions its time on the basis of this on-going estimate. However, from the time the
ﬁrst reward is delivered until the trial ends, performance is completely stable. Post-
reinforcement pauses can be said to have come from the same underlying gamma
distribution, and the proportion of time allocated to lever-pressing (which is the ratio
of corrected hold time to the sum of post-reinforcement pause, corrected hold and
release times) for each reward delivered after the ﬁrst cease to change. Since the
amount of time the lever is held per reward will be constant, only the time the lever
is released can make the proportion of time allocated to lever-pressing per reward
change. Since two of the three components of time allocation do not change, and
time allocation itself does not change, the third component (all releases following the
ﬁrst lever-press following a reward delivery) also cannot change. In other words, the
entire behavioural policy—when to start pressing, how long to press, and how long to
release—is ﬁxed from the time the ﬁrst reward is delivered and the payoﬀ is known.
This “ﬁlling in” mechanism has been described elsewhere (Gallistel et al., 2001)
as a feed-forward model of Thorndike’s (1898) law of eﬀect. Rather than waiting for
observable consequences of behaviour to inform the animal about the best course
of action, the feed-forward description implies that an internal world model of the
animal’s situation informs the animal about the best course of action. We demonstrate
here that rats indeed behave as though they have an internal world model of the
price-frequency constancy, and that a single reward is suﬃcient in providing payoﬀ
information that will feed forward to the rat’s behavioural policy for the combination
of subjective opportunity cost and reward intensity it can expect to receive throughout
the trial.
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4.4.4 The decision to quit
In many instances, rats earn a single reward and cease to respond, our so-called
“inﬁnite evidence” conditions of the contrast between gradual-change (purely model-
free) and step-change (at least partly model-based) descriptions of the task of learning
the subjective opportunity cost and reward intensity of the electrical stimulation on
oﬀer during a trial. This work-then-quit behaviour could be the result of either of
two processes. The animal may not have ceased responding, per se, but has engaged
in a post-reinforcement pause drawn from a distribution with a central tendency
suﬃciently long that its duration is censored by the end of the trial. Alternately
or in tandem, armed with a world model of how trials progress (Chapter 3), the
animal may have opted to wait until the leading bracket trial, with known high
payoﬀ, would be presented again. Regardless of which process drives the animal
to apparently cease responding entirely, both imply the above-described “ﬁlling in”
mechanism: the currently expected payoﬀ from self-stimulation, updated in step-wise
fashion following the delivery of a single reward, sets the duration of the pause to
be taken before the animal begins responding. As the proportion of time allocated
to self-stimulation per reward is also set by this single-step updated expected payoﬀ,
it is possible that all components of the behavioural policy that make up the molar
measure of performance are also set when the payoﬀ is “ﬁlled in.” In other words,
it is altogether possible that the internal representation of payoﬀ sets not only the
duration of the post-reinforcement pause, but also of each lever-press to make, of
each short lever release, and of each bout of the various other activities the rat could
perform in the operant chamber. We shall return to this hypothesis in Chapter 5.
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4.4.5 Conclusions
The results presented here suggest that rats behave as though they have a
world-model of how a test trial will progress. Not only does a single, step-change
model account for initial (post-priming and post-reinforcement) pauses better than
a gradual-change model, no matter how long it takes for the step- or gradual-change
to occur, but that step-like change usually occurs following a single exemplar of the
reward to be delivered, at least in the case of risk-less rewards. This ﬁnding runs
contrary to the predictions of a purely model-free description of performance for
rewarding brain stimulation in the randomized-triads design, according to which the
association between actions (namely lever-pressing) and consequences is gradually
adjusted as the reward prediction error is driven to zero over the course of many
reward deliveries. If such a “gradual” updating process occurs, the rate at which
estimates of the determinants of the decision are revised must at least be subject to
the statistical properties of the environment.
Given the presumed involvement of ventral tegmental dopamine neurons in
signalling the temporal diﬀerence reward prediction error that is critical to model-
free accounts of performance for rewards, it would be interesting to use the methods
and analyses developed here to gauge how interference with dopamine eﬄux aﬀects
model-free and model-based performance, if it does at all. For example, it would be
possible to ascertain whether dopamine receptor antagonists like pimozide alter the
rapidity of adjustments to new subjective opportunity costs and reward intensities
over the long time scales over which they act, and whether that adjustment occurs
step-wise or gradually.
Similarly, new optogenetic techniques allow for the selective excitation or inhi-
bition of dopamine neurons on the millisecond time scale over which reward prediction
errors are presumed to have their eﬀect. If phasic dopamine neurons truly encode
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this reward prediction error, then inhibiting them in the appropriate time window
following each reward would artiﬁcially indicate to the rat that the reward it had
received was always less rewarding than expected. The post-reinforcement pause
would decrease continually throughout the trial as the reward was predicted to be
ever smaller, until it was censored by the trial. Meanwhile, the overall proportion of
time allocated to self-stimulation per reward would decrease until it reached a lower
asymptote, despite the reward’s constant pulse frequency.
In contrast, if phasic dopamine signalling is related to dopamine tone, which
itself is related to the absolute intensity of the rewarding eﬀect, its eﬀort cost, or
the payoﬀ that can be expected from engaging in any other activity while in the
operant chamber, as suggested by Hernandez et al. (2010), then selectively activating
dopamine neurons in the same time window will continue to produce the step-like
changes in initial pauses and overall performance described here. If the eﬀect of
decreased dopamine tone is on the payoﬀ from self-stimulation or leisure activities,
rather than the process by which the payoﬀs are updated, the rat will continue to
update the payoﬀ from self-stimulation in a single step. Enhanced dopamine signalling
will simply change what that payoﬀ is. The results, methods, and analyses presented
here provide a fertile starting point for understanding how manipulations aﬀect the
animal’s on-going behavioural policy. A profound understanding of how various neural
circuits store, process, and implement the various components of this policy is a truly
daunting task, but the tools and results described here are easily applicable to the
further understanding of how human and non-human animals decide and choose.
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Chapter 5
A molecular model of performance for brain stimu-
lation reward
5.1 Introduction
Although there have been many attempts to characterize the moment-to-
moment action selection problem (Pyke et al., 1977; Staddon, 1992; Montague et al.,
1995; Sutton and Barto, 1981; Niv et al., 2007), few have attempted to apply their
descriptions to brain stimulation rewards. This is surprising, as intra-cranial self-
stimulation provides direct access to neural machinery involved in implementing the
decision. The electrode is in an identiﬁable location and provides a reward that is
not only devoid of extraneous sensory characteristics, but also from which the animal
will not become sated.
Traditional models of real-time performance have been framed in the context
of temporal-diﬀerence reinforcement learning, describing punctate actions (Montague
et al., 1996), or punctate actions accompanied by latencies (Niv et al., 2006), as
a Markov or semi-Markov decision process. In these models, the animal holds a
representation of a small number of states of the world and the decisions it can make
in each of those states, and either bases action selection on a cached value of the
action in a state (if using model-free learning) or a tree search (if using model-based
learning).
Previous chapters have revealed two major behavioural processes that seem to
operate in the well-trained animal.
1. An expected payoﬀ from self-stimulation on trial T can be inferred from cached
values of the price and intensity of rewards on trial T − 1. In other words, the rat
- 190 -
maintains a simple one-trial look-back world model of the state transition function
from trial T − 1 to trial T . Unlike what is proposed by model-free learning schemes,
the rat does not base its action-selection policy on the reward it received on the last
trial. Instead, the rat bases its action-selection policy on the payoﬀ for the trial to
come based on its estimate of the trial type that has just come to pass (trial T − 1)
and its estimate of the trial sequence it encounters (the state transition function Tˆ ).
2. Following a very small number of reward deliveries, which may potentially be the
very ﬁrst reward delivered, the payoﬀ on a test trial is known for certain and no
longer requires updating. Unlike feedback-based reinforcement learning schemes, the
rat does not gradually adjust its action-selection policy in response to a backward-
propagating reward prediction error. Instead, the rat “ﬁlls-in” the appropriate payoﬀ
as soon as it can be known. In other words, the rat maintains a simple one-shot
update rule for the payoﬀ from self-stimulation on test trials. The ultimate result of
this one-shot update process is that reward delivery provides the necessary stimulus
to set the action selection mechanism for the remainder of the trial.
In light of these two ﬁndings, we provide a new account of the action selection
problem. The rat develops a world model with two components: the next trial type it
can expect, and the stability of the subjective opportunity cost and reward intensity
on any given trial. As soon as the costs and rewards on a trial can be known, the
rat then allocates its time among the competing activities that can be observed. The
various activities directly observable to an investigator who has access to the record of
lever presses and releases are the result of various “hidden” processes. These hidden
processes, or behavioural states, generate stay durations with characteristic distri-
butional properties, terminating on other observable activities. The rate at which
one hidden behavioural state is terminated when the animal engages in a particular
activity is entirely set by the payoﬀ the animal can expect from self-stimulation ac-
tivities during the trial. Real-time performance is the result of the ongoing hidden
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behavioural states that have control over what the animal does, and action selection
is determined by which hidden behavioural state will take control for a given level of
payoﬀ.
5.2 Introduction to the CTMC
5.2.1 Continuous-time Markov chains
Action selection is usually described in the reinforcement learning literature as
a series of point events, leading from one trial state to another as decisions are made.
In contrast to these approaches, we present a portrayal in which the rat has a model
of the trial—that is, parameters remain constant—and a model of the session—that
is, the session’s triad structure—which provide the rat with an expected payoﬀ. In
our model, the rat is in one of a variety of behavioural states when it engages in a
particular activity for a period of time, and the duration of time the rat spends in
some states is purely a function of the payoﬀ the rat expects to get according to its
world models. The concept of a “state” moves from the external world (like the state
“One tenth of a second from the state which brings rewards”) to the internal world
(e.g., “I am holding patiently”).
Let us assume that the rat has a model of the world based on a few simple
rules, like a) the ﬁrst trial the rat encounters will have a high payoﬀ, b) the occurrence
of a ﬂashing house light signiﬁes that the state of the world has changed, c) the payoﬀ
following the ﬂashing light depends in some way on the price and reward intensity
that has just been encountered or inferred, and d) the payoﬀ will not change until
the house light ﬂashes again. If the rat expects a high payoﬀ, it will devote its time
almost exclusively to acquiring trains of brain stimulation. If the rat expects a low
payoﬀ, it will devote its time almost exclusively to all other activities it can perform
in the operant chamber, such as grooming and exploring.
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When the rat spends its time doing other things, it still faces an action selection
problem: it can groom, explore, or rest, but it cannot perform all those actions at
once. If some process sets how long the animal performs each of those actions, an
experimenter with access only to the stream of holds and releases cannot distinguish
between these activities.
A continuous-time Markov chain (CTMC) describes the behaviour of a system
as a series of processes that terminate with a characteristic rate. If the system truly
obeys the Markov property, all one needs to know is the current state of the system to
predict what the future states may be. As a result, each state of the system must have
a constant rate of failure. If every state of the system has a characteristic, constant
rate of failure, then the dwell times in every state will be exponentially distributed.
In other words, CTMCs describe an underlying system as a set of exponentially
distributed processes which each terminate with characteristic rate onto each other.
Suppose the following simple CTMC holds true: the rat begins a trial with
a post-priming pause, which terminates with characteristic rate on a hold, which
terminates with characteristic rate on a release, which terminates with characteristic
rate on a hold, until the whole system is stopped when the cumulative amount of
time spent holding reaches the price or the cumulative amount of time in all these
activities reaches the trial time. In this chain, future activities can be predicted on the
basis of only the current activity: there is some constant probability that the current
activity will fail and its termination will lead with a particular known probability
to another activity. Action selection in this chain is simply the implementation of a
characteristic termination rate when the animal is performing a particular activity.
Dwell times in each activity would be the directly observable result of the action
selection process in real time. Overall trial performance in this case emerges from the
diﬀerential probabilities that the rat will begin and cease to perform various activities,
such that trials where the payoﬀ from self-stimulation is high will favour holding and
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discourage pausing or releasing, while trials where the payoﬀ is low will favour pausing
and releasing over holding.
The directly-observable activities the rat engages in are not likely to be purely
Markov processes. If that were so, the dwell times in the various activities we can
detect would be sampled from an exponential distribution that peaks at 0 and decays
constantly over time. Instead, the rat likely spends some minimum amount of time
performing an action. At the very least, it spends at least as much time performing
the action as we can detect. The amount of time the rat spends in any particular
activity might therefore be better modelled as the result of a non-exponential process
whose termination rate increases over small time frames and approaches exponential
behaviour the longer the rat has been performing that action.
When the distribution of dwell times in directly observable activities is not
exponential, the chain can no longer be strictly called “Markovian,” because the
probability of switching from activity A to activity B is no longer constant over time.
The probability of switching from A to B when A terminates may still be constant,
so there is still a “Markovian” element to the chain: assuming A has stopped, there is
a constant probability that the next activity will be B. Chains of this type are called
“semi-Markov,” since termination rates may not be independent of time, but are
constant at transition points. The model we present here is a continuous-time, semi-
Markov chain involving activities which can be directly observed, and behavioural
states which may not.
5.2.2 Previous models
5.2.2.1 Melioration
Matching refers to the observation that on concurrent variable-interval (VI)
schedules of reinforcement, animals will tend to allocate their relative rates of re-
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sponding to each alternative in proportion to the relative rates of reinforcement. The
response requirement on any given operant is sampled from an exponential distri-
bution or a geometric approximation thereof, the eﬀect of which is that there is a
constant probability per unit time that engaging with the manipulandum will deliver
rewards. Importantly, the VI schedule of reinforcement traditionally used to study
matching has an inﬁnite hold: as soon as it is armed, the manipulandum remains
armed until the next response is made. These two features ensure that matching
is very nearly optimal: no other pattern of relative responding to the concurrently
available alternatives will substantially increase the number of rewards an animal
may obtain. In single-operant contexts, matching has been generalized (de Villiers
and Herrnstein, 1976; McDowell, 2005) such that response rate is related to the rate
at which experimenter-controlled rewards are delivered relative to the other rewards
that an animal may derive from the operant chamber context, such as grooming, ex-
ploring, and resting. Although some of the assumptions of matching have been found
not to hold in the case of brain stimulation rewards (Conover et al., 2001b), it has
been a useful framework for studying decision-making in animals.
Since matching is very nearly the optimal strategy in concurrent VI schedules,
some (Williams and Royalty, 1989) have argued that matching is the result of a max-
imizing algorithm. At any point in time, the animal may emit responses with the
highest probability of reinforcement, which would result in approximately matching
behaviour. However, Herrnstein and Heyman (1979) tested animals on a concurrent
VI/VR schedule of reinforcement, under which pigeons allocated their pecking be-
tween one key providing 3.2 seconds of access to a food hopper according to variable
intervals with means of 15, 30, or 45 seconds and another providing access to the food
hopper according to variable ratios with means of 30, 45, and 60 responses. In their
hands, although pigeons matched their relative responding to the relative obtained
rates of reinforcement, their performance did not maximize the overall rate of rein-
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forcement. Pigeons had a strong bias toward the VI schedule, rather than the VR
schedule predicted by a maximization account.
One proposed mechanism (Vaughan, 1981) by which matching occurs is melio-
ration. According to this hypothesis, if the local rate of reinforcement (the number of
reinforcements obtained while working at a manipulandum per unit time spent there)
of an alternative is less than the local rate of reinforcement obtained elsewhere, the
animal will be pulled toward the richer of the two. For example, if pecking key A
provides grain at a rate of 1 every 45 seconds and pecking key B provides grain at
a rate of 1 every 15 seconds, as the pigeon spends more and more time pecking at
key A, the probability that a response at B will be reinforced increases. At the point
where the local rate of reinforcement from A begins to fall below that of B, the pigeon
will switch to responding on key B. As it spends a greater amount of time at key B,
the probability that a response at A increases, until the local rate of reinforcement
from A exceeds that of B, resulting in another switch. This result obtains because the
reward is held in trust so long as the rat has not yet lever-pressed; as time marches
on, the probability that the lever is armed will increase and the rat will surely be
rewarded for a lever press. If the pigeon were to peck at a rate of once every 15 sec-
onds on key A (delivering rewards at rate 1/45), it would receive a reward once every
three pecks; if the pigeon simultaneously pecked at a rate of once every 45 seconds on
key B (delivering rewards at rate 1/15), it would receive a reward once every press.
Melioration proposes that because the local rate of reinforcement on pecking key B
is greater than that on pecking key A, the pigeon will allocate more pecks to B. If
the pigeon now pecks once every 5 seconds to B and once every 60 seconds to A,
the local rate of reinforcement will be 1 pellet per 3 responses at B and 1 pellet per
response at A. When the local rate of reinforcement from A exactly matches that of
B—say the pigeon pecks at A at a rate of once every 15 seconds (local rate of 1/3)
and at B at a rate of once every 5 seconds (local rate of 1/3)—the pigeon is also
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matching its relative rate of responding (1/151/5 ) to the relative rate of reinforcement
(1/451/15). Melioration proposes that the diﬀerential local rate of reinforcement drives
the animal to alter its responding to the option providing rewards at the higher local
rate until there is no diﬀerence in the local rate of reinforcement from the two options
available.
Data from Gallistel et al. (2001) imply that the factor controlling allocation of
responses to alternatives is not their relative local rates of reinforcement. Stay dura-
tions for levers on either side of an operant chamber would be expected to ﬂuctuate
not only with changes in the programmed rate of reinforcement, but also with un-
usually long intervals sampled from the variable-interval distributions. If local rates
of reinforcement were the source of matching behaviour measured on the molar level,
then rats working under concurrent VI/VI schedules delivering electrical brain stim-
ulation would be inﬂuenced by unusually low rates of reinforcement that may occur
simply by randomly sampling intervals from an exponential distribution. Unfortu-
nately for the melioration hypothesis, the distributions of stay durations (as assessed
by log-survivor plots) at a wide range of immediately-preceding inter-reward intervals
were virtually superimposable. It mattered little whether the immediately previous
local rate was low (that is, the inter-reward interval was high) or high: the probability
of remaining at the lever per unit time was identical regardless.
In explaining these data, the authors advocated a feed-forward control of per-
formance, rather than the feed-back system implicit in melioration. Feed-back sys-
tems require the rat to select the action entirely according to immediate consequences:
responding at a rate of 1/15 seconds at A produces a local rate of reinforcement of 1/3
responses, while responding at responding at a rate of 1/45 seconds at B produces
a local rate of reinforcement of 1/1 responses. In contrast, a feed-forward system
maintains a representation of the environment that allows an animal to quickly react
when it perceives changes to its situation. They propose that one system evaluates
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the rate of reinforcement from the options, and another evaluates whether that rate of
reinforcement is likely to have changed. If a change in the overall rate is likely to have
occurred, the animal adjusts its performance as quickly as could be done in principle.
If the environment is highly variable or highly stable, the threshold for identifying
a change in rate is tuned accordingly. Note that in the feed-forward case, the rat’s
actions are not the result of the immediate consequence of its actions. Instead, the
rat’s actions are the result of a model of its environment.
Given the evidence suggesting a feed-forward, rather than feed-back mecha-
nism for the emergence of matching, how can one model the moment-to-moment basis
for the behaviour observed on a molar scale?
5.2.2.2 Model-based reinforcement learning
One feed-forward description of real-time performance involves endowing the
experimental subject with a model of the identity, magnitude, and cost of the re-
wards to come. For example, a master chess player may have a model of all board
conﬁgurations their opponent may respond with for each piece they could move. The
current conﬁguration of the board provides a stimulus that informs the player which
action is optimal if he wants to achieve the goal of a check-mate only if the player
also maintains a mapping of how the board can evolve and projects this mapping
suﬃciently into the future. In an operant context, a pigeon may have learned that
responding at a blue pecking key an average of 30 times leads to 4 seconds of access to
a water bowl, while responding at the red pecking key leads to 3 seconds of access to
a food hopper approximately every 45 seconds. In this case, the mapping of pecking
keys to the magnitude of the water and food rewards, their identity, and their costs
are learned and encoded in memory.
Model-based reinforcement learning has been especially useful in the context of
goal-driven evaluative systems. Importantly, a habit-driven (that is, not model-based)
- 198 -
evaluative system maintains a representation of magnitude but not identity, making
it resistant to reinforcer devaluation. If all that is learned is that the blue pecking
key delivers 1 arbitrary unit of reward while the red pecking key delivers 2 arbitrary
units of reward, then subsequent devaluation of the food delivered by the red pecking
key but not the water delivered by the blue pecking key will not aﬀect a habit-driven
system. In contrast, a goal-driven (that is, model-based) evaluative system maintains
a representation of both identity and magnitude, making it vulnerable to reinforcer
devaluation.
In the model-based formulation, some stimulus is necessary to provide the
appropriate information. As discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, rats working for brain
stimulation rewards in the randomized-triads design behave as though they have a
model of the triad progression of trials within a session, cued by the inter-trial interval,
and a model of the progression of reward encounters within a trial. The appropriate
stimulus, however, is a vector of subjective determinants of decision: trials during
which the reward intensity is high and subjective opportunity cost is low are cued by
the occurrence of an inter-trial interval and the combination of low reward intensity
and subjective opportunity cost on the trial that preceded the inter-trial interval
cue. Moreover, this vector of intensity and opportunity cost does not need to be
explicitly uncovered, as rats rarely respond on trailing bracket trials of a repeating
triad of leading, test and trailing trials. This implies that the expected combination
of intensity and opportunity cost may be updated, but even when it isn’t, it provides
the appropriate signal of which of the three trial types will follow.
Within a test trial, the payoﬀ is unknown prior to the delivery of the ﬁrst
reward. As soon as the ﬁrst reward is delivered, at least in the case of risk-less rewards,
rats behave as though they have a constant behavioural policy for the duration of
time they are earning rewards. Post-priming and post-reinforcement pauses, as well
as the overall proportion of time spent harvesting rewards, change abruptly between
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the time the subjective opportunity cost and reward intensity are unknown to the
time they are, in principle, completely determined. Here again, key determinants
of decision-making (opportunity cost and reward intensity) provide the necessary
stimulus for implementing a complete behavioural policy.
If the stimuli that signal the appropriate action to be taken are the deter-
minants of the decision itself, a model-based description of the task simpliﬁes to a
simple ﬁlling-in process. When there is no objective variability in the opportunity
cost, reward intensity, and probability of reinforcement, the rat can simply pursue a
behavioural policy based on its best current estimate of what the scalar combination
of these decision variables will be. On this view, the representation of the payoﬀ
from self-stimulation competes with that of extraneous activities, which each set the
probability that rats will engage in “work-related” or “leisure-related” activities.
A similar model has been formulated by Gallistel et al. (2001). In modelling
performance on concurrent VI/VI schedules of reinforcement, they assumed that stays
on either side were stochastic, exponential processes related to the combination of re-
inforcement rate and magnitude (the income) for that side. When conditions ﬂuctuate
frequently, the rat obtains a small number of exemplars following the point at which a
change is perceived to have occurred, re-estimates the obtained incomes, and adjusts
performance accordingly. When they are stable for long periods of time, the rat’s
estimates reﬂect a compromise between new and old rates.
5.2.3 Description of the mixture model
In the model we present here, the scalar combination of subjective opportu-
nity cost, reward intensity, and probability determine the leaving rate (and thus its
reciprocal, the stay duration) of a wide array of behavioural states composing the
various observable activities in which the rat engages. External stimuli, such as the
ﬂashing house light, signal a change in trial type and that conditions will be stable
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until the light ﬂashes again. During test trials, the ﬁrst reward delivery allows the
rat to revise its initial estimate of the payoﬀ in a single step, providing the rat with
an appropriate internal stimulus that dictates how it ought to allocate its time. Prior
to this, the rat’s performance is strongly inﬂuenced by its uncertainty of the payoﬀ
to come, setting a consistent behavioural policy at this phase of the trial that diﬀers
from the later, stable phase of the trial that follows the ﬁrst reward delivery.
5.2.3.1 Activities
In our treatment of real-time performance, the animal may be engaged in
one of six activities that are directly evident from the stream of holds and releases
at the lever. These behavioural activities are: post-priming pauses (PPPs), post-
reinforcement pauses (PRPs), holds, taps, true leisure bouts (TLBs) and censored
true leisure bouts. We discuss each activity below.
Post-reinforcement and post-priming pauses occur between the time the lever
extends into the operant chamber to the ﬁrst time the lever is held. The ﬁrst such
pause in a trial, as deﬁned in Chapter 3, is the PPP, as it occurs 2 seconds following
the onset of the constant priming stimulation that is delivered during the inter-trial
interval. Post-reinforcement pauses, in contrast, occur following every subsequent
lever extension, usually (and in the case of rewards delivered with certainty, always)
preceded by the delivery of reinforcement.
Holds refer to every depression of the lever. When the subjective opportunity
cost of the reward is suﬃciently low, there may be many holds, all censored by lever
retraction. As the opportunity cost increases, there may be fewer holds, and when it
is suﬃciently high, any given hold may be much less likely to result in the completion
of the work requirement.
Finally, lever releases occurring after the lever has been held may either be
short or long (Conover et al., 2001b). When the reward intensity is high and the
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subjective opportunity cost is moderately low, rats will often release the lever for
short periods of time, quickly re-engaging the lever. These short pauses, uncensored
by the end of the trial and lasting under a second, we deﬁne as taps. They may be
included in the psychological perception of work, since the rat is close to the lever,
and may even still have a paw on the manipulandum while the lever is released. In
contrast, the rat may switch to a diﬀerent goal after depressing the lever, leaving
it to explore, groom and rest. These longer pauses, lasting a second or more, we
deﬁne as true leisure bouts, as we presume that the animal is engaged in activities
unrelated to self-stimulation and related, instead, to the extraneous leisure activities
it can perform in the operant chamber.
Censored true leisure bouts (CTLBs) refer to pauses of any type (following
lever extension at the start of a reward encounter or following a hold in the midst of
a reward encounter) that are censored by the end of the trial but last longer than 1s;
when they occur, the animal has engaged in an activity that lasts at least as long as
the entire trial. A 1s criterion was used to ensure that very short pauses that were
censored by the end of the trial were not counted as CTLBs. We have isolated CTLBs
from PPPs, PRPs, taps and TLBs to facilitate the extrapolation of performance in
real time to the whole trial.
5.2.3.2 Hidden states
Since there is no way to know exactly what the animal is doing in the operant
chamber from glancing at the stream of lever releases and holds that is available, each
behavioural activity (PPP/PRP, CTLB, hold, tap, and TLB) may comprise various
“hidden” behavioural states. For example, TLBs may include grooming, exploring
and resting bouts that each have characteristic termination rates. The distribution
of dwell times in TLB activities would therefore be a mixture of multiple behavioural
states that the animal is in and which would be directly observable only given the ap-
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propriate equipment. Moreover, hidden behavioural states may produce behavioural
patterns that would not be observable even in principle. For example, the hold ac-
tivity may include a mixture of “patiently waiting” and “impatiently tapping” states,
or tapping-related releases may include long-interval and short-interval distributions.
In each case, only a careful interrogation of the distributions of dwell times making
up each activity would reveal the number and characteristics of hidden behavioural
states that compose them.
5.2.3.3 Expected payoﬀ
In our modelling, we have assumed that the most important determinant of
dwell times within each hidden behavioural state is the expected payoﬀ from self-
stimulation. Given the degree to which the mountain model, a molar model of
performance for rewarding brain stimulation, can explain performance for risk-less
and risky options based on a scalar combination of subjective reward intensity, op-
portunity cost, and probability of reinforcement (the payoﬀ), we consider the most
important determinant of the behavioural allocation function to be the payoﬀ that
can be expected from self-stimulation activities and the (presumably constant) payoﬀ
from non-self stimulation activities. Our choice of determinant for the action-selection
process was motivated by a feed-forward model (Gallistel et al., 2001) according to
which the leaving rate on one side of a concurrent VI/VI schedule is proportional to
both the expected income (or payoﬀ) derived from the other side and the expected
income relative to all sources of reward. Similarly, we have assumed that the rate at
which a hidden behavioural state is terminated is a function of payoﬀs that may be
obtained from self-stimulation and from extraneous leisure activities.
The model proposed below assumes that performance on the molar level is the
result of the rat ﬁlling in a value for the payoﬀ it can expect from self-stimulation,
which biases the durations of the underlying behavioural states it will engage in.
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When a hidden state terminates uncensored, a hidden state from a diﬀerent be-
havioural activity is begun. Although each activity we can observe is composed of
the same underlying behavioural states with particular distributional characteristics
(like a shape and scale), their mean depends on the expected payoﬀ. The animal’s
pattern of responding is therefore completely, though non-deterministically, described
by the payoﬀ it can expect to receive. In other words, the payoﬀ from self-stimulation
will bias the animal to spend more time in some activities and less time in others as
a result of altering the rate at which those activities terminate.
When that payoﬀ is not known with certainty, as is the case on test trial types
in the randomized-triad design, the ﬁrst reward encounter will have diﬀerent, though
consistent characteristics: the usual trade-oﬀ between exploration and exploitation
is disrupted. During this ﬁrst reward encounter, the outputs of exploration and
exploitation both consist of work. As a result, the animal would be biased toward
working longer. Until the subjective opportunity cost is suﬃciently high to indicate
to the animal that no matter how great the subjective intensity of the reward to come,
self-stimulation will not be worthwhile, the rat will depress the lever until a reward
is delivered.
We present here a two-phase model of performance for rewarding brain stim-
ulation, in which the ﬁrst phase is characterized by a short PPP and a single, long,
continuous work bout (including holds and taps), while the second is characterized by
a continuous-time semi-Markov chain of hidden behavioural states, the probability
of which is determined by the payoﬀ from self-stimulation, and for which leisure-
related activities (PRPs and TLBs) are highly sensitive to alterations in payoﬀ while
work-related activities (holds and taps) are not.
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5.3 The CTMC
The model we shall present below is, in essence, hierarchical. The various
directly-observable activities (PRP, hold, tap, TLB) are made up of various hidden
behavioural states. The probability that an animal engaged in an activity has entered
a particular state is constant across payoﬀs. The probability that the particular
state terminates may or may not be payoﬀ-dependent. Behavioural states can be
collectively observed through various activities that transition to each other in often
trivial ways. For example, the probability of transitioning from a PRP, tap or TLB to
a hold is one. If a TLB is going to terminate uncensored by the end of the trial, it must
necessarily be followed by a hold. Similarly, if a hold is going to terminate uncensored
by lever retraction following successful completion of the work requirement, it will
necessarily terminate on either a tap or a TLB. The relative probability of each
transition (hold to tap contrasted with hold to TLB) is also a function of the current
expected payoﬀ. Finally, the probability per unit time of ceasing responding for the
remainder of the trial may also be a function of the currently expected payoﬀ.
Figure 5.1 is a schematic of how we have modelled the entire reward encounter,
from the time the lever is extended into the chamber to the time it is retracted, start-
ing from the time the rat has estimated the payoﬀ. Prior to the time the subjective
opportunity cost and reward intensity are revealed, the rat’s performance reﬂects the
payoﬀ it expects to receive.
Five labelled white boxes represent the ﬁve diﬀerent activities available after
the ﬁrst reward has been delivered. Within four of those activities (post-reinforcement
pause, hold, true leisure bout, and tap), there are multiple hidden behavioural states.
Although activities can transition to each other, for simplicity of modelling, hidden be-
havioural states do not. When one hidden behavioural state terminates (for example,
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Figure 5.1. Molecular model of a reward encounter. When the RE begins (top left
corner), the rat may initiate an uncensored post-reinforcement pause, a hold, or a
censored pause. These activities (white boxes) comprise multiple hidden behavioural
states (small circles) with diﬀerent probabilities of occurrence (wi) and within which
the rat will spend a possibly payoﬀ-dependent time (μi = F (Ub)). When the rat
leaves a hidden behavioural state, it transitions at rate αS,S′ to a new activity, like
a hold, or one of multiple diﬀerent releases, such as TLBs, taps, and CTLBs. When
the hold has been visited for a cumulative amount of time, the hold time is censored
by lever retraction, at which point a new reward encounter may begin.
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release). The preponderance of a hidden behavioural state in generating dwell times
for the activity in question is wi (its weight). The payoﬀ estimate for the trial deter-
mines the mean μi of the distribution from which dwell times of a hidden behavioural
state will be drawn. The expected dwell time in an activity is the convex combina-
tion of its component parts (∑i wiμi where ∑i wi = 1), and activity S transitions
to activity S′ by following the arrows in the activity-transition diagram presented in
ﬁgure 5.1 at a rate of αS,S′ .
The reward encounter proceeds as follows. The lever extends into the operant
chamber, which begins the reward encounter (yellow box, top left corner). The rat
may cease responding altogether with probability P [PRP censored] set by the payoﬀ,
or if not (with probability P [PRP uncensored]), may begin pressing immediately with
probability P [PRP = 0]. If the ﬁrst pause in responding is neither censored by the
end of the trial, nor shorter than can be measured, the rat begins a PRP of non-zero
duration. This PRP activity is actually the result of multiple (in the schematic, three)
hidden behavioural states. The probability that the rat is in behavioural state i while
performing the PRP activity is wi, and the duration for which the rat is in said state
i is given by μi. As a result, the expected duration of the PRP (μPRP ) is the convex
combination ∑i wi · μi, where ∑i wi = 1. The rate at which the PRP is terminated
is 1/μPRP , and this termination leads to a hold. When a hold begins, it, too, is the
result of multiple (in the schematic, two) hidden behavioural states, and the expected
duration of the hold (μH) is the convex combination of these holding-related hidden
behavioural states.
The hold terminates, when uncensored, on a release. The probability that a
lever release will be censored by the end of the trial is
P [Rel censored];
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if the release is not censored by the end of the trial (with probability P [Rel uncensored]),
it will either be a short, tapping-related release occurring with probability
P [uncensored rel is tap]
or a long, leisure-related TLB release occurring with probability
P [uncensored rel is TLB].
Both the TLB and tap activities are made up of hidden behavioural states, and as
with the PRP and hold activities, their termination rate is the reciprocal of the convex
combination of their respective hidden behavioural states. The only state in which
the rat is presumed to remain once entered is the CTLB state, which can be reached
with probability
P [PRP censored]
if the rat begins the CTLB at the start of a reward encounter, or
P [Rel censored]
if the rat begins the CTLB following a hold. When the cumulative time that the lever
has been held reaches the price, the hold bout will be censored by the retraction of
the lever, possibly followed by reward delivery. At this point, a new reward encounter
may begin.
In addition to indirectly setting the termination rate of an activity, we have
assumed that the payoﬀ can set four separate probabilities:
1. the probability that the rat begins the reward encounter in the CTLB state
P [PRP censored]
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2. the probability that the rat begins the reward encounter with a PRP of 0 duration
P [PRP = 0]
3. the probability that a long pause in responding is censored by the end of the trial
P [Rel censored]
4. the probability that an uncensored pause in responding is less than 1s due to lever
tapping
P [uncensored rel is tap]
All other transition probabilities are either trivial (1 or 0) or calculable from the above
four relationships (e.g., P [PRP uncensored] = 1 − P [PRP censored]). It is possible
that one or more of these probabilities is payoﬀ-independent, as we will empirically
demonstrate later.
Figure 5.2 is a schematic of how we have modelled the dependency of dwell
times in an activity on the expected payoﬀ. Following the ﬁrst reward delivery, and
every reward delivered thereafter, the rat has an up-to-date estimate of the payoﬀ
from self-stimulation. This estimate sets the duration of an activity: while the relative
composition of the hidden behavioural states making up an activity remains the same,
their hazard functions will reach a diﬀerent ﬁnal level, thereby changing the expected
duration of the activity. The rat then remains in a given behavioural state for a
period of time sampled from the appropriate distribution of dwell times or until its
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Figure 5.2. Dependency of dwell times on payoﬀ. The expected payoﬀ from self-
stimulation (E[Ub]) is presumed to set the mean dwell time in any payoﬀ-dependent
hidden behavioural states. As any observed activity is the result of a dwell time
chosen with some probability from one of its component hidden states, the dwell times
in an activity will be stochastic realizations of the distribution that characterizes
a particular state at a particular payoﬀ level, with mean μi and shape κi. The
distribution from which the dwell time is selected is chosen with probability wi =
P [Activity = Si]. Bottom row shows the dependence of the mean of each hidden state
(y-axis) on payoﬀ (x-axis); horizontal lines and shaded areas represent the predicted
mean and standard deviation of the distribution setting dwell time durations. Vertical
lines indicate from where, in the panels above, dwell times are sampled. The middle
row shows the probability density function (rotated 90 degrees) of each hidden state.
At the top, an example of the resulting log-survival plot is depicted as a function of
the log-dwell time and payoﬀ, where hot colours signify high payoﬀs. Overlain on this
3D log-survival plot are the three functions setting the means of the hidden states
that make up this hypothetical activity.
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and initiating a blackout delay or inter-trial interval. In the schematic example, high
self-stimulation payoﬀs reduce the amount of time spent in states S2 and S3 when
performing the activity, but the mean dwell time in state S1 is constant across payoﬀs.
As a result of its eﬀect on the means of individual hidden states of an activity, the
payoﬀ will alter the expected sojourn in that activity: overall, the rat will spend less
time performing this hypothetical activity by virtue of spending less time in each of
its component behavioural states. At the top of the ﬁgure, we show the log-survival
function plotted at each log-dwell time (y-axis) and payoﬀ (x-axis, it is inverted such
that ribbons closer to the reader represent high payoﬀs and those farther away are low
payoﬀs) that results from the mixture of payoﬀ-dependent and independent states.
For simplicity and symmetry, we expected that dwell times in leisure-related
activities would be sensitive to the payoﬀ from self-stimulation, and dwell times in
work-related activities would be sensitive to the payoﬀ from everything else. To test
this, we ﬁrst checked whether the dwell times in each activity were dependent on
the payoﬀ from self-stimulation. We could therefore assess whether the payoﬀ from
self-stimulation aﬀected the activities we presumed they would (PRP, TLB) and did
not aﬀect the activities we presumed they wouldn’t (holds, taps).
The CTMC assumes that dwell times in any given state will be independent
of history. This includes the time spent in the PRP; in other words, the duration
of the PRP on one reward encounter can not be dependent on performance during
prior reward encounters if the Markov property is to hold. One would expect the
PRP on reward encounter n to be highly similar to that on reward encounter n − 1
if the constant payoﬀ from self-stimulation throughout the trial had set them both.
In a scenario where the Markov property does not hold, the duration of the PRP
bears some relationship, above and beyond the payoﬀ, to activities performed on the
preceding reward encounter, such as the amount of time spent holding and tapping.
To test this, we performed a two-stage hierarchical linear regression on the logarithm
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of each PRP. The ﬁrst stage of the hierarchical linear regression predicted the log-
PRP duration based on the logarithm of the payoﬀ from self-stimulation for the trial
from which it came. The second stage predicted the log-PRP duration from both
the log-payoﬀ and the log-corrected work bout (which sums consecutive holds and
taps) from the reward encounter that just preceded it. If this second model predicts
additional variance in log-PRP durations that cannot be attributed to the log-payoﬀ,
the Markov property does not hold in the case of PRPs with non-zero duration.
In the case of TLBs, the Markov assumption means that the time spent en-
gaged in the TLB activity is sampled with the same probability from any of the
behavioural states that make it up, no matter how long the animal spent holding
or tapping beforehand. One could argue that following a longer work bout (that is,
holding and tapping), the exhausted rat will take a longer true leisure bout. We
assessed the degree to which this was true by correlating the duration of every TLB
activity with the duration of the corrected work bout that immediately preceded it.
A strong positive correlation would imply that these two activities do not obey the
Markov rule: the duration of a TLB would be dependent on the duration of time
spent in hold and tap activities. In contrast, the absence of a correlation would imply
that the duration of a TLB is independent, at least to a ﬁrst-order approximation, of
the rat’s lever-pressing history.
5.4 Methods
5.4.1 Behavioural protocol
Rats were the same as in Chapters 2, 3 and 4. Rats were presented with triads
of trials, starting with a leading bracket trial presenting high-frequency stimulation
at a 1s price, a test trial presenting stimulation of a frequency and price that was
pseudo-randomly drawn without replacement from a list, and a trailing bracket trial
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presenting low-frequency stimulation at a 1s price.
In the case of rats DE1, DE3, MA5, DE7, PD8, DE14, DE15, DE16, DE18
and DE19, test trials were drawn from a list containing 3 pseudo-sweeps for each pair
of reinforcement probabilities presented (1 vs 0.75, 1 vs 0.50, 1 vs 0.50 with lever
locations switched, and 1 vs 0.75 with lever locations switched). Performance during
each probability condition of each pair was analysed separately. Pseudo-sweeps were
sets of pairs of prices and frequencies either arrayed along the frequency axis at the
same 4s price (frequency pseudo-sweep), arrayed along the price axis at the same
high frequency (price pseudo-sweep), or arrayed along a ray that passed through the
intersection of the previous two sweeps and the presumed Fhm and Pe values for the
mountain ﬁt described in Chapter 2 (radial pseudo-sweep).
In the case of rats F3, F9, F12, F16, F17 and F18, test trials were drawn from
a list containing 9 pseudo-sweeps. Three of the pseudo-sweeps were identical to those
presented above. The other 6 were price-frequency pairs arrayed along the frequency
axis at 0.125s, 0.25s, 0.5s, 1s, 2s, and 8s prices.
Performance presented throughout this chapter was obtained exclusively dur-
ing test trials of the randomized-triads design.
5.4.2 Statistical procedures
We began by ﬁrst testing some of the assumptions of the model by determining
the proportion of variance, if any, that could be accounted for by previous performance
when controlling for the payoﬀ in eﬀect during the trial. It was then possible to
identify the various components of the continuous-time semi-Markov chain (CTMC),
by ﬁtting increasingly complex mixtures of exponential and gamma distributions to
the dwell times observed in four, non-overlapping categories of behavioural activities
(PRPs, holds, taps and TLBs) and transitions to a ﬁfth (CTLBs) from the ﬁrst
reward delivery onward. These components, and the payoﬀ-dependent probabilities
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of transitioning from one activity to the next, were individually ﬁt for each animal.
When the various components of the CTMC had been identiﬁed, we extrapo-
lated what molar performance, from the ﬁrst reward delivery onward, would be if the
rat’s behavioural policy were governed by this continuous-time semi-Markov model.
The extrapolation provides both a qualitative and quantitative description of how
well the CTMC accounts for performance not only on the molecular level, which is
its stated purpose, but also on the molar level.
5.4.2.1 Testing the Markov assumption for PRPs
Our CTMC assumes that every reward encounter following the ﬁrst reward
delivery is essentially the same: whether one considers the beginning, middle, or end
of the trial, the animal behaves as though it passes through a number of hidden
behavioural states, measurable as activities, and either obtains a reward or stops
responding altogether. We sought to test whether the duration of the PRP was
dependent in any way on previous lever-pressing activities by performing a linear
regression of the logarithms of the PRP durations (excluding, of course, nil durations)
against the logarithms of the total corrected work bouts that preceded them.
If the time spent working and the post-reinforcement pause are both related
to the payoﬀ from self stimulation, then the time spent in each of those activities
will necessarily be related to each other. If the Markov property does not hold for
PRPs, then there will be variability in PRP duration that can be attributed to the
time spent in previous activities, such as the last work bout, and not to the payoﬀ
alone. We calculated the proportion of variance in log-PRP duration that could be
uniquely attributed to the payoﬀ and not the duration of the corrected work bout that
resulted in the reward delivery, and the proportion that could be uniquely attributed
to the last corrected work bout and not the payoﬀ. A single corrected work bout was
the sum of all hold times and tap times that were uninterrupted by an intervening
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TLB. For example, if the rat held for 1s, released for 0.5s, and held again for 0.75s
before engaging in a TLB for 10s, the total corrected work bout that preceded the
10s TLB was 2.25s. We isolated the bouts from the period of time following the ﬁrst
reward delivery, that is, from reward encounters 2 onward, and included only those
work bouts that were censored by lever retraction. These proportions were assessed
by comparing a “larger” model to two “smaller” models:
1. Using only log-payoﬀ as a predictor,
2. Using only the log-duration of the last corrected work bout as a predictor, and
3. Using both log-payoﬀ and log-duration of the last corrected work bout as a pre-
dictor.
The proportion of variance accounted for by model 3 results from two pre-
dictors. Subtracting the proportion of variance accounted for by payoﬀ (model 1)
provides an estimate of the increase in predictive power that the last corrected work
bout alone contributes to log-PRP duration. Subtracting the proportion of variance
accounted for by the last corrected work bout (model 2) provides an estimate of the
increase in predictive power that the payoﬀ alone contributes to log-PRP duration.
If the Markov property did not hold, the duration of the last corrected work bout
would have to have had at least some inﬂuence on the duration of the subsequent
PRP. As such, we extracted the proportion of variance in log-PRP that could be
uniquely attributed to the log-last corrected work bout, as well as that which could
be uniquely attributed to the log-payoﬀ.
5.4.2.2 Testing the Markov assumption for TLBs
A key assumption of the CTMC is that transitions from one state to another
are independent of previous states. Although the rat may enter a state that is charac-
terized by a gamma distribution, and its dwell time in that state will therefore not be
independent of the amount of time already in the state, when that state terminates,
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the Markov property assumes that the rat transitions to other states with constant
probability. It does not matter that the rat has been transitioning between holds and
taps for a long or a short time—the duration of the TLB when the work bout ter-
minates uncensored is presumed to be drawn from the same mixture of distributions
that each characterize a hidden behavioural state.
To determine whether the duration of any TLB depended on the duration
of time spent working (that is, all holds and taps) before that point, we correlated
TLB durations with the total corrected work bout duration that preceded them. The
total proportion of variance in TLB duration accounted for by the last corrected work
bout was extracted across all price-frequency pairs presented to each animal in each
condition.
5.4.2.3 Inferring hidden behavioural states
As a ﬁrst step, we identiﬁed whether the expected dwell time in an activity
was payoﬀ-dependent by extracting the maximum-likelihood estimate of the mean
dwell time for the activity at each payoﬀ in all subjects and conditions together. The
data were then restricted to the range of payoﬀs that was common to all animals and
conditions, and we performed a linear regression of the log-maximally likely mean
dwell time onto the logarithm of the payoﬀ. The deviance of this regression is a
measure of error, and the deviance of a null model for which payoﬀ has no eﬀect on
dwell time (an intercept-only model) is a measure of total variability. Their diﬀerence
is the variability predicted by payoﬀ. The proportion of the total variability that was
explained (a pseudo R2 statistic) was then calculated for each activity. It is on the
basis of these R2 statistics that we chose to model dwell time as payoﬀ-dependent or
independent.
Each non-overlapping behavioural activity (PRP, hold, tap, TLB, CTLB)
could comprise multiple hidden components. In order to balance comprehensive-
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ness with parsimony, we ﬁt increasingly complex mixtures of exponential and gamma
distributions to the set of dwell times in each activity, for which the mean of each com-
ponent of the mixture was potentially a logistic function of the logarithm of the payoﬀ,
with constant shape parameter (in the case of gamma distributions) and mixture pro-
portions. Exponentially-distributed components were assumed to be payoﬀ-invariant,
while the logarithm of the mean of gamma-distributed components could be a logistic
function of payoﬀ. Payoﬀ-sensitive, exponentially-distributed components are a spe-
cial case of payoﬀ-sensitive, gamma-distributed components, where the shape param-
eter equals one, and payoﬀ-insensitive gamma-distributed components are a special
case where the slope of the logistic function of payoﬀ is 0.
If payoﬀ-dependent dwell times could be justiﬁed, we ﬁt up to 5 components,
starting with one gamma-distributed component whose mean was a scaled sigmoid
function of payoﬀ. We then attempted a ﬁt with one exponential component whose
mean was constant across payoﬀs and one payoﬀ-dependent gamma-distributed com-
ponent. In each attempt, ﬁrst the number of gamma components was incremented
(from 1 to the number of components), then the total number of components. This
continued until the weight of any component was below 0.1 on a ﬁt attempt or the
number of components would have become 6.
If the assumption of a payoﬀ-dependent dwell time was not justiﬁed, we ﬁt
up to 5 components, starting with one exponentially-distributed component whose
mean was constant across payoﬀs. We then attempted a single gamma-distributed
component. In each attempt, ﬁrst the number of gamma-distributed components
was incremented (from 0 to the number of components), then the total number of
components. This continued until the weight of any of the components of a ﬁt attempt
was under 0.1, or the number of components would have become 6.
We then identiﬁed among all combinations of exponentially- and gamma-
distributed hidden states that which had the lowest Akaike Information Criterion
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(AIC, Akaike, 1976). Attempts to ﬁt too complex or too parsimonious a model to
the set of dwell times in an activity would have high AIC values, while a model that
was suﬃciently complex to explain the data without extraneous parameters would
have low AIC values.
The AIC is deﬁned as twice the number of parameters minus twice the loga-
rithm of the likelihood function for the maximally likely set of ﬁt parameters:
AIC = 2nparm − ln(L).
The probability of n data points, as a function of k mixing proportions w and distribu-
tional parameters Θ (where Θ corresponds to the mean in the case of exponential dis-
tributions, a vector with shape and scale parameters as entries for payoﬀ-independent
gamma distributions, and a vector with logistic and shape parameters as entries for
payoﬀ-dependent gamma distributions) is the likelihood,







In other words, it is the product of the convex combination of the probability
of each dwell time according to each hidden behavioural state weighted by its mixing
proportion. In the case of censored observations, the survivor function was used. In
the case of uncensored observations, the density function was used. For example, the
likelihood of a mixture of two components, with weights of 0.4 and 0.6, and means of
1s and 2s, for a single uncensored dwell time (x1) of 1.6s is given by
P [x = x1|Θ1,Θ2] = P [x = 1.6|μ1 = 1] × 0.4 + P [x = 1.6|μ2 = 2] × 0.6.
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Similarly, the probability of a single censored dwell time (x2) of 1.6s is given by
P [x ≥ x2|Θ1,Θ2] = P [x ≥ 1.6|μ1 = 1] × 0.4 + P [x ≥ 1.6|μ2 = 2] × 0.6.
The probability of observing both x1 and x2 is the product of the above prob-
abilities. The ﬁtting algorithm identiﬁed the parametrization of Θs (which comprises
all the distributional characteristics of each hidden behavioural state) and ws (which
sets the preponderance of each hidden behavioural state in an activity) for which this
likelihood L was maximal.
The number of parameters for any given model of an activity is two or ﬁve
for every gamma-distributed component. In the case of components with payoﬀ-
dependent means (nγvar), there is one for the shape, one for the intercept of the logis-
tic, one for its slope, one for its minimum asymptotic value and one for its maximum
asymptotic value. In the case of components with payoﬀ-independent means (nγconst),
the slope is ﬁxed at 0, the maximum and minimum are ﬁxed at the mean, and only the
intercept is free to vary. There is one parameter for every exponentially-distributed
component (nExponential, the shape has a value ﬁxed at one and one parameter deter-
mining the mean is free to vary). Finally, there is one parameter for all but one of the
total number of distributions: k-1 of the components have a parameter determining
their mixing proportion, and the mixing proportion of one of the components is not
free to vary. This number of parameters, nparm = 2nγconst+5nγvar+nExponential+(k−1),
is what we used to evaluate the parsimony of our model. To ensure parsimony in how
a behavioural activity was described, we considered only the mixture model which
produced the lowest AIC value.
In summary, we identiﬁed sets of w and Θ values (one for each hidden state/mix-
ture component) for which the likelihood function was maximal and for which the
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AIC was minimal, where
Θi = [μi]
for payoﬀ-invariant exponential components, where μi is the mean of distribution i,
Θi = [κi, μi]
for payoﬀ-invariant gamma components, where κi is the shape parameter of distribu-
tion i,
Θi = [κi, β0i , β1i ,Mini,Maxi]
for payoﬀ-dependent gamma components, where β0i is the intercept, β1i is the slope,
Mini is the minimum and Maxi is the maximum predicted log-mean dwell time for
component i at a particular payoﬀ.
We identiﬁed the maximum-likelihood estimates of the parameters describing
each activity iteratively in a manner similar to the expectation-maximization algo-
rithm. In each iteration of a ﬁt, assuming the most recently ﬁt set of k constant (for
payoﬀ-independent exponentially- and gamma-distributed components) and logistic
functions (for payoﬀ-dependent gamma-distributed components), and k shape param-
eters (in the case of gamma distributions), we ﬁrst obtained the maximum-likelihood
estimates of the mixture proportion of the ﬁrst k − 1 components.
This ﬁt was constrained such that the sum of the proportions could not be
greater than 1 or less than 0. Once a maximum-likelihood ﬁt of the mixing propor-
tions was complete, the algorithm used the most recently ﬁt values to identify the
maximum-likelihood estimates of the logistic and constant functions setting the loga-
rithm of the mean. This ﬁt was constrained such that the expected dwell time for any
hidden behavioural state was at most the longest observed dwell time for that activity
and greater than 0. As the survivor function is a monotonically increasing function
of the mean (for a score x, the survival probability of x never decreases as the mean
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increases), the probability of a set of censored observations can be made arbitrarily
large. For example, for a score x = 0.1s, the survivor function is 0.37 (i.e., 37 % of
dwell times are at least 0.1s) when the mean is 0.1s, 0.90 when the mean is 1.0s, and
0.99 when the mean is 10.0s. As a result, the mean of any component at any payoﬀ
was constrained to be at most the longest dwell time observed for that activity across
all payoﬀs, and at minimum, the shortest dwell time. Shape parameters of gamma
distributions were constrained to be at least 1. A value of 1 indicates an exponential
distribution. When a state is composed of exponentially-distributed sub-states, both
of which must terminate in order for the state to terminate (for example, observing
a “tapping release” may require “release paw from lever” and “resume lever-press”
to be completed), dwell times in the state will have a gamma distribution with a
shape parameter greater than 1. Shape parameters between 0 and 1 imply that a
state is made up of a mixture of sub-states, with one component terminating more
quickly than others. As uncovering the components of a mixture is the purpose of
the algorithm described here, states were not allowed to have shape parameters that
were less than 1.
To ensure that each component was uniquely speciﬁed, behavioural states were
sorted from largest mixing proportion to smallest. This ensured that component 1
always referred to the most preponderant component of the mixture of distributions,
component 2 the second, and so on. Following this second phase of the algorithm, the
logarithm of the probability of all dwell times in the activity given the ﬁt parameters
(the log-likelihood) was calculated and compared to its value on the previous iteration.
The algorithm continued to ﬁt w, then Θ, values until the log-likelihood changed by
less than 0.001 (the parameter values converged) or 500 iterations had been performed.
All ﬁts converged well before the 500 iteration limit was reached. Three starting values
were used for this process: where payoﬀ-dependent, logistic functions were set to have
a slope of 0, −50 and 50 and an intercept that set the midpoint of the logistic function
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at the midpoint of the logarithm of the payoﬀs tested. In all cases, the starting shape
parameter of all components was set to 1 and the starting maxima and minima of the
logistic functions, where applicable, were set to the maximum and minimum observed
dwell times in the activity.
5.4.2.4 Inferring transition probabilities
Inference of the preponderance of each state (its mixing proportion wi) pro-
vides the probability that a dwell time in an activity is sampled from the distribution
that is characteristic of that state. Inference of the parameters that set each state’s
distributional characteristics (Θi), which could be
1. a mean μi for exponential,
2. a shape-mean combination [κi, μi] for gamma, or
3. a shape-scaled logistic combination [κi, β0i , β1i ,Mini,Maxi] for payoﬀ-dependent
gamma distributions,
provides the probability per unit time that any state will terminate. The total ex-
pected duration of a sojourn in the activity is the weighted combination (convex
because the weights sum to one) of the duration of each of its component states
∑
i(wiμi). The termination rate of an activity is the reciprocal of its total expected
duration. The transition rate from one activity to the next is thus almost completely
speciﬁed by the set of wis and Θis.
For most links in the chain, the probability of a transition from one observable
activity to another, and from one hidden behavioural state to another, is trivial: it is
either 0 or 1. For example, when a PRP has terminated, no matter which behavioural
state may have actually occurred, it necessarily terminates on a hold with probability
1. When a tap or TLB terminates, no matter which behavioural state may have
actually occurred, it must also necessarily terminate on a hold with probability 1.
However, a hold could terminate on a long, censored release or an uncensored release,
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and the uncensored release could be either a tap or a TLB. We therefore needed to
explicitly model two probabilities: the probability that the rat would not return to
work after releasing the lever, and if it did, the probability that an interruption to
lever-pressing resulted in either a tap or TLB. We performed a logistic regression,
using log-payoﬀ as the sole predictor for a binomial outcome: either that a release
would be censored by the end of the trial and last longer than 1s, in the case of the
probability of a CTLB, or that an uncensored release was either a tap or a TLB,
in the case of the probability of a tap. The former logistic regression provides the
probability of transitioning from a hold to a CTLB, assuming a hold has terminated
(P [Relcens]), while the probability of transitioning from a hold to either a tap or TLB
is obtained by subtracting this number from one (P[Relunc] = 1 − P [Relcens]). The
second logistic regression provides the probability that an uncensored release is a tap
(P [Relunc = tap]) at each level of payoﬀ; subtracting this number from 1 provides the
probability that an uncensored release is a TLB (P[Relunc = TLB] = 1−P [Relunc =
tap]).
5.4.2.5 Inferring starting probabilities
Two cases require further explicit modelling. As stated, the CTMC assumes
that following reward delivery, there is a PRP of non-zero duration that terminates on
a hold. Although this is often the case, it is not a universal occurrence. For a select few
rats with highly eﬀective electrodes for which stimulation does not appear to induce
any additional movement, the rat depresses the manipulandum as the lever re-enters
the operant chamber. In this case, the ﬁrst activity the rat performs in a reward
encounter is a hold rather than a PRP. We address this reality by modelling zero-
duration PRPs explicitly. Following reward delivery, there is some payoﬀ-dependent
probability that the CTMC will begin directly in a hold activity, thereby forcing the
PRP to last zero seconds. We performed a logistic regression on the proportion of not
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immediately-aborted reward encounters that were begun directly in the hold activity,
as a function of the logarithm of the payoﬀ.
A second special-case of the PRP concerns the so-called CTLB activity. It is
possible that there are actually multiple hidden behavioural states related to censored
true leisure bouts. For example, a rat may return to work after tens of minutes in
anticipation of the next trial. In order to simplify the analysis, we considered only
PRPs and releases that were censored by the end of the trial and lasted longer than
1s. We performed a logistic regression on the proportion of reward encounters that
were immediately aborted (that is, the PRP was longer than 1s and censored by the
end of the trial), as a function of the logarithm of the payoﬀ.
5.4.2.6 Extrapolating to the entire trial
Once the rat has obtained an estimate of the payoﬀ, this estimate sets the
duration of the various hidden behavioural states that compose each activity. The
activity will have an expected dwell time equal to the convex combination of the
weight of each behavioural state and its mean. The reciprocal of this dwell time
deﬁnes the rate at which the activity is left. From the above-mentioned hidden
behavioural states, transition probabilities, and special-case transitions, a complete
picture of performance on a reward encounter can emerge.
The rate αA,A′ at which an activity A transitions to another activity A′ is the
product of the reciprocal of its mean dwell time multiplied by the probability that A′
follows A (αA,A′ = 1/μA · P[A → A′]). In many instances, the transition probability
P [A → A′] is either 0 or 1. Uncensored PRPs, taps, and TLBs are always followed by
holds. In the case of transitions from holds, the probability of a transition to a tap,
TLB or censored true leisure bout may be somewhere in the interval [0,1]. Holds could
terminate on censored (CTLB) or uncensored releases; if uncensored, a release could
be a tap or a TLB. Both of these probabilities have been explicitly modelled above.
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As a result, every potential transition rate is completely speciﬁed in the model.
We can deﬁne a series of diﬀerential equations for the evolution of performance
in the CTMC in terms of these transition rates: at any time t, the rate at which an
activity is left is the sum of all transition rates leading away from it, and the rate at
which it is entered is the sum of all transition rates leading toward it. If αij is the
transition rate from activity j to i, and αii is the (negative) transition rate away from
activity i, then the probability at any time t that the rat engages in activity i is a
diﬀerential matrix equation of the form
∂
∂t
P [activity = i at time t] = AP [activity = i at time t]
where A is a matrix whose entries are the elements αij and αii. For example, suppose
the probability of being engaged in activity A is 1, and A′ is 0, and further suppose
that the rate αA,A′ = 0.25. After 1s, the probability of being engaged in activity A′ is
0.25, and the probability of still being engaged in activity A is 0.75. Another 1s later,
the probability of transitioning from A to A′ is still 0.25, so of the 0.75 probability that
remains in performing activity A, one quarter of it (0.75 × 0.25 = 0.1875) transitions
from A to A′. Thus, there is now a 0.5625 probability (0.75 − 0.1875) of still being
engaged in activity A, and a 0.4375 probability (0.25 + 0.1875) of being engaged in
activity A′. In other words, the absolute change in the probability of being engaged
in activity A (0.25 at 1s, and 0.1875 one second later) depends on the probability
of already performing the activity (1.00 at 1s, and 0.75 one second later), which is
an ordinary diﬀerential equation of the form ∂/∂tP [A at t] = αA,A′P [A at t]. Since
there are multiple activities that could transition to each other, the CTMC deﬁnes a
system of these ordinary diﬀerential equations that can be elegantly condensed into
the matrix equation deﬁned above, with the transition rates αA,A′ as entries to the
matrix A.
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If we enumerate the activities as PRP (1), hold (2), tap (3), TLB (4) and




−αPRP,H 0 0 0 0
αPRP,H −αH,R αtap,H αTLB,H 0
0 αH,tap −αtap,H 0 0
0 αH,TLB 0 −αTLB,H 0
0 αH,CTLB 0 0 0
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
and the probability of engaging in activity i at time t is a column vector with entries
arranged in the same order (PRP, hold, tap, TLB and CTLB).
The general solution to diﬀerential equations of the form ∂/∂tX(t) = AX(t)
is
X(t) = C1eλ1tU1 + . . . + CneλntUn
where Ck is a constant, and λk and Uk are the kth eigenvalue and eigenvector, re-
spectively. In the case of engaging in some activity at any given point in time, this
becomes
P [activity = i at time t] = C1eλ1tU1 + . . . + CneλntUn,
with Ck, λk and Uk the kth constant, eigenvalue, and eigenvector.
The constant is solved according to the appropriate starting probabilities
in each state. The probability of starting in the CTLB activity is P [PRPcens].
The probability of starting in either of the two non-CTLB activities (PRPs and
holds) becomes 1 − P [PRPcens], which sets the probability of starting on a hold
to (1 − P [PRPcens]) · P [PRPunc = 0], and of starting on an uncensored PRP to
(1 − P [PRPcens]) · (1 − P [PRPunc = 0]). All other starting probabilities are 0. At
t = 0, the exponential terms of the probability equation disappear (as e0 = 1), so the
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starting probabilities deﬁne a simple linear system of form









which can be solved for the vector of Cks directly.
This general solution provides the probability, at any time t, that the rat is
performing each of the 5 activities, when approximating the overall termination of an
activity as a true time-invariant Markov process (i.e., all activities are exponentially
distributed). This seemed a reasonable approximation, as the modal shape parameter
for an activity was usually one, which is indicative of an exponentially-distributed
process. The time spent engaging in each of the above-mentionned ﬁve activities
is simply the integral of the probability of performing the activity in question over
time. For example, if at time t = 0.0s, there is a 0.8 probability of performing a PRP
activity, and a 0.2 probability of performing a hold activity, the rat has eﬀectively
spent 0.08s in a PRP and 0.02s in a hold between t = 0 and t = 0.1s. If, at time
t = 0.1s, there is now a 0.7 probability of performing the PRP activity and a 0.3
probability of performing a hold, the rat has eﬀectively spent 0.07s in the PRP and
0.03s in the hold activity between t = 0.1 and t = 0.2s. Summing these together,
the rat has accumulated a total of 0.08 + 0.07 = 0.15s in the PRP and 0.05s in
the hold activity since the start of the reward encounter. We performed a numerical
integration, at 0.1s time steps (the resolution of our behavioural apparatus) until one
of the following conditions was true:
1. The total time accumulated in hold activities reached the price, or
2. The total time accumulated in all activities together reached the reward encounter
time predicted by a linear regression of log-reward encounter duration on log-objective
price and log-subjective reward intensity.
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The linear regression used above to predict the duration of the reward en-
counter used the log-subjective intensity, as a more valuable reward will drive the
reward encounter to be shorter, as well as the log-objective price. This was done
because even if the subjective opportunity cost of rewards will be equal when the
price is 0.01s or 0.02s, the rat will have to actually hold the lever for 0.01s or 0.02s,
and thus, the reward encounter will last, at minimum, twice as long in the 0.02s case
than it does in the 0.01s case. At a constant objective price, increases in reward
intensity should decrease the duration of the reward encounter, and at a constant
subjective reward intensity, increases in objective price should increase the duration
of the reward encounter.
This allowed us to extrapolate the results of our molecular model, which speci-
ﬁes behaviour on a moment-to-moment time scale, to the molar level, which describes
behaviour on the scale of reward encounters and whole trials. The numerical inte-
gration of the system of diﬀerential equations provides the evolution of performance
over arbitrary time scales, while the stopping criteria (either the objective price or the
predicted reward encounter duration) provide a reasonable time scale over which to
evaluate the integration. This modelling allows us to estimate the proportion of time
allocated to holding and tapping, but only for the period of time the rat is actually
working. In order to extrapolate time allocation to the entire trial, this time alloca-
tion was multiplied by the probability of not starting on a CTLB (1 − P [PRPcens]),




5.5.1 Testing the assumptions of the model
5.5.1.1 PRP is independent of previous work bout
To test the Markov assumption with respect to the duration of the PRP, we
performed a linear regression of the logarithm of the PRP duration as a function
of the logarithm of the payoﬀ and the logarithm of the last corrected work bout.
This analysis did not include PRPs of 0 duration (for obvious reasons), and excluded
instances where the last corrected work bout was equal to the objective price. This
exclusion was performed to maximize the proportion of variance that can be uniquely
attributed to each predictor: last corrected work bout duration or payoﬀ, which is a
scalar combination of the objective price with other key determinants of the decision
to press.
Figure 5.3 is a box-whisker plot of the proportion of variance in log-PRP du-
rations that can be accounted for by only the log-payoﬀ (Log[Ub]) and by only the
log-last corrected work bout (Log[CWB]) when the rat did not obtain a reward follow-
ing a single, continuous hold. Overall, the log-last corrected work bout accounts for
no variance (median of 0.00145) above and beyond what can be accounted for by the
log-payoﬀ, while the log-payoﬀ uniquely accounts for considerable variance (median
of 0.17696). The far-right box-whisker plot provides the ratio of the proportion of
variance uniquely predicted by log-payoﬀ compared to log-last corrected work bout.
The median of these ratios is very large (161.6), reﬂecting the much greater degree
to which our proposed determinant (log-payoﬀ) can account for the decision to wait
before pressing again than previous performance.
This linear regression provides an important conﬁrmation that the duration of
the PRP is relatively independent of the duration of the states that came before it,
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Figure 5.3. PRP durations are independent of previous work bout. Box whisker plot of
the proportion of variance in Log10[PRP duration] that can be uniquely attributed to
the duration of the last corrected work bout (red) or to the payoﬀ from self-stimulation
(green) and not the other. In the right-hand panel, the ratio of the proportion of
variance in Log10[PRP duration] that can be uniquely attributed to payoﬀ to the
proportion of variance that can be uniquely attributed to the duration of the last
corrected work bout is shown in a box-whisker plot. In all cases, post-reinforcement
pauses do not bear any meaningful relationship with the duration of the last work
bout, when controlling for payoﬀ, while being much more heavily dependent on payoﬀ
while controlling for the duration of the last work bout.
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thereby conﬁrming (at least to a ﬁrst-order approximation) that the Markov property
holds in the case of the post-reinforcement pause. We now turn to the second type
of pause that may not be time-invariant: the true leisure bout.
5.5.1.2 TLB duration is independent of previous work bout duration
To test the Markov assumption with respect to TLBs, we performed a simple
linear regression of the log-TLB durations as a function of the log-corrected work
bout that preceded them. For the Markov assumption to hold, TLB durations (and
therefore, their logs) would need to be independent of history. As a ﬁrst-order ap-
proximation, then, we set to determine whether there was any relationship between
how long the rat had worked and the duration of the pause, lasting longer than 1s,
that followed.
Figure 5.4 demonstrates this independence. The left-hand panel shows a scat-
ter (for the animal showing the strongest dependence of TLB on the last corrected
work bout) of the duration of the TLB as a function of the immediately preceding
corrected work bout: there is little evidence a systematic relationship. The right-
hand panel is a box-whisker plot of the proportion of variance in log-TLB that can
be accounted for by the log-last corrected work bout. It has a median value of 0.011,
and in no case is the relationship statistically signiﬁcant at the traditional 0.05 level.
We can conclude from these data that, indeed, the Markov assumption holds (to a
ﬁrst-order approximation) in the case of TLBs: they are relatively independent of
the corrected work bouts that preceded them, no matter what the payoﬀ may be.
Regardless of whether the rat spent a great deal of time working or a short amount of
time working, the rat will spend no more or less time engaging in uncensored releases
lasting over 1s.
Having justiﬁed the Markov assumption for PRPs and TLBs, we shall now
describe the results of modelling real-time performance in the period of time following
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Figure 5.4. TLB duration is independent of previous work bout. The left-hand panel
provides a scatter plot of the data from F17, the animal showing the strongest de-
pendence of log-TLB duration on the log-last corrected work bout duration. The
regression line is indicated in red. The right hand panel provides a box-whisker plot
of the R2 values from all animals in all conditions; the median value occurs at ap-
proximately 0.01 (1% of the variance in log-TLB duration can be explained by the
duration of the last corrected work bout) and in no case is the regression statistically
signiﬁcant. Points indicate individual R2 values.
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the ﬁrst reward delivery as a CTMC, painting a portrait of each activity.
5.5.2 Modelling performance
5.5.2.1 Payoﬀ-dependent and independent activities
Figure 5.5 provides our justiﬁcation for allowing PRPs and TLBs to have
hidden behavioural states with payoﬀ-dependent means, while restricting the hid-
den behavioural states of holds and taps to payoﬀ-independent means. Although
the maximum-likelihood estimates of the PRP (top left) and TLB (bottom right)
duration consistently decrease with payoﬀ across rats (R2 values of 0.48 and 0.38,
respectively), the maximum-likelihood estimates of the tap (top right) and hold (bot-
tom left) durations have much weaker relationships with payoﬀ (R2 values of 0.07 and
0.11, respectively). All correlations were signiﬁcant, but at a 5% type-I error rate,
with the number of data points observed (at minimum 1260), an R2 value of 0.003
would be statistically signiﬁcant. As a result of their weaker payoﬀ relationships, we
judged that allowing holds and taps to consist of payoﬀ-dependent components was
not justiﬁed by the overall pattern of dwell times in these activities across all animals.
5.5.2.2 Post-reinforcement pause
Figures 5.6 and 5.7 provide a portrait of the PRP. Figure 5.6 shows the log-
survival function of the dwell times at each payoﬀ for one animal (DE15) at each
payoﬀ, with dwell times on a log scale. Hot colours indicate high payoﬀs and cool
colours indicate low payoﬀs. In linear space, the log-survival function is a straight
line when the underlying process is a single exponential distribution; it is convex for
mixtures of multiple distributions and concave for gamma distributions. Plotting the
log-survival (z-axis) as a function of the log-dwell time (y-axis), as has been done
here, exaggerates the convex/concave relationship for single gamma- and mixtures of
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Figure 5.5. Maximum likelihood dwell times as a function of payoﬀ. Scatter plots of
the log-maximum likelihood dwell times in PRP (upper left), hold (upper right), tap
(lower left) and TLB (lower right) activities for all animals in the range of payoﬀs
common to all animals, as a function of the log-payoﬀ. While the relationship between
log-dwell time and log-payoﬀ is strong for both PRP and TLB activities (R2 values
are 0.48 and 0.38, respectively), the relationship is weak for both holds and taps (R2
of 0.07 and 0.11, respectively).
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Figure 5.6. Log-survival function of the PRP dwell time. The log-survival function
is shown here as a function of PRP dwell time (in logarithmic space) and payoﬀ
(in ordinal space) overlain with the predicted dwell times of the hidden states. Hot
colours indicate high payoﬀs while cold colours indicate low payoﬀs. At high payoﬀs,
the PRP rarely survives beyond a few seconds, while at low payoﬀs, PRP dwell times
on the order of hundreds of seconds have a higher probability of survival.
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x10000
Figure 5.7. Portrait of the post-reinforcement pause activity. Top panels show his-
tograms of the number of hidden states (upper left), the log-shape parameter (upper
centre), the slope of the sigmoid (upper right), the log-minimum dwell time (middle
centre), and log-maximum dwell time (middle right). The bottom two panels show a
box-whisker plot of the Ln-likelihood ratio of the CTMC model to a model in which
PRP durations are stochastic realizations of a single, payoﬀ-independent exponential
process. The bottom right panel focuses on the region from 10 to 180. Red points
indicate individual Ln[Likelihood Ratio] values. Note that the scale on the bottom
left plot is in units of ten thousand.
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multiple gamma distributions; exponential distributions become convex. Gamma and
exponential (that is, gamma distributions with a shape parameter of 1) distributions
thus appear to have more concave (downward-accelerating) log-survival functions,
and mixtures have more convex (downward-decelerating) functions.
Overlain with the ﬁt, we have indicated the hidden behavioural states in black.
In this animal, two hidden PRP behavioural states were extracted: one with a nega-
tive sloping payoﬀ dependence and one payoﬀ-independent component.
The plots on the ﬁrst row of ﬁgure 5.7 show the number of hidden states (left),
their shape parameter (middle), and the slope of the scaled logistic function that sets
their mean (right), for each animal in each condition. In each case, we provide a
histogram and box-whisker plot of the extracted value. The post-reinforcement pause
appears to consist of one or two states (median number is 1, inter-quartile range spans
1 to 2) that is largely exponentially distributed (median κ is 1.14, or a logarithm of
0.06; inter-quartile range spans 1 to 1.44, or logarithms from 0 to 0.16). This hidden
state has a payoﬀ-dependent mean, and the slope of the payoﬀ-mean relationship is
negative (median slope is −4.77, inter-quartile range spans −6.9 to −2.7).
The middle row shows the minimum of the scaled logistic (middle) and the
maximum of the scaled logistic (right), for each animal in each condition. We pro-
vide, as above, a histogram and box-whisker plot of the extracted values. The post-
reinforcement pause appears to have a very low minimum (often as low as 0.1s), with
a median log of −0.26 (0.55s) and inter-quartile range spanning −0.86 (0.17s) to 0.07
(0.42s). At low payoﬀs, the post-reinforcement pause rises to a maximum of 1.37
(23.20s), with an inter-quartile range spanning 0.86 (7.28s) to 1.83 (68.08s).
The bottom panel of ﬁgure 5.7 shows the log-likelihood ratio of our model, in
which dwell times are sampled from a mixture of exponential and payoﬀ-dependent
gamma distributions, compared to a null model in which dwell times are sampled from
a single, payoﬀ-independent exponential distribution. As the range of log-likelihood
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ratios extends to 2.5 × 104, we have expanded the plot in the right-hand panel, to
focus on the region from logarithms of 10 to 180. In all cases, the log-likelihood
ratio is large, with a minimum log of approximately 11, indicating that in the worst
case, the probability of our data is approximately 60000 times (e11) more likely if we
assume our model is correct than if we assume a null model is correct, even when
taking the extra parameters into account.
5.5.2.3 Hold
Figures 5.8 and 5.9 provide a portrait of the hold activity. Figure 5.8 shows a
typical log-survival plot of the dwell times at each payoﬀ for one animal (F9). The
payoﬀ-independent behavioural states are indicated with a black line overlay. In this
animal, two hidden holding-related states were extracted: one with a low (log of 0.2,
or 1.6s) mean and one with a high (log of 1.1, or 12.6s) mean.
The top plots of ﬁgure 5.9 show the number of hidden states (left), their shape
parameter (middle), and their mean (right), for each animal in each condition. In
each case, we provide a histogram and box-whisker plot of the extracted value. Holds
appear to consist of two or three (median number is 2, inter-quartile range spans 2
to 3), mostly exponentially distributed (median κ is 1.25, inter-quartile range spans
1 to 1.91) hidden states. The log-dwell time in holding-related states is broadly
distributed, with a median at a log of 0.34 (or 2.19s) and an inter-quartile range
spanning a log of −0.14 (or 0.7s) to a log of 0.84 (or 6.92s).
Because multiple hidden behavioural states related to holding were identiﬁed,
and these states were forced to have payoﬀ-independent mean dwell times, we further
identiﬁed the mean dwell time for the two most preponderant components (those with
the greatest wi). The two most preponderant components were ordered by their mean;
if only one component was identiﬁed, it was assumed to be the longest. The medians
and inter-quartile ranges of the mean dwell times for each of these two components
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Figure 5.8. Log-survival function of the hold dwell time. The log-survival function
is shown here as a function of hold dwell time (in logarithmic space) and payoﬀ
(in ordinal space) overlain with the predicted dwell times of the hidden states. Hot
colours indicate high payoﬀs while cold colours indicate low payoﬀs. Two components
are apparent: one with a mean that is a few seconds long, and a second with a mean
that is on the order of tens of seconds.
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Figure 5.9. Portrait of the hold activity. Top panels show histograms of the number of
hidden states (left), the log-shape parameter (centre), and predicted mean dwell time
(right). The middle two panels show a box-whisker plot of the Ln-likelihood ratio of
the CTMC model to a model in which hold durations are stochastic realizations of a
single exponential process. The bottom right panel focuses on the region from 0 to
180. Red points indicate individual Ln[Likelihood Ratio] values.
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are indicated in red in the top right panel of ﬁgure 5.9. The dwell time of the shorter
component had a median log of −0.31 (0.49s) with an inter-quartile range spanning
a log of −0.69 (0.20s) to 0.12 (1.31s). The dwell time of the longer component had a
median log of 0.87 (7.35s) with an inter-quartile range spanning a log of 0.412 (2.58s)
to 1.25 (17.7s).
The bottom panel of ﬁgure 5.9 shows the log-likelihood ratio of our model, in
which dwell times are sampled from a mixture of exponential and payoﬀ-independent
gamma distributions, compared to a null model in which dwell times are sampled from
a single, payoﬀ-independent exponential distribution. As above, because of the large
range spanned by the log-likelihood ratios (from 0 to 13000), the right-hand panel
focuses on the region from 0 to 180. While 3 of 52 ﬁts (6%) have a log-likelihood
ratio of 0, indicating that our two-component model is no better than a null (single
exponential component) model, the next smallest log-likelihood ratio is 30. In 94% of
cases tested, the probability of the data according to our model is at least e30 ≈ 1013
times better than a model in which all hold times are drawn from a single exponential
distribution.
5.5.2.4 Tap
Figures 5.10 and 5.11 provide a portrait of the tap activity. The upper left-
hand panel shows a typical log-survival function of the dwell times at each payoﬀ for
one animal (F9). Overlain with the ﬁt, we have indicated the hidden behavioural
states in black. In this animal, two hidden tapping release-related behavioural states
were extracted: one with a very short mean (log of −1, or 0.1s) and one with a longer
mean (log of −0.45, or 0.35s).
The top plots of ﬁgure 5.11 show the number of hidden states (left), their
shape parameter (middle), and their mean (right), for each animal in each condition.
In each case, we provide a histogram and box-whisker plot of the extracted value.
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Figure 5.10. Log-survival function of the tap dwell time. The log-survival function
is shown here as a function of tap dwell time (in logarithmic space) and payoﬀ (in
ordinal space) overlain with the predicted dwell times of the hidden states. Hot
colours indicate high payoﬀs while cold colours indicate low payoﬀs. Two components
are apparent: one with a mean that is 0.1 seconds long, and a second with a mean
that is on the order of 0.4 seconds.
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x10000
Figure 5.11. Portrait of the tap activity. Top panels show histograms of the number of
hidden states (left), the log-shape parameter (centre), and predicted mean dwell time
(right). The bottom two panels show a box-whisker plot of the Ln-likelihood ratio of
the CTMC model to a model in which hold durations are stochastic realizations of a
single exponential process. The bottom right panel focuses on the region from 2000
to 5000. Red points indicate individual Ln[Likelihood Ratio] values. Note that the
scale on the bottom left is in units of ten thousand.
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The tap appears to consist of two (median number is 2, inter-quartile range spans 2
to 2), largely gamma-distributed (median κ is 4.23, inter-quartile range spans 2.98
to 99.99) hidden states. The log-dwell time in tapping-related release states has a
median at −0.53 (or 0.30s) and an inter-quartile range spanning from −1 (or 0.1s) to
−0.44 (or 0.36). Additionally, this distribution appears to be highly bimodal, with
one mode near the median, at approximately 0.3s (log of −0.53), and another mode
at the shortest tapping-related release that can be detected, 0.1s (log of −1).
Because multiple hidden states related to tapping were identiﬁed, and these
states were forced to have payoﬀ-independent mean dwell times, we further identiﬁed
the mean dwell times of the two most preponderant components (those with the
greatest wi). The two most preponderant components were ordered from shortest to
longest mean; if only one component was identiﬁed, it was assumed to be the longest.
The medians and inter-quartile ranges of the mean dwell times for each of these two
components are indicated in red in the middle right panel of ﬁgure 5.11. The dwell
time of the shorter component had a median log of −1.00 (0.1s) with an inter-quartile
range spanning a log of −1.00 (0.1s) to −1.00 (0.1s). The dwell time of the longer
component had a median log of −0.43 (0.37s) with an inter-quartile range spanning
a log of −0.49 (0.32s) to −0.37 (0.39s).
The bottom panel of ﬁgure 5.11 shows the log-likelihood ratio of our model, in
which dwell times are sampled from a mixture of exponential and payoﬀ-independent
gamma distributions, compared to a null model in which dwell times are sampled
from a single, payoﬀ-independent exponential distribution. Similarly to ﬁgures 5.7
and 5.9, the right-hand panel focuses on the region from 2000 to 5000. In all cases,
the log-likelihood ratio is large, with a minimum of approximately 2158, indicating
that in the worst case, the data is approximately e2158 > 264 − 1 (greater than can
be represented by a 64-bit unsigned integer) times more likely if we assume our two-
component model is correct than if we assume a null (single exponential component)
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model is correct.
5.5.2.5 True Leisure Bout
Figures 5.12 and 5.13 provide a portrait of the TLB. Figure 5.12 shows a
typical log-survival function of the dwell times at each payoﬀ for one animal (DE15).
Overlain with the ﬁt, we have indicated the hidden behavioural states in black. In
this animal, two hidden TLB behavioural states were extracted, both with negative
sloping payoﬀ dependencies.
The plots on the top row of ﬁgure 5.13 show the number of hidden states (left),
their shape parameter (middle), and the slope of the scaled logistic function that sets
their mean (right), for each animal in each condition. In each case, we provide a
histogram and box-whisker plot of the extracted value. The post-reinforcement pause
appears to consist of two states (median number is 2, inter-quartile range spans 2 to
2) that is largely gamma-distributed (median κ is 5.11, inter-quartile range spans
1 to 13). These hidden states have a payoﬀ-dependent mean, and the slope of the
payoﬀ-mean relationship is negative (median slope is −8.1, inter-quartile range spans
−153.4 to 0)
The middle row shows the minimum of the scaled logistic (middle) and the
maximum of the scaled logistic (right), for each animal in each condition. We provide,
as above, a histogram and box-whisker plot of the extracted values. True leisure bout
activities appear to have a very low minimum (often as low as 1s), with a median log
of 0.23 (1.68s) and an inter-quartile range spanning 0.12 (1.31s) to 0.47 (2.92s). When
payoﬀ is low, the dwell time in TLB-related behavioural states rises to a median log of
1.38 (23.82s), with inter-quartile range spanning a log of 0.52 (3.34s) to 1.92 (83.18s).
However, the maximum dwell times appear to be almost uniformly distributed: they
are widely distributed from a log of 0, corresponding to the 1s tapping criterion (which
is the lowest possible dwell time in TLB activities), to a log of 2, corresponding to a
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Figure 5.12. Log-survival function of the TLB dwell time. The log-survival function
is shown here as a function of TLB dwell time (in logarithmic space) and payoﬀ (in
ordinal space) overlain with the predicted dwell times of the hidden states. Hot colours
indicate high payoﬀs while cold colours indicate low payoﬀs. At high payoﬀs, the
probability that a TLB will survive beyond 10s is very low, while at low payoﬀs, the
probability that a TLB will be at least tens of minutes is very high. One component of
this two-component mixture is close to 1s and relatively payoﬀ-independent, reﬂecting




Figure 5.13. Portrait of the true leisure bout activity. Top panels show histograms of
the number of hidden states (upper left), the log-shape parameter (upper centre), the
slope of the sigmoid (upper right), the log-minimum dwell time (middle centre), and
log-maximum dwell time (middle right). The bottom two panels show a box-whisker
plot of the Ln-likelihood ratio of the CTMC model to a model in which TLB durations
are stochastic realizations of a single exponential process. The bottom centre panel
focuses on the region from −1400 to 0, while the bottom right panel focuses on the
region from 100 to 2000. Red points indicate individual Ln[Likelihood Ratio] values.
Note that the scale on the bottom left is in units of ten thousand.
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100s true leisure bout. We shall return to this point later.
The bottom panel of ﬁgure 5.13 shows the log-likelihood ratio of our model, in
which dwell times are sampled from a mixture of exponential and payoﬀ-dependent
gamma distributions, compared to a null model in which dwell times are sampled
from a single, payoﬀ-independent exponential distribution. In all but 4 (7%) cases,
the log-likelihood ratio is large, with a minimum of 154.7, indicating that in 93%
of cases, the probability of the data assuming our two-component, payoﬀ-dependent
model is true was at least e154.7 ≈ 1.53×1067 times greater than the probability of the
data assuming a null (single payoﬀ-independent component) model. In the remaining
7% of cases, the probability of the data assuming a null model was greater than when
assuming the mixture model we have proposed.
5.5.2.6 Starting probabilities
The top left panel of ﬁgure 5.14 shows, for a representative rat (DE1), the
relationship between the logarithm of the payoﬀ and the probability that a reward
encounter begins with a CTLB. The prediction of the logistic regression is depicted
along with the observed probabilities and their associated 95% conﬁdence intervals;
the proportion of variance is indicated in the legend. The top right panel of ﬁgure 5.14
shows a box-whisker plot of the overall proportion of variance in CTLB probability
accounted for by payoﬀ across all rats and conditions. The median R2 is 0.15, with
an inter-quartile range spanning 0.09 to 0.21.
The bottom left panel of ﬁgure 5.14 shows, for a representative rat (F3), the
relationship between the logarithm of the payoﬀ and the probability that a reward
encounter begins with a hold. The prediction of the logistic regression is depicted
along with the observed probabilities and their associated 95% conﬁdence intervals;
the proportion of variance accounted for by payoﬀ is indicated in the legend. The
bottom right panel shows a box-whisker plot of this proportion across all rats and
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All PRPs and holds immediately following reward
Fit, logistic regression
Pseudo R2=0.142
































All uncensored PRPs and holds immediately following reward
Fit, logistic regression
Pseudo R2=0.086













Figure 5.14. Probability that the PRP is censored, and if not, that it lasts 0s. The
upper left panel provides an example relationship of the probability of a CTLB when
the reward encounter begins as a function of payoﬀ for a typical animal (DE1). Cir-
cles indicate proportions of times the rat began a CTLB at the start of the reward
encounter (± 95% conﬁdence interval), solid lines indicate the logistic regression line.
The upper right panel is a box-whisker plot of the R2 values of this relationship across
all animals and conditions. The bottom left panel provides an example relationship
of the probability of starting a reward encounter immediately in the hold activity
(that is, the duration of the PRP is 0) as a function of payoﬀ for a typical animal
(F3). Circles indicate proportions of times a reward encounter began on the hold
activity (± 95% conﬁdence interval), solid lines indicate the logistic regression line.
The bottom right panel is a box-whisker plot of the R2 values of this relationship
across all animals and conditions.
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conditions. The median R2 is 0.07, with an inter-quartile range spanning 0.03 to 0.10.
In both cases, there is considerable variability in the proportion of variance
that can be accounted for by these logistic regressions. Some rats very rarely begin
reward encounters in a CTLB. As a result, the R2 values for the logistic regressions of
these animals is close to 0. Similarly, because of interfering motor eﬀects, some rats
rarely begin reward encounters by immediately holding the lever down, while some
rats with highly eﬀective electrodes are capable of depressing the lever as soon as it
begins to extend into the chamber.
5.5.2.7 Transitions from holds to releases
The top left panel of ﬁgure 5.15 shows, for a representative rat (DE15), the
relationship between the logarithm of the payoﬀ and the probability that an uncen-
sored hold terminates on a CTLB. The curve of the logistic regression is depicted
along with the observed probabilities and their associates 95% conﬁdence intervals;
the proportion of variance is indicated in the legend. The top right panel shows a
box-whisker plot of the overall proportion of variance in CTLB probability accounted
for by payoﬀ across all rats and conditions. Overall, rats very rarely stop responding
entirely part-way through a trial, and the probability of doing so is largely payoﬀ-
independent. The median R2 is 0.01, with an inter-quartile range spanning 0.002 to
0.03. These estimates are much lower than the results seen above, implying that if
the rat is going to wait until the next trial begins before the rat returns to work, it
will do so as soon as the reward encounter begins.
The bottom left panel of ﬁgure 5.15 shows, for a representative rat (DE20),
the relationship between the logarithm of the payoﬀ and the probability that an
uncensored hold terminates on an uncensored release lasting one second or less. The
curve of the logistic regression is depicted along with the observed probabilities and
their associated 95% conﬁdence intervals; the proportion of variance accounted for
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All uncensored trial releases
Fit, logistic regression
R2=0.026




































































Figure 5.15. Probability that a hold terminates on a CTLB, and if not, that it termi-
nates on a tap. The upper left panel provides an example of the relationship between
the probability that a hold that is terminated before reward delivery will be followed
by a CTLB for a typical animal (DE15). Circles indicate proportions of times an
uncensored hold was followed by a CTLB (± 95 % conﬁdence interval), solid lines
indicate the logistic regression line. The upper right panel is a box-whisker plot of
the R2 values of this relationship across all animals and conditions. The bottom left
panel provides an example of the relationship between the probability that a hold that
is not interrupted by a CTLB will be a tap for one representative animal (DE20).
Circles indicate proportions of times an uncensored hold that wasn’t followed by a
CTLB was interrupted by a tap (± 95 % conﬁdence interval), solid lines indicate the
logistic regression line. The bottom right panel is a box-whisker plot of the R2 values
of this relationship across all animals and conditions. In the inset, we have provided
a histogram of the proportion of uncensored releases that have been classiﬁed as taps.
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by payoﬀ is indicated in the legend. The bottom right panel shows a box-whisker
plot of this proportion across all rats and conditions. The median R2 is 0.02, with
an inter-quartile range spanning 0.0045 to 0.05. The inset to the bottom right panel
shows why: the probability that a release will be classiﬁed as a tap is above 70% in all
ﬁts, and in over half of the cases, the probability that a release will be classiﬁed as a
tap is above 90%. While the probabilities of a long, censored PRP, and a short, zero-
duration PRP are payoﬀ-dependent, these results imply that the probabilities of a
tapping-related release, and long, censored leisure bouts are both payoﬀ-independent.
5.5.3 Molar predictions of the molecular model
Figure 5.16 depicts the ﬁrst step in extrapolating from the molecular-level
performance described by the CTMC to molar, whole-trial performance. The left-
hand panel shows the linear regression of log-reward encounter duration onto log-price
and log-subjective intensity for a representative rat (DE15). Objective price was used
because at a constant reward intensity, no matter how low the objective price, its
value will aﬀect the duration of the reward encounter: a trial for which the objective
price is 0.02s will take longer to lead to reward than one for which the objective price
is 0.01s, even though the rat may treat those two as subjectively equally costly.
As expected, there is a strong relationship between price, intensity, and reward-
encounter duration. As a result, we used this estimate of how long the rat took to
complete a reward encounter that was not censored by the end of the trial.
This estimate provides the appropriate time frame for which to evaluate the
evolution of the CTMC as described. Each activity i in the CTMC will transition
to another activity j at a rate of αji, and the rate at which it is left will be αii. For
example, if holds transition to taps, TLBs, and CTLBs at rates
αtap,hold, αTLB,hold, αCTLB,hold
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Figure 5.16. Predicting reward encounter duration for whole-trial extrapolation. The
left-hand panel provides an example regression of log-reward encounter duration as
a function of log-objective price and log-reward intensity for a representative animal
(DE15). Circles indicate mean log-reward encounter duration (± 95 % bootstrap
conﬁdence interval), surface indicates the regression plane. The right-hand panel is a
box-whisker plot of the R2 values across all rats and conditions.
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then, necessarily, the rate at which the rat leaves the hold state will be the (negative)









P [activity = i at t] = AP [activity = i at t]
where A is a matrix whose entries are αij and αii. The solution to this system of
5 linear, ordinary diﬀerential equations gives the probability, at any point in the
reward encounter, that the rat engages in any activity i, assuming the transition
rates are time-invariant. Since the average amount of time accumulated in each
activity from the start of the reward encounter to any arbitrary time t is an integral
of the probability of engaging in each activity, integrating the time spent in each
activity from 0 to the point in time at which the reward encounter is ended provides
an estimate of how much time is spent in each activity. The time allocation thus
extrapolated (time spent in hold and tap activities divided by the time spent in
all activities) provides an estimate of the proportion of time allocated per reward
encounter. Multiplying this value by the probability of starting a reward encounter
without a CTLB provides an estimate of what the time allocation would be, were we
to extrapolate molecular performance to the level of the entire trial.
Figures 5.17 and 5.18 show the time allocation predicted by the model if we
were to extrapolate the CTMC from the reward encounter to the whole trial, for each
of the rats that underwent the subjective price experiment. The extrapolation was
performed on these animals because of the much larger quantities of data available
from which to estimate the payoﬀ-dependent and independent hidden states. The
left panels of each row are contour plots of the time allocation extrapolated from the














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 5.17. Extrapolated mountains and the comparison of molar TA to observed
values for subjective-price rats, part 1. Left column depicts time allocation contours
extrapolated from the CTMC. Right column compares the time allocation observed
throughout the entire trial (open circles) to that predicted by the CTMC (solid lines)
for each pseudo-sweep. Numbers in far right panel indicate the proportion of variance
in observed time allocation values that can be predicted by extrapolating the CTMC














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 5.18. Extrapolated mountains and the comparison of molar TA to observed
values for subjective-price rats, part 2. Continued from 5.17.
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general dependence of molar time allocation on log-price and log-pulse frequency often
has a very similar general appearance to that of the Reinforcement Mountain Model.
The right panels show a comparison of the time allocation observed throughout the
entire trial (open circles, ± 95% bootstrap-derived conﬁdence intervals) with the time
allocation predicted by extrapolating the CTMC to the entire trial (solid lines). There
is reasonable agreement between the two, with R2 values ranging from 0.770 to 0.933,
indicated on the far right side of each row.
5.6 Discussion
We have used a continuous-time semi-Markov model to describe performance
for brain stimulation reward in the test-trial phase of the randomized-triads design.
The model is based on a small number of core principles, simple functions, and an
assumption that responses and pauses in various observable activities are independent
of the responses and pauses that preceded them.
This is in contrast to reinforcement learning models, which model performance
as a punctate choice of what to do at discrete time steps (Montague et al., 1996), and
melioration, which models performance in terms of the local rate of reinforcement
from each source of reward. The model presented here assumes that the rat does
not learn the expected payoﬀ over a number of rewards, as would be proposed by
model-free reinforcement learning (Montague et al., 1996); instead, the rat “ﬁlls in”
the appropriate value for the payoﬀ and adjusts its stay durations accordingly. The
model also assumes that the key determinant of stay durations involves an accumu-
lation of time spent lever-pressing over the entire reward encounter, weighted by the
probability of reinforcement. If the local rate of reinforcement—that is, the instanta-
neous rate at which rewards are delivered on a moment to moment basis—were the
key determinant, animals would simply stop lever-pressing after the lever is retracted
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without reward delivery—making the local rate of reinforcement from lever-pressing
0. The probability of reinforcement appears to be averaged across appropriately-cued
trials (the lever for these trials is generally on a diﬀerent side of the chamber and a
ﬂashing cue light provides a discriminative stimulus). In our model, the determinant
of the stay durations in each activity (though it is only a weak predictor of hold
and tap durations) is the scalar combination of subjective opportunity cost, reward
intensity, and reward probability, rather than the local rate of reinforcement. As in
the model of Gallistel et al. (2001), which inspired the CTMC model presented here,
performance is stochastic, and the dwell time in each state is a function of the payoﬀs
on oﬀer. However, the Gallistel et al. (2001) model diﬀers from ours in that it entails
sampling of dwell times from a single, exponential distribution and alternation be-
tween options according to their combined payoﬀs. Model selection based on the AIC
shows that more complex distributions and mixtures thereof are required to describe
the data adequately. The alternation principle in the Gallistel et al. (2001) model is
better suited to dual-operant context than to the present single-operant context.
Our model of performance in real time diﬀers from previous attempts: it is
not based on an optimization principle, and it more readily describes performance
as a series of non-punctate events. As a result, we shall discuss the overall pattern
of responding that is revealed by the algorithm, the response pattern of a typical
rat, the model’s ability to account for trial-level performance, and its application in
identifying the neural substrates that underlie the decision-making process.
5.6.1 Real-time performance
Our modelling suggests that the payoﬀ sets the probability that the rat is
in one of a small number of hidden behavioural states, which are only indirectly
observable in the stream of holds and releases at the lever. These hidden behavioural
states are, by and large, characterized by a constant failure rate (the distribution of
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dwell times is roughly exponential) over the entire trial. The ﬁrst reward delivery (in
the randomized-triads design) provides suﬃcient information to set for the remainder
of the trial:
1. The duration of PRP states,
2. the probability that the PRP state terminates at such a high rate that a reward
encounter begins, for all intents and purposes, with a hold,
3. the probability that the PRP state terminates at such a low rate that the trial
ends before the PRP, and
4. the duration of TLB states when the rat has not given up pursuit of the reward
on oﬀer.
In each case, the payoﬀ eﬀectively sets the expected dwell time in states that reﬂect
pursuit of non-self stimulation goals: the expected dwell time in the PRP (points
1 and 2), the expected dwell time in a CTLB (3), and the expected dwell time in
TLBs (4). The expected dwell time in holds or taps (Figure 5.5, 5.9 and 5.11) and
the probability that a temporary lever release reﬂects a tap (ﬁgure 5.15) bear only a
weak relationship with payoﬀ.
What emerges then is a pattern of responding in which the duration of the
post-reinforcement pause and the duration of the TLB is set by the expected payoﬀ
from self-stimulation in eﬀect during the trial, while the duration of a hold and tapping
release is not. Overall, then, our analyses allow us to describe, in real time, how the
animal partitions its time among the various activities in which it can engage. Given
this description, what does a typical rat do?
5.6.1.1 What does a typical rat do?
The model provides a fairly complete account of what the rat does in real
time. The rat extracts a subjective estimate of the total amount of time it worked
to earn a reward. It maintains a running average across multiple trials, according to
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a discriminative stimulus, of the probability that the reward will be delivered. The
rat then computes a payoﬀ by performing a scalar combination of the opportunity
cost with the subjective intensity of the rewarding eﬀect and the probability that the
reward will be delivered. Following the ﬁrst reward delivery, performance follows the
same chain, with the same probability of transitioning from one hidden state to the
next, every time the lever is extended back into the cage.
The payoﬀ sets the duration of one or two PRP states. When the payoﬀ
is high, the PRP state reaches a minimum of 0.7s; when it is low, the PRP state
approaches a maximum of 18.5s. In the absence of forced motoric side-eﬀects caused
by the stimulation, very high payoﬀs will lead the rat to engage in a 0-duration PRP
state, completely forgoing any leisure activity. The PRP states typically lead to one
of two types of holds: long-hold (as long as required to obtain the reward) and short-
hold (2s). When the typical rat temporarily leaves a hold state, it does so as part of
a tap, which consists of two states: “short” taps (0.1s in duration) and “long” taps
(0.4s). Longer, leisure-related releases are rarer, comprising a very small subset of
all uncensored releases of the lever. Nonetheless, when the TLB activity is begun,
it comprises two distinct hidden states with payoﬀ-dependent mean. One of these
hidden states is likely an artifact of the arbitrary tapping criterion, as its maximum
is very nearly the arbitrary minimum imposed by classifying releases into taps and
TLBs; the other likely represents a true leaving process.
This picture of the typical rat’s activities is somewhat diﬀerent than has been
described previously. The rat does not appear to continuously alternate between
pursuing the goals of work and the goals of leisure, as though pushed from one to
the other. Instead, the rat “consumes” its leisure activities, all at once, during the
post-reinforcement pause, works continuously until rewarded, or until it gives up,
performing the equivalent of a coin toss at each instant of trial time with a coin
whose bias depends on the payoﬀ.
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Similarly to the model of dual-operant performance proposed by Gallistel et al.
(2001), the expected dwell time in each activity that reﬂects an underlying pursuit of
leisure (PRP states and putative CTLB states) is related to the payoﬀ derived from
work activities. Unlike the Gallistel et al. (2001) model, we have proposed a non-
linear function mapping the payoﬀ from self-stimulation to dwell time. The duration
of behavioural states in hold and tap activities is insensitive to the payoﬀ derived
from self-stimulation. As a result, we hypothesize that the payoﬀ from pursuing
extraneous, non-self stimulation activities would alter the duration of hold and tap
activities. This idea remains to be tested, but is empirically veriﬁable: background
stimulation trains have been used in molar studies (Arvanitogiannis, 1997) to validate
the Shizgal Mountain Model. If we were to increase the payoﬀ from pursuing non-
self stimulation goals by providing electrical brain stimulation while the animal is
not lever-pressing, one would expect the termination rate of hold and tap states to
increase when background stimulation is available. Conversely, administering foot-
shock at random intervals while subjects are not lever-pressing would decrease the
payoﬀ derived from pursuing non-self stimulation goals. As a result, one would expect
the termination rate of hold and tap states to decrease when background foot shock is
possible. In both cases, neither increasing the payoﬀ from other activities by providing
background stimulation, nor decreasing it by providing foot-shocks, should alter the
mean dwell time in PRP and TLB activities.
In modelling the stay durations in each activity, we can further distinguish, in
principle, two types of hidden behavioural states: behavioural states that are hidden
by virtue of our inability to detect them without suﬃciently sensitive equipment
(“hidden to us”) and those that may not even be detectable by behavioural means
alone (“truly hidden”). As an example of “hidden to us” states, the rat that has quit
may have opted against lever-pressing for the remainder of the trial, but may still face
an action selection problem that can be modelled by the CTMC, provided we have
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appropriate equipment to detect that the animal is grooming, resting, or exploring.
As an example of a “truly hidden” states, it may not be possible to visually detect
the diﬀerence between a “long” hold, lasting on the order of tens of seconds, from a
“short” hold, lasting on the order of a few seconds, without ﬁtting a mixture model of
the hold durations. The value of the CTMC lies not only in its ability to detect what
may be diﬀerent actions that could be detected with sensitive equipment, but also
actions that may look alike to the casual observer. The addition of video camera- and
accelerometer-based systems may help make this CTMC model richer, but may not
provide all the necessary information. For example, the typical rat has two modes of
holding, and the only way to distinguish them is on the basis of their relative means:
one appears to be short while the other is long. We ﬁnd it unlikely that a review of a
video record would provide more information about what these two modes of holding
represent.
With such a rich, non-normative model of real-time performance, what can be
said about its predictions at the level of the whole trial, on the order of minutes to
hours? If molar performance is the result of molecular performance, what does the
CTMC model at the level of individual holds and pauses say about the whole trial?
5.6.2 Matching is an emergent property of the CTMC
The CTMC, as modelled and as described, makes no explicit assumptions
about the matching law, melioration, or reinforcement learning. We used two core
principles:
1. that the relevant determinant of the rat’s decision to press (the payoﬀ) is an
expectation for the scalar combination of subjective opportunity costs accrued over
the entire encounter, reward intensities and probabilities of reinforcement, and
2. that this determinant sets what the animal actually does, be it directly observable
(activities) or latent (hidden behavioural states).
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With only these two core principles, it is possible to re-create performance that
is close to the matching law in the six subjects for which there is the most data (F3, F9,
F12, F16, F17, and F18). Although no parameters have been added to the CTMC
to ensure that the proportion of total time allocated to self-stimulation activities
match the suitably-transformed ratio of the payoﬀ from self-stimulation to the sum
of suitably-transformed payoﬀs from each activity, the CTMC often re-captures this
relationship. By virtue of the way each piece ﬁts with each other piece—the payoﬀ-
dependent probability per unit time of ceasing a PRP state (including those with
higher- and lower-than-measurable termination rates), the payoﬀ-dependent probabil-
ity of long-mean TLB states, and the presumed payoﬀ-independent probability of each
hold and tap state—the CTMC reveals that matching on the molar scale is simply
an emergent property of the molecular interactions of various hidden exponentially-
and gamma-distributed behavioural states that can be quite succinctly summarized
in terms of their termination rate or mean-dwell time. Future studies will be required
to assess whether this is true in more data-poor cases, and if not, the conditions un-
der which this result obtains. Nonetheless, that performance at the molar level can
be reasonably well predicted (at least 77% of the variance in molar time allocation
is accounted for) by the multiple interacting pieces of the CTMC is an encourag-
ing ﬁrst step to understanding how animals partition their time among competing
alternatives.
The CTMC model described here provides a potentially powerful tool for in-
vestigating what the animal is doing—in real time—as well as what manipulations
may do at a level that has heretofore been impossible to assess. The CTMC may even




The CTMC allows us to summarize the behavioural components of real-time
performance with a relatively small number of distributional parameters. The sum-
mary is that much simpler when we consider that a large proportion (the ﬁrst bin
of the log-shape parameter histograms of ﬁgures 5.7, 5.9 and 5.13 provide graphical
evidence of this) of the hidden behavioural states extracted by the algorithm are ex-
ponentially distributed, requiring only a single parameter that sets the constant rate
at which the behavioural state terminates.
An easy implementation of this scheme in neural circuitry involves a winner-
take-all competition between populations representing the various possible actions
(Neiman and Loewenstein, 2013). Populations of neurons, connected by reciprocal
inhibition to each other and recurrent self-excitation, provide a source for which
activity the animal chooses to engage in. If neurons representing the pursuit of BSR
are active, they will inhibit neurons representing the pursuit of other goals. For
example, sub-populations of neurons representing “hold the lever for a while” may
equally make reciprocally inhibitory connections with those representing “hold the
lever for only a bit” as well as self-excitatory connections. The most active sub-
population of neurons will excite itself greatly, inhibit the others, and provide the
animal with a temporary goal to pursue. The degree of noise in the representation of
competing states, their ability to drown out the currently active sub-population, and
the currently active sub-population’s ability to excite itself will each determine how
long a sub-population maintains control of the animal’s behavioural output.
Given that spike rates can be modelled as Poisson processes with a constant
termination rate (Werner and Mountcastle, 1963), the fact that most hidden be-
havioural states can be described with a single termination rate parameter is rather
encouraging. The termination rate of a behavioural state and its probability of oc-
- 264 -
currence would certainly be related to the ﬁring rate of the neurons involved in its
representation. For example, if a sub-population is involved in representing a hold
state of 1s duration, then that population ought only be active while the animal un-
equivocally emits a short-duration hold. We would expect that sub-population to be
active only when the animal is in that behavioural state, and it would be possible to
decode, from population activity, the probability that the rat is in that behavioural
state using Bayes’ rule: the probability of being in state “short-hold,” assuming a
particular response from a large ensemble of neurons, can be decoded from the neural
response when the rat is in various behavioural states, the probability that the rat is
in this behavioural state, and probability of the neural response.
The CTMC thus also provides a solid behavioural basis for interpreting en-
semble recordings while animals engage in a single-operant task. The most rigorous
way to attribute a neural representation to activity within a population of cells is to
use Bayes’ rule to turn the tuning curve of each neuron for the proposed psychological
phenomenon (P[activity|state]), each neuron’s baseline ﬁring rate (P[activity]) and
the probability of representing the phenomenon (P[state]) into a decoded probability
of the phenomenon being represented. For example, some neurons (population A)
may be more active than usual when the rat is in the “holding patiently” state; the
tuning curve of population A would provide the probability that these neurons ﬁre
as a function of the duration of the hold, but not the probability that the rat is en-
gaging in a long hold based on the population’s ﬁring rate (the decoded probability).
Provided one is recording from multiple units with diﬀerent holding-related tuning
curves, a simple application of Bayes’ rule
P [state|activity] = P [activity|state] · P [state]P [activity]
would be suﬃcient to relate activity in a population of neurons to a putative hidden
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behavioural state.
One important population of neurons to consider with the CTMC is in the
ventral striatum. The nucleus accumbens shell may be one candidate region that
translates the payoﬀs from diﬀerent goals into action (Yin et al., 2008), thereby
underlying the various behavioural states of the CTMC. Prefrontal cortical regions
may provide the information regarding the expected payoﬀ from each goal (Cohen
et al., 2002), combining the subjective opportunity costs, reward intensities, and risk
involved in acquiring each. Finally, dopamine neurons of the ventral tegmental area
may modulate activity within the nucleus accumbens (Goto et al., 2007), making
sub-populations representing some behavioural states more resilient to competition
from other behavioural states. The roles of each of these regions in the animal’s
behavioural output could easily be assessed with the CTMC model presented here,
and hypotheses concerning how each nucleus contributes to performance would be
readily tested empirically.
5.6.4 Concluding remarks
Our model opens a new universe of possibilities for investigating the eﬀect
of manipulations to reward-valuation circuitry on hitherto unmeasurable aspects of
performance. One interesting question regards the eﬀect of psychostimulants such as
cocaine on the pattern of responding. The Shizgal Mountain Model has been useful
in identifying the stage of processing at which manipulations act, but cannot on its
own determine how it impacts performance on the molecular level. For example,
the Mountain Model has identiﬁed that cocaine aﬀects the neural circuitry of reward
beyond the output of the network that carries out a spatio-temporal integration of
the injected signal. In light of these ﬁndings, one could argue that the increase
in dopamine eﬄux to the nucleus accumbens produced by cocaine administration
scales the translation of injected pulse frequency into subjective reward intensity.
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This explanation posits that higher dopamine tone in the nucleus accumbens would
makes all rewards more valuable by a constant factor. Others have argued that
cocaine alters the animal’s proclivity to invest eﬀort into acquiring electrical rewards
(Salamone et al., 2005). A ﬁnal means by which cocaine would alter reward processing
beyond the spatio-temporal integration of action potentials elicited at the electrode tip
involves decreasing the payoﬀ from alternate activities in the box. The CTMC could
provide an answer to how cocaine might aﬀect performance on the molecular level. It
may alter only the payoﬀ from self-stimulation activities (either by scaling the reward
intensity or making pursuit of brain stimulation more eﬀortful), which would alter
the dwell time in activities related to the pursuit of leisure rewards (PRP and TLB
state durations, and well as CTLB probabilities). It may alter only the payoﬀ from
other activities, which we hypothesize would change the duration of states related to
the pursuit of work rewards (holds and taps). A large number of questions regarding
how a particular manipulation of neural circuitry—a pharmacological manipulation,
a lesion, or a physiological challenge—impacts the patterning of performance in real
time can now be readily answered thanks to our CTMC model. The development
of new techniques, like optogenetics, will even provide tools to assess the eﬀect of
manipulations that occur on the same time scale as the CTMC, that is, in real time
and on the order of milliseconds.
Although causal manipulations and lesion studies can easily be conducted in
the context of the CTMC model, they are by no means the only way the CTMC model
is useful in understanding how the brain evaluates and decides. The real-time nature
of the CTMC can just as readily be transported to the study of neural correlates of
any behavioural state, presumably resulting from neural activity in neurons that can
be identiﬁed, to study where the determinants of action selection may be represented
individually and where they have been combined. The new methodology presented
here for succinctly describing the rich patterning of responses in a single-operant
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context provides a springboard for a new era in understanding how the brain evaluates




Before the start of a self-stimulation session, the typical subject appears to be
oblivious to its environmental conditions. It often grooms itself as a consequence of
having been handled by a large primate, sniﬀs around the operant chamber, and rests
in the corner as the experimenter programs the day’s experimental protocol. As soon
as the large house light begins to ﬂash, the rat awakens from its apparent stupor, and
priming stimulation invigorates its movements. As the lever extends into the operant
chamber, the rat leaps to the manipulandum and begins holding it down.
How the animal selects what to do, when to do it, and for how long to do it,
has been a burning question in psychology, neuroscience, ecology, and—in the case
of the human animal—economics. Answers to the question of action selection inform
much more than the question of motivation. In order for an animal to select an
action, the animal must learn action-outcome pairs in as simple or complex a sense
as necessary (thereby engaging learning systems), convert the outcomes of actions
into a common currency (thereby engaging valuation systems), maintain at least an
ordinal preference for the actions it can take (thereby engaging action-incentivizing
systems), and keep track of the potentially ﬂuctuating payoﬀs it has obtained from
the actions available to it (thereby engaging mnemonic systems). An animal that is
unable to learn that a particular patch is bare, or remember that the patch is rife
with predators, or convert the beneﬁts from food and those from sex into a common
currency, or at least order foraging at two patches in terms of their desirability, would
very quickly become extinct.
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6.1 The action selection problem
The action selection problem itself has been traditionally considered in the
context of instrumental conditioning. The procedure is naturally suited for answering
questions about how to choose what to do and how long for which to do it: the animal
opts between operant A and operant B, or operant A and everything else, and the
action selected directly reveals the animal’s preference between the two. It is possible
to then study how various manipulations will change what the animal elects to do,
either at the molecular level of individual holds and pauses or at the molar level of
the entire trial.
What we describe below are three descriptions of action selection. Reinforce-
ment learning models, with their deep roots in artiﬁcial intelligence and machine
learning, provide a normative account of what an animal ought to do in order to
maximize its total net rate of reward. Model-free reinforcement learning implies that
rats learn only the net reward at any given point in time, a view consistent with a
habit-learning system that is insensitive to the identity of an outcome and maintains
a representation of only the net reward that can be expected. In other words, the
rat forms only a representation that lever-pressing will lead to a reward, and nothing
else. Model-based reinforcement learning implies that rats learn not only the value
of an action in a particular state (e.g., pressing the lever is “good”), but also form a
representation of the state that will result from that action (e.g., pressing the lever
will lead to a delicious banana-ﬂavoured food pellet). In this case, what is learned
is a model of the world, a view consistent with a goal-learning system that main-
tains a representation of both the net reward and the identity of the outcome that
can be expected. A diﬀerent, non-normative description of action selection takes its
pedigree from the early days of operant psychology. The matching law (Herrnstein,
1961) is based on the observation that animals will approximately match the relative
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rate at which they respond to one operant (and therefore select it) to its relative rate
of reinforcement. The law was subsequently extended to the single-operant context
by assuming that the choice is between the experimenter-controlled action and ev-
erything else the subject can do while in the chamber. Although some (Sakai and
Fukai, 2008) have linked the Matching law to reinforcement learning models, this
also requires matching behaviour to result from the steady-state of a gradual learning
process, a result that (as we shall discuss later) does not obtain.
6.1.1 Model-free reinforcement learning
A highly general description of action selection simply requires the rat to
maintain stimulus-response contingencies: responses that lead to desirable stimuli
are strengthened, while those that do not are weakened. As a result, no action need
be “selected”: the action with greatest associative strength with rewarding stimuli is
that which the subject performs.
In natural settings, however, the rat does not have an explicit “teacher” for
which responses are desirable and which are not. The animal must explore a space
of responses, and assign credit for reward to an action it has taken in what may
have been a long chain of responses. According to reinforcement learning accounts,
the animal solves this assignment of credit problem by way of an internal “critic”
that performs an estimate of the total future net reward that can be expected from
performing any particular action. The “actor” then evaluates the optimal policy to
implement in order to obtain the greatest total net reward. The critic maintains an
estimate of the total future net reward that is expected in a particular state, and if
it is surprising—that is, the reward magnitude that was delivered is diﬀerent from
what was expected—the critic module will update the expectation as a function of
the learning rate. The actor module will then use this updated expectation to tune
performance to maximize the total net reward the rat obtains.
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For example, suppose a monkey must maintain a key press when it sees a
yellow light in order to obtain a juice reward (Apicella et al., 1991). The stimuli
are presented at randomly chosen intervals, but (assuming the key is still pressed)
the juice reward is delivered two seconds after light onset. If the monkey behaves
as a model-free reinforcement learning agent, the ﬁrst time the juice is delivered, at
t = 2s, it is a surprising event, with a reward of R(St=2), prompting the critic module
to update the value of the state “light came on” (with presumably 0 expected value)
at t = 2 by some learning factor α of the discrepancy:
V (St=2) ← 0 + α × (R(St=2) − 0).
If the learning rate is 1, the new value of the state at t = 2 will be the last delivered
reward, while a learning rate of 0 will mean the value of the state is never updated.
Now let us suppose the light comes on again, following an inter-stimulus interval of
random duration. The value of the state “light came on” is no longer 0, because it
incorporates both the immediate net reward (0) with the total discounted value of
future states. This, of course, diﬀers from the initial estimate of 0, which will drive the
critic module to update the value of the state at t = 0 according to the discrepancy
between the expected reward (0) and the sum of the immediate net reward (0) with
the discounted total net future rewards (of which V (St=2) is one such future reward).
Over repeated presentations, the value of the state at each point in time converges
onto a “true” value, a process which is called “value iteration.” In this scenario, the
monkey need not learn which states follow which other states; all that needs to be
learned is that maintaining the key press will lead to a certain level of reward.
The time required to obtain an accurate estimate of the value of states is
inversely related to the learning rate of the process. If α in the expression above is 1,
then the expected value of the state “light on” two seconds after the onset of the cue
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(V (St=2)) is immediately equal to the value of the juice reward. In very few trials, the
expected value of trial states at any time after the cue light is illuminated will have
converged to their “true” values. In natural settings, however, there is variability in
the amount and timing of rewards that an animal will receive, and a high learning
rate will drive the animal to give an inordinate amount of weight to these deviations.
If the learning rate is 1 and the monkey expects that a reward of magnitude 10 will
be delivered at t = 2, presenting a reward of magnitude 10 at t = 1.9 or a reward
of magnitude 5 at time t = 2 will both drastically alter the value of the state “light
came on” at all time points. Indeed, too high a learning rate and an animal navigating
its environment would be pulled very strongly by the rare events occurring simply
because of random sampling. Too low a learning rate and the animal would require
too many trials to form an accurate representation of how much reward to expect
from its environment. Without some model of the world, what the animal should or
should not do is guided by feed-back of the total net reward that has followed previous
actions, until the function that maps values to states and actions at any particular
time (V (St)) is maximized.
6.1.2 Model-based reinforcement learning
In contrast, model-based reinforcement learning requires the rat to learn not
only that taking action A at time step t results in a particular total net reward,
but also the identity of that reward. In other words, the rat constructs not only a
stimulus-response map of the total future reward that can be expected from making a
response at a particular time, but also a stimulus-stimulus map of the stimuli that can
be expected from making a response at a particular time. Model-based descriptions
allow multiple conclusions and representations of what the state of the world will be:
if one takes action A at time t, one can expect state S ′ with total future net reward
r. This sort of description, and its contrast with model-free reinforcement learning,
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has been particularly useful in formalizing the diﬀerence between habit-based and
goal-based decision-making.
Habit-based systems of decision-making are insensitive to reinforcement deval-
uation (Dickinson et al., 1995), a result one would expect if model-free reinforcement
learning mechanisms underlie these systems. When a rat is extensively trained to
lever-press for food, habit-based systems are at play when the food is subsequently
paired with illness but the rat continues to lever-press. Although the reinforcer has
been devalued, the rat continues to respond because, in the model-free account, the
rat has learned that lever-pressing leads to a desirable total future net reward.
In contrast, goal-based systems of decision-making are sensitive to reinforcer
devaluation, a result one would expect model-based reinforcement learning mecha-
nisms underlie these systems. When a rat has not been extensively trained to lever-
press for food, goal-based systems are at play when the food is subsequently paired
with illness and the rat ceases to respond. The rat ceases to respond because, in the
model-based account, it has learned not only that lever-pressing leads to a desirable
total future net reward, but also that lever-pressing leads to food. Since that stimulus
(food) is no longer desirable, the rat stops lever-pressing.
Model-based reinforcement learning descriptions of action selection are easy
to apply when the stimuli resulting from an action are readily observable. There is no
reason the stimuli cannot be, in principle, very complex. In this case, a model-based
description is still easily applicable. For example, the chess player cannot rely on
which next move will allow him to win (though that is certainly helpful). The expert
chess player also needs to know which moves will lead to board conﬁgurations that
are more desirable than others, projected many steps into the future. Thankfully, we
do not approach all of life’s decisions the same way an expert chess player evaluates
their strategy to beat Gary Kasparov, or we would all be lost in thought.
Any problem that can be solved by model-based reinforcement learning can,
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in principle, be solved by a biological agent, provided suﬃcient representational ca-
pacity. For example, given inﬁnite time and resources, the rat can form a model of
its environment that is suﬃciently rich to account for the ripening of food sources,
the rise and fall of watering grounds, and the wax and wane of predator populations.
However, just as with the above chess example, a combinatorial explosion results from
increased representation: there are an estimated 5× 1052 board conﬁgurations (Allis,
1994), and neither human beings nor computer programs have ever been capable of
representing them all in the service of a policy. This does not prevent people unlike
this author from being very good at chess, but it does suggest that certain problems
which can be solved in principle simply cannot be implemented in brains with physical
limitations.
The situation is slightly more diﬃcult to envision when the stimuli are ill-
deﬁned and internally-generated. Suppose the action an animal ought to do next
is informed not only by a distinct cue, but also by the subjective opportunity cost
and reward intensity that has just been in eﬀect. At which point does the spirit
of model-based reinforcement learning break down? When the key determinants of
decision are themselves stimuli for action selection, model-based descriptions become
indistinguishable from feed-forward descriptions that propose that action selection
results from the payoﬀs that can be expected from pursuing each goal through an
evaluation of long-term trends in the mean and variability of payoﬀs in the past.
6.1.3 Matching
Matching refers to the experimental observation that animals will match the
relative rate of responding for an option to its relative rate of reinforcement (Herrn-
stein, 1961). The matching law implies that the relevant determinant of the action to
select is the rate at which it provides reinforcement. This is consistent with our view
that the key variable in action selection is a scalar combination. The idea that the rel-
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evant variables in determining matching behaviour were subjective was incorporated
early on (Killeen, 1972). Similarly, payoﬀ involves subjective variables: subjective
opportunity cost, eﬀort cost, reward intensity and risk. In the single-operant con-
text, the matching law reduces to a choice between pursuing experimenter-delivered
rewards and everything else, so that the rate of responding is related to the rela-
tive rate at which experimenter-controlled rewards are delivered compared to that at
which other rewards are delivered.
Two mechanisms have been proposed by which matching occurs, neither of
which has been entirely successful. The ﬁrst is melioration (Vaughan, 1981), which
describes matching as the result of changing local rates of reinforcement: when the
local rate of reinforcement from one option falls below that of its competitor, the
animal switches to the competing action. If, for example, the animal responds at a
rate of 5 presses per minute on operant A delivering rewards at a rate of 1 per minute,
and at a rate of 25 presses per minute on operant B delivering rewards at a rate of 1
per 10 minutes, the local rate of reinforcement from A is 1/5, whereas that from B is
1/250. Since the local rate of reinforcement from A is considerably higher than that
from B, the animal will switch to the richer schedule. When the animal is matching,
the animal responds at a rate of 10 presses per minute on A (yielding local rate of
1/10) and at a rate of 5 per minute on B (yielding a local rate of 1/10).
A second mechanism is maximizing (Green et al., 1983), which describes
matching as the result of optimizing the total rate of reward. The variable inter-
val schedules that typically control the delivery of rewards hold rewards indeﬁnitely
after a programmed interval has lapsed. As the animal responds for longer periods
of time to one option, the probability that a reward is waiting at the other option
increases. In the above example, if the animal simply ignored the leaner operant, it
would collect a reward every second. By matching, the animal collects one reward
every second and another reward every 10 seconds. There is no other strategy that
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will improve the overall rate at which the animal collects rewards, so in the typical
scenario, matching is simply a maximizing strategy.
Neither of these two accounts can adequately account for performance in atyp-
ical operant contexts. If response rates are an indirect proxy for the amount of time
an animal decides to spend pursuing an option, melioration implies that stay dura-
tions at each of two operants will be dictated by both the programmed relative rates
of reinforcement and unusually long intervals sampled from the variable-interval dis-
tributions. If local rates of reinforcement were the source of matching behaviour
measured on the molar level, then unusually low rates of reinforcement would alter
the local rate of reinforcement and produce changes in performance. Unfortunately
for the melioration hypothesis, stay durations were not inﬂuenced by unusually long
inter-reward intervals (Gallistel et al., 2001).
Herrnstein and Heyman (Herrnstein and Heyman, 1979) tested pigeons on a
concurrent VI/VR schedule of reinforcement, under which one pecking key delivered
rewards according to a variable interval and another according to variable ratios.
Pigeons matched their relative responding to the relative obtained rates of reinforce-
ment. The maximizing strategy would be to respond on the VR schedule to a much
greater extent than the equivalent VI. Instead, pigeons had a strong bias toward
the VI schedule, rather than the VR schedule predicted by a maximization account.
However, Green et al. (1983) argued that the value of extraneous activities, when
added to the value of lever pressing for the VR schedule, could account for the bias
toward the VI schedule. When responding on a concurrent VR-VR schedule in which
responses to one side increases the ratio on one side and responses to the other side
increase both ratios, pigeons acted according to a maximizing strategy.
If reinforcement learning models are inadequate for explaining continuous,
payoﬀ-dependent stay durations in the randomized-triads design, and neither molec-
ular accounts of matching can provide a satisfying answer to the real-time patterning
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of performance, how can we model how the self-stimulating rat selects among the
competing activities that are available to it?
6.2 Performance in the randomized-triads design
We have collected data that provide a framework within which to study the
action selection problem. In the following section, we shall argue that working for
brain stimulation rewards is the product of a series of non-linear mappings, that the
self-stimulating rat extracts statistical regularities from the test trials it encounters
regarding both dynamic and static periods, and that actions are selected on the basis
of the payoﬀs that may be derived from performing them. Our data also suggest
that the way the animal partitions its time between work (lever-pressing) and leisure
(everything else) involves consumption of the beneﬁts derived from each in a largely
all-or-none manner, rather than through rapid alternation between exertion and rest.
6.2.1 Molar-level
At the molar level, we have presented a further validation of the Shizgal Moun-
tain Model’s ability to accurately detect an eﬀect that occurs beyond the spatio-
temporal integration of the injected electrical reward signal. The model proposes
that the overall proportion of time allocated to self-stimulation is the result of a non-
linear behavioural allocation function, which takes as its inputs the payoﬀs derived
from lever-pressing and those derived from performing other activities in the operant
chamber. The payoﬀs themselves involve a scalar combination of subjectively-mapped
variables that can, in principle, be controlled experimentally: the subjective oppor-
tunity cost, eﬀort cost, reward intensity, and risk. These subjective determinants are
often non-linear functions of directly manipulable variables: the price (the required
total amount of time the lever must be held to earn a reward), the force required to
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hold down the lever, the physical characteristics of the electrical stimulation train,
and the probability of reinforcement. Since the mappings are non-linear, changes in
objective stimuli do not necessarily result in equivalent changes in their subjective
impact. Beyond a certain point, decrements in price are ineﬀective at lowering the
subjective opportunity cost (Solomon et al., 2007). Subjective eﬀort costs should ex-
plode when the force required to hold down the lever is beyond the maximum physical
work the subject can exert.
Thanks to the non-linearities, however, changes of scale (or, alternately, gain)
are separable from changes in threshold (or, alternately, sensitivity). For example,
changes in the maximum intensity of the rewarding eﬀect (a change of scale/gain) can
be distinguished from changes in the relative impact of each electrical pulse on the
intensity of the rewarding eﬀect (a change of threshold/sensitivity). A manipulation
that makes all rewards better by a constant factor can be distinguished from one that
disproportionately ampliﬁes weak rewards.
The strength of the Mountain Model resides in its capacity to take advantage of
these non-linearities. The post-synaptic eﬀect of the stimulation’s pulse frequency, for
example, grows as a power function at low pulse frequencies and rises to an asymptotic
value at high pulse frequencies (Simmons and Gallistel, 1994). The scalar combination
of the key determinants of decision (subjective intensity, cost, exertion, risk, etc.) will
drive performance according to another non-linear function: the relationship between
payoﬀ and performance is a sigmoid, with a maximum at high payoﬀs, a minimum
at low payoﬀs, and a smooth transition between the two (McDowell, 2005). In each
case, the non-linearity allows assignment of three parameters—sensitivity, gain, and
slope—where a linear function would allow only two (slope and intercept). When
measuring the variables together, changes to the sensitivity of the function mapping
pulse frequency to reward intensity (Fhm) can be distinguished from changes the
sensitivity of the function mapping payoﬀ to performance (Pe).
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6.2.1.1 Detecting an eﬀect occurring downstream from the spatio-temporal
integrator
We have presented evidence (Breton et al., 2013; Arvanitogiannis and Shizgal,
2008) that the Mountain Model can, indeed, detect changes that are known to aﬀect
the post-synaptic integration of the directly-activated substrate for self-stimulation.
By increasing the duration of the train, neurons can be stimulated at a lower rate
in order to achieve a given (half-maximal) level of subjective reward. By decreasing
it, neurons must be stimulated at a higher rate in order to achieve that same level.
While the Mountain Model accurately detected changes in the sensitivity of the func-
tion mapping pulse frequency to subjective reward intensity in all animals, in a subset
of animals, the model also detected changes to the sensitivity of the function map-
ping payoﬀ to performance. Further modelling demonstrated that these results could
be explained if, in those animals, at least two spatio-temporal integration systems
had been activated, consistent with a widely-discussed hypothesis that multiple sub-
systems may be involved in the temporal integration process (Arvanitogiannis et al.,
1996; Fulton et al., 2006; Shizgal et al., 2001; Carr and Wolinsky, 1993) This expla-
nation is predicated on the assumption that the model can, indeed, correctly identify
the stage of processing for manipulations occurring beyond the peak-detection stage.
The Mountain Model has been further validated here, showing that a change in
the probability of reinforcement produced large changes in the marker for manipula-
tions occurring beyond the peak detection stage, with only small or time-inconsistent
changes in the marker for manipulations occurring prior to peak detection.
6.2.1.2 Quantifying subjective risk
If we assume that no variables other than risk have changed as a result of
making the reward probabilistic, it is also possible to evaluate the degree to which
probability results in subjective risk via the Mountain Model. The degree to which
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the rat must compensate for the lower probability in terms of a constant subjective
opportunity cost is, in eﬀect, the subjective impact of probability. If a maximally
intense reward requires a price of 30 seconds for the payoﬀ from self-stimulation to
be equal to that of non-self stimulation, then one would expect a maximally intense
reward delivered with 50% subjective probability to require a price of 15 seconds for
the payoﬀ from self-stimulation to be equal to that of non-self stimulation. In other
words, assuming that only risk changes, for all four payoﬀs to be equal, the following
two equalities must be met:
(Imax/SPe1.0) × no risk = Ue,
and
(Imax/SPe0.50) × subjective risk for 50% probability = Ue,
where Imax is the maximal intensity of a reward, Ue is the payoﬀ from non-self stim-
ulation (everything else), and Pei is the price at which the payoﬀ from a maximally
intense brain stimulation reward is equal to that from everything else. Since these
two expressions must be equal to each other, the ratio of Pe1.0 to Pe0.5 will be equal
to the ratio of the risk associated with a reward delivered with probability 1.0 to the
risk associated with a reward delivered with probability 0.50.
Our results demonstrate not only the validity of the Mountain Model in cor-
rectly identifying an eﬀect occurring downstream from the spatio-temporal integra-
tion of the injected signal, complementing previous validation attempts (Breton et al.,
2013; Arvanitogiannis and Shizgal, 2008), but also the computational power aﬀorded
by the model. By making only one assumption—that risk should not aﬀect the in-
tensity of the rewarding eﬀect of brain stimulation, the subjective eﬀort cost, or the
payoﬀ from everything else—our model has also provided some preliminary evidence
that the mapping of probability of reinforcement to risk is scalar, or nearly so, over
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the range tested.
Overall, rewards delivered with probabilities of 0.75 or 0.50 tend to be deval-
ued to an extent that would be normatively expected. The median change in Pe from
a probability of 1 to a probability of 0.75 was found to be 0.13598, corresponding to a
subjective risk of 73%. The median change from a probability of 1 to a probability of
0.5 was found to be 0.33089, corresponding to a subjective risk of 47%. These repre-
sent modest diﬀerences, and they underline the importance of rigorous psychophysical
scaling when studying the variables that aﬀect what an animal decides to do and for
how long they choose to do it.
The Mountain Model provides a molar description of performance for brain
stimulation rewards. It assumes that the rat’s allocation decision, at the level of
the whole trial, is based on the payoﬀ derived from self-stimulation activities. Our
experiments, however, contain structure at a ﬁner temporal scale than the trial. We
shall now turn our attention to how the rat makes molecular decisions about which
action to take and for how long to take it based on the session’s structure, at a
diﬀerent level than can be explained by the Mountain Model.
6.2.2 World model of change
In the randomized-triads design, the rat is presented with a repeating pattern
of trial types. Each trial in a session is cued by the ﬂash of a yellow house light
during a 10-second inter-trial interval, 8 seconds into which a single train of high-pulse
frequency priming stimulation is delivered. All experimentally manipulable variables
are constant for the duration of the trial. The pulse frequency, pulse current, pulse
duration, train duration, price, force, and probability of reinforcement are all ﬁxed
from the time the house light stops ﬂashing to the time it begins again. The trials
within a session progress in highly structured manner, according to triads. The ﬁrst
trial (the leading bracket) is characterized by a strong reward (as high as the animal
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can tolerate) delivered at a negligible price (1s). At the start of the second trial of
a triad (the test trial), the pulse frequency, price, and probability of reinforcement
are sampled from a large randomized list without replacement. The third trial (the
trailing bracket) is also characterized by a negligible price, but the reward on oﬀer
is suﬃciently weak (10Hz) that the rat ought never be motivated to work for it.
This repeating pattern is presented for hours at a time, for days, until the list is
exhausted, at which point the characteristics in eﬀect on test trials are sampled from
a new randomized list.
Such a repeating pattern may be diﬃcult to a naive observer to detect. Indeed,
were the task on a human observer’s part to detect the apparent direction of motion
in an array of randomly moving dots against a contrasting background, the same
pattern of trial presentations may not be obvious at ﬁrst glance. Suppose the ﬁrst
trial of a repeating sequence of three presented a large proportion of dots moving
in the same direction with high contrast, the second presented a randomly selected
proportion and contrast, and the third presented a stimulus in which no dots moved
in the same direction against a highly contrasting background. How long would it
take for a human observer in these conditions, instructed to identify whether the dots
appeared to move in a particular direction and unaware of the triad structure, to act
on the basis of this repeating cycle?
Our results imply that rats, indeed, are capable of extracting the statistical
regularities inherent in the randomized-triads design. At the very least, they act
on the basis of an expectation for payoﬀ that they would not have were it not for
some model of the world. Without a simple model of how sessions progress, rats in
the randomized-triads design would begin working for brain stimulation rewards as
a function of the last trial type encountered. Upon starting a new trial, a rat us-
ing model-free reinforcement learning principles will behave as though it expects the
next reward to be like the last, leading the animal to produce long pauses following
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a trailing bracket trial, short pauses following a leading bracket trial, and an average
pause of intermediate duration following test trials. Instead, our results show deﬁni-
tively that the very ﬁrst pause the rat makes—before it can know anything about
the payoﬀ from self-stimulation—depends on the payoﬀ of the trial type to come, in
feed-forward fashion, rather than the trial that has just elapsed. Rats spend little
or no time pausing on leading bracket trials, slightly more time in this pause on test
trials, and rarely ever bother to lever-press on trailing bracket trials. Since there is no
other way for them to know what the payoﬀ will be on a particular trial, and every
trial is cued the same way, they must form an expectation for what the payoﬀ will be
based on a stimulus that is not directly observable.
These data also give hints about the identity of the stimulus that allows rats
to form this expectation. In cases where animals make shorter-than-usual pauses at
the start of the trailing bracket trial, the preceding test trial presented stimulation
that was very cheap and very strong or very weak—not unlike the characteristics of
the leading and trailing bracket trials. Rats therefore appear to employ two sets of
syllogisms based on the trial that came before. If the last trial was similar to a trailing
bracket trial, then the next trial will be a leading bracket; if the last trial was similar
to a leading bracket trial, then the next trial will be a test trial. On the test trial,
the price and reward intensity may sometimes be suﬃciently similar to either of the
bracket trials. As one would expect if the rat had maintained a set of three, two-trial
sequences, these misleading test trials result in an uncharacteristically short pause on
the subsequent trailing bracket trial. At suﬃciently low prices and reward intensities,
the rat behaves as though it believed the test trial was a trailing bracket, and takes
a very short pause on the trailing trial rather than a long one. At suﬃciently high
intensities and low prices, the rat behaves as though it believed the test trial was a
leading bracket, and takes a short pause rather than a long one.
Furthermore, the uncharacteristically short pauses on trailing bracket trials
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occur predominantly when the subjective opportunity cost is suﬃciently similar, and
not necessarily when the objective opportunity cost is similar. When the price is below
a minimum value (approximately 3 to 4s), the subjective opportunity cost ceases to
change (Solomon et al., 2007). If the rat discriminated among trial types according
to the objective price, test trials with very low prices would diﬀer from the bracket
trial price of 1s, thereby allowing the rat to discriminate among these trial types
and prevent any confusion. If the rat made the discrimination on the basis of the
subjective opportunity cost, test trials very low prices would have the same subjective
opportunity cost as bracket trials, and thus, mislead the rat to infer that the next trial
is not a trailing bracket trial. When the prices presented on test trials have a similar
subjective opportunity cost to the price in eﬀect on bracket trials (1s), regardless of
its objective value, the rat is misled into taking a shorter-than-characteristic pause
on subsequent trailing trials. This indicates that the relevant stimuli that cue what
the next trial will bring are subjective.
Finally, when the test trial presents stimulation that is very expensive, and
therefore the payoﬀ from self-stimulation is low, rats make their characteristically
long pause on the subsequent trailing bracket trial. In other words, the appropriate
cue is a compound stimulus involving both the appropriate subjective opportunity
cost and subjective reward intensity together, rather than their scalar combination.
Moreover, this compound stimulus provides an expectation of not only the next trial’s
payoﬀ, which would set the duration of the pause to take, but also of the next stimuli
the rat is likely to encounter. If the relevant stimulus is a vector of subjective reward
intensity and opportunity cost, then the rat must have some mechanism for knowing
the subjective reward intensity and opportunity cost that was in eﬀect on trailing
bracket trials on which it never worked, and therefore never obtained an estimate.
Rats take the same, short pause at the start of leading bracket trials that follow
trailing bracket trails on which the animal never pressed, suggesting that the rat
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maintains a mapping of the (possibly updated) opportunity cost-intensity compound
on one trial to that expected on the next. The pattern of errors imply that, rather
than counting to three, the rats have stored a model consisting of three, two-trial
sequences:
1) If current trial is high-intensity, low-opportunity cost (“leading-like”), next trial is
variable intensity and opportunity cost (“test-like”).
2) If current trial is low-intensity, low-opportunity cost (“trailing-like”), next trial is
high-intensity, low-opportunity cost (“leading-like”).
3) If current-trial is neither high-intensity/low-opportunity cost (“leading-like”) nor
low-intensity/low-opportunity cost (“trailing-like”), next trial is low-intensity, low-
opportunity cost (“trailing-like”).
The picture of the self-stimulating rat in the randomized-triads design is now
considerably richer: over the course of training, rats form a world model of the pro-
gression of trials within a session, the world model provides the rat with an expecta-
tion for the subjective opportunity cost, subjective reward intensity, and payoﬀ from
self-stimulation to come, and the stimulus the rat uses to identify the next trial type
is a vector comprising each subjective determinant of the decision to press. A world
model of how trials change within a session, however, leads to the important question
of whether rats develop a world model of the stability of the payoﬀ within a trial.
6.2.3 World model of stability
Each trial presented in the randomized-triads design may diﬀer to a varying
extent from the trial that preceded it, but from the time the lever ﬁrst extends into
the cage following the ﬂashing house light to the time it retracts and the house light
ﬂashes again, conditions within the trial are completely stable. If an animal is capable
of developing an inference rule for what the payoﬀ on the next trial is expected to be,
then it is natural to ask whether an animal is capable of developing a model for what
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the payoﬀ from self-stimulation at any given point in the trial can be expected to be.
The pause made at the start of the test trial will reﬂect, to a certain extent, the
payoﬀ that can be expected. This is because this pause is diﬀerent from that made at
the start of trailing bracket trials, with unquestionably low payoﬀ, but slightly longer
than that made at the start of leading bracket trials, with unquestionably high payoﬀ.
The test trial, however, has a payoﬀ that has been drawn at random from a list, so the
duration of this post-priming pause cannot reﬂect the true payoﬀ that can be realized
throughout the entire trial. If the duration of the pause the rat takes before it begins
to lever-press (either at the start of the trial or following lever-retraction) is in any
way related to the payoﬀ, two options are possible: either the pause gradually changes
over multiple reward deliveries, or it changes abruptly following a suﬃcient number of
exemplars. Moreover, if our molar model of time allocation can explain time allocation
from each period of time between lever extension and lever retraction (either because
a reward is delivered or because the trial has ended), then the proportion of time
allocated to self-stimulation activities should also change as the estimated payoﬀ
changes.
Our data suggest that the patterns of post-priming (when the trial begins)
and post-reinforcement (when the lever extends back into the chamber) pauses are
many orders of magnitude more likely if we assume a step-wise rather than a gradual
change. The pause following lever extension changes abruptly, in which case the
animal’s decision regarding how long to wait before lever-pressing would depend on
a single-step update rule following a suﬃcient number of exemplars. That number is
one, or nearly so: in most cases, the maximum-likelihood estimate of the number of
reward deliveries necessary before the duration of the ﬁrst pause switches from what
it was at the start of the trial to what it will be at the end of the trial is a single
reward.
Similarly, the change in time allocation is greatest between the time the an-
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imal knows nothing about the payoﬀ from self-stimulation to the time the payoﬀ is
revealed. Following the ﬁrst reward delivery, time allocation values cease to change
systematically. If the proportion of time the rat spends harvesting rewards is con-
trolled by the payoﬀ, and that time allocation ceases to change following the ﬁrst
reward delivery, it is unlikely that the animal continues to make meaningful revisions
to its estimate of the payoﬀ from self-stimulation. This is further corroborated by the
change in the ﬁrst pause the rat takes following lever extension: if the post-priming
and post-reinforcement pauses are both related to the payoﬀ the rat expects to re-
ceive from self-stimulation, the rat ceases to meaningfully update its estimate of that
payoﬀ as soon as it has obtained a single reward.
The results not only suggest that the period of time before the ﬁrst reward
delivery is special, but they also suggest that it is unreasonable to treat the well-
trained self-stimulating rat as a model-free reinforcement learning agent. Were the
rat to require re-learning the value of pressing on every test trial, the process would
either produce incremental changes in pause durations and time allocations or the
rat would have a high learning rate parameter for tuning those changes based on the
experienced record of reward. Tuning the learning rate therefore requires some world
model. If a world model of the stability of the trial is required to appropriately tune
the learning rate so that it is very nearly one, learning rate tuning is subsumed by a
world model that allows a feed-forward update to key decision variables as quickly as
the model deems necessary.
It also appears implausible that the rat has “memorized” the large number of
potential pairs of prices and reward intensities that it is likely to encounter (which, in
the case of some rats, would be 126 combinations) in order to pick out the matching
combination and implement the corresponding policy. Instead, the rat appears to use
a model of how trials progress and a model of the stability of conditions within a trial
to identify, as quickly as possible in principle, the key determinants of the decision to
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press.
If the payoﬀ itself is the stimulus that sets the appropriate policy to follow, then
this very-liberally deﬁned model-based reinforcement learning model is no diﬀerent
than one in which the payoﬀ directly sets the probability of engaging in activities of
varying length. Such a model is discussed below.
6.2.4 Payoﬀ-based action selection
Model-based descriptions of the task involve a table-lookup process in which
the total future net reward of a trial state—such as lever-pressing—is found within a
list of stimuli. If a cue signals that the total future net reward will be high, the rat
presented with the cue can look up the optimal policy to take without re-learning the
contingencies for reward. The rat will begin to press with some expectation for what
the total future net reward ought to be. Similarly, if a diﬀerent cue signals that the
total future net reward will be low, the rat will implement the policy it has already
found to be optimal, rarely if ever sampling the lever for rewards.
The situation is slightly murkier when the stimulus itself is the payoﬀ. If
the payoﬀ serves as an internal cue to signal that future rewards will be suﬃciently
valuable and can be acquired at suﬃciently low cost to justify lever-pressing, the rat
may still look up in a table the optimal policy to implement for a given payoﬀ. At
that point, though, the process of table lookup is no diﬀerent than a process by which
the payoﬀ informs which action to take.
We have modelled (Chapter 5) the molecular-level action selection process as
a “ﬁlling in” (that is, rapidly-updating) mechanism by which payoﬀ directly provides
the animal with what to do and, in so doing, for how long to do it. Rather than
assuming the rat has associatively learned a pairing between a particular payoﬀ and
the optimal policy to implement, we have assumed that the payoﬀ sets the policy by
altering state-termination rates as a function of the payoﬀ from competing activities.
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If the payoﬀ is high, it will drive the self-stimulating rat to select a post-priming pause
of very short duration before starting to lever-press and will rarely, if ever, release
to lever to engage in other activities. If the payoﬀ is low, the rat will elect to do
other things it is possible to do in the operant chamber before starting to lever press,
and will often leave that lever-pressing state to resume the alternate activities that
may be performed. In fact, this pattern often results in a censored true leisure bout:
when the payoﬀ is suﬃciently low, the rat simply stops lever-pressing altogether and
engages exclusively in other activities until the end of the trial.
The overall eﬀect of this scheme is that the payoﬀ sets the eﬀective stay dura-
tion in post-reinforcement pauses, true leisure bouts and censored true leisure bouts,
while the eﬀective stay duration in holds and taps remains constant. Since animals
in our hands engage only very rarely in uncensored true leisure bouts, the data imply
that the rat usually consumes the fruits of leisure activities in a single continuous
bout, during the post-reinforcement pause.
Furthermore, the fact that the eﬀective stay duration in holds (which may
be censored by reward delivery) and taps is payoﬀ invariant implies that the same
strategy—a mixture of short and long types of holds—is used no matter what the
payoﬀ from self-stimulation will be. When the price is low and intensity is high,
all holds will be censored by lever retraction, and the maximum proportion of time
allocated will be achieved: the ratio of the price to the sum of the price and the
shortest post-reinforcement pause the rat can take. As the payoﬀ decreases, the ﬁrst
factor to make any contribution to changes in time allocation will be the duration
of the post-reinforcement pause, because many holds will continue to be censored by
lever retraction. At suﬃciently low payoﬀ, the post-reinforcement pause will be very
long, and if it terminates at all, the duration of the subsequent hold will not yield
a reward. As it terminates, the high probability of engaging in a true leisure bout
or quitting, rather than releasing the lever brieﬂy as part of a tap, will drive time
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allocation to a minimum value.
Conover et al. (2001a) reported a strong relationship between inter-response
times and the programmed rate of reinforcement on a traditional, inﬁnite-hold VI
schedule of reinforcement. Unlike what they found, we observed that the relationship
between tapping-related releases and payoﬀ was weak (accounting for only 11% of
the variance in short-release duration). In their experiment, inter-response intervals
were composed of two components: just as in our modelling, dwell times in lever-
release activities comprise a short- and a long-mean component. Unlike what was
found in Chapter 5, the mean of the short-mean component of lever releases was
dependent on the VI, which would make it payoﬀ-dependent. The diﬀerences between
the two procedures used is very likely the reason for our diﬀerent ﬁndings. In an
inﬁnite-hold VI schedule, the ﬁrst response after the lever is armed is rewarded, while
in our cumulative handling time schedule, the animal is rewarded as soon as the
cumulative time the lever has been depressed reaches the experimenter-set price. As a
result, steady responding and steady holding strategies are diﬀerentially reinforced. A
steadily-holding rat will not obtain many rewards under an inﬁnite-hold VI schedule
of reinforcement, as a reward will not be delivered until the lever is released and
pressed after being armed. A steadily-tapping rat will obtain rewards at a lower
rate under a cumulative handling time schedule of reinforcement, because every lever
release increases the time to reward without providing much leisure beneﬁt. In our
hands, using a cumulative handling-time schedule of reinforcement, operant tempo
varies only very little with payoﬀ. The eﬀect of increasing payoﬀ is to both increase
the probability that a lever release will be short, operant-related responding, and to
decrease the duration of time for which the rat engages in activities that are unrelated
to operant responding.
The many interacting components of the model—time spent in each activity,
probability of quitting, probability of releasing the lever as part of a tap compared
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to a true leisure bout—work in concert to produce curves that look like the Match-
ing Law would predict on a molar level. In other words, “matching” is an emergent
property that results from payoﬀ-dependent sojourns in PRP, TLB, and quit activ-
ities and their transition probabilities to and from payoﬀ-independent sojourns in
hold and tap activities. The animal matches the relative time invested in an option
to the relative rate of reinforcement because the payoﬀ it provides sets the rate at
which a particular action will be terminated. The probability-weighted combination
of the set of actions determines the eﬀective dwell times in activities that are directly
observable. If the eﬀective dwell time in work bouts (holds and taps) depends on the
payoﬀ from everything else, it is equivalent to stating that the rate at which work
is left (the reciprocal of its expected dwell time) depends on the payoﬀ from every-
thing else, and vice-versa for dwell times in leisure bouts (PRPs, TLBs, and quits).
High payoﬀs from competing activities bias the animal toward selecting actions that
terminate at a high rate, while low payoﬀs from competing activities bias the animal
toward selecting actions that terminate at a low rate. Matching occurs because a
comparatively high VI from alternative A will result in a high leaving rate from alter-
native B, and a comparatively low VI from alternative B will result in a low leaving
rate from alternative A, resulting in
E[A]/E[B] = f(E[UA])/f(E[UB]),
where E[A] is the eﬀective expected dwell time pursuing alternative A, E[B] is the
eﬀective expected dwell time pursuing alternative B, f(E[UA]) is a function of the
payoﬀ expected from alternative A and f(E[UB]) is a function of the payoﬀ expected
from alternative B.
The model presented in Chapter 5 provides a remarkably good (though im-
perfect) account of single-operant performance in the randomized-triads design for
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each test trial, from the time the ﬁrst reward is delivered onward. However, it can, in
principle, apply to leading bracket trials, for which the expected payoﬀ is known to
be high as the trial begins, as well as to trailing bracket trials, for which the expected
payoﬀ is known to be low as the trial begins. Given the evidence from Chapter 3 that
the rat behaves as though it has a world model of the progression of trials in a triad,
and the evidence from Chapter 4 that the rat behaves as though it has a world model
of the stability of conditions within a trial, how does the rat select which action to
do, and how long to do it, in the general framework of the randomized-triads design?
6.3 Putting it all together
Figure 6.1 provides a potential schematic of action selection in the randomized-
triads design. The rat may be in one of three diﬀerent trial types: a leading bracket,
test, or trailing bracket trial. Data from Chapter 3 suggest that the rat maintains a
representation of the last trial’s expected subjective opportunity cost and intensity
(which was potentially updated) to infer the next trial’s expected subjective opportu-
nity cost and intensity. If both are suﬃciently similar to the trailing bracket trial, the
rat directly infers it is currently in a leading bracket trial, a process learned through
potentially reinforcement-learning mechanisms. Similarly, if both the subjective op-
portunity cost and reward intensity are suﬃciently similar to the leading bracket trial,
the rat infers it is currently in a test trial, and will begin to “explore” the mapping
of lever-pressing to payoﬀ. Finally, if the last trial’s subjective opportunity cost and
intensity are not similar to either bracket, the rat infers it is currently in a trailing
bracket trial.
Following the exploration stage (in the case of test trials) or trial type inference
(in the case of bracket trials), the rat uses the payoﬀ expected from self-stimulation
and the payoﬀ expected from leisure activities to determine which activity to perform,
- 293 -




































Figure 6.1. Action selection in the randomized-triads design. When an inter-trial
interval begins, the trial state—a vector of the cached values of the subjective reward
intensity (I) and opportunity cost (Ps)—is used as a signal to infer the subjective
reward intensity and opportunity cost in eﬀect on the next trial, according to state
transition function Tˆ . If the trial state on the last trial was consistent with a trailing
bracket trial, the rat can update its estimate of the trial state on the current trial to
that of leading bracket trials and immediately exploit the rewards of self-stimulation.
If the trial state on the last trial was consistent with a leading bracket trial, the
rat must explore the mapping between lever-pressing and rewards and consequently
update the elements that make up the state vector (subjective opportunity cost and
reward intensity). If the trial state on the last trial was inconsistent with either
bracket type, the rat can update its estimate of the trial state on the current trial
to that of a trailing bracket trial and immediately exploit the rewards of non-self
stimulation activities. During the exploitation stage, the payoﬀ from self-stimulation
(E[Ub]) sets the balance of time spent pursuing self-stimulation and non-self stim-
ulation activities. Activities that reﬂect pursuit of brain stimulation rewards are
white (holds, taps), and those that reﬂect pursuit of extraneous rewards are shaded.
Experimenter-enforced events, such as the inter-trial interval (ITI) and reward de-
livery are indicated in grey-outlined boxes, while dashed boxes indicate “cognitive”
operations and circles represent trial phases.
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and for how long to perform it, by setting the termination rate on these actions. In
tandem, the current estimates of the subjective opportunity cost and reward inten-
sity of the electrical reward on oﬀer are updated, if necessary. When the rat never
worked—as is the case on most trailing bracket trials—the estimates of the subjective
opportunity cost and reward intensity are never updated from the predicted value,
and the next trial is inferred on the basis of these estimates, rather than discovered
values.
The exploration stage—assuming the rat explores the mapping between lever-
pressing and payoﬀ on that trial—appears quantitatively diﬀerent from the exploita-
tion stage. Once the mapping is known, because the rat has a world model of the
structure of the trial which may have developed over the many months it is trained,
there is no need for the estimated payoﬀ to be revised again. The post-priming pause
occurring at the very beginning of the test trial—when the mapping between lever-
pressing and the payoﬀ that will be delivered is as-yet unknown—is only slightly longer
than that on leading trials. Since the payoﬀ that can be obtained on test trials is, on
average, intermediate, the short post-priming pause at the onset of test trials might
reﬂect a separate process that is usually at odds with self-stimulation but is aligned
with exploitation at the start of test trials. When the payoﬀ from self-stimulation is
known, the rat may infrequently leave lever-pressing to explore whether the payoﬀ
from everything else has changed, or resume lever-pressing from a protracted leisure
bout to explore whether the payoﬀ from self-stimulation has changed. In this case, the
goal of exploitation—devoting one’s time to the option with the better payoﬀ—is at
odds with the goal of exploration—investigating whether and in what way the payoﬀ
from various activities has changed. However, at the very beginning of a test trial, the
rat does not yet know what the mapping between lever-pressing and reward will be.
In this special case, the goal of exploitation—devoting one’s time to a single option
with the presumed best payoﬀ—is aligned with the goal of exploration—investigating
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whether and in what way the payoﬀ from each option has changed. Once the payoﬀ
from self-stimulation is uncovered, exploration and exploitation are, once again, at
odds.
6.3.1 The counter-factual payoﬀ hypothesis
The model presented here is very similar to one proposed by Gallistel et al.
(2001). In it, Gallistel et al. propose that the rat extracts the current rate of rein-
forcement of each option from a small sample of intervals. The scalar combination
of reinforcement rate with other key determinants (subjective intensity, for example)
provides the income from each side, the ratio of which sets the ratio of the means of
the two exponential processes that determine how long to pursue each goal.
E[A]/E[B] = UA/UB
They further propose a linear relationship between the sum of the leaving rates from
pursuit of each goal and the sum of the experienced incomes that can be derived from
each goal.
1/E[A] + 1/E[B] = b + m(UA + UB)
Those two constraints—that the ratio of expected sojourns at each option be equal
to the ratio of incomes and that the sum of the reciprocal of the expected sojourns at
each option be a linear function of the sum of the incomes —result in the prediction
that the reciprocal of the expected dwell time in pursuit of an option will be directly
proportional to the income from the unchosen option and directly proportional to the
ratio of income from the unchosen option to the sum of the incomes from both:





This description is similar to our view that the rat in the randomized-triads
design obtains a single exemplar of what the payoﬀ from self-stimulation will be on
a test trial, which then sets the eﬀective expected time the rat will spend in leisure-
related activities. As the payoﬀ from non-self stimulation activities does not change,
the eﬀective expected time the rat will spend in work-related activities will also not
change. Unlike the Gallistellian model, however, the time spent in pursuit of the
rewards derived from leisure does not depend on the sum of the incomes from both
pursuit of leisure rewards and pursuit of brain stimulation rewards. If that were the
case, the eﬀective expected time the rat will spend in work-related activities would
also be payoﬀ-dependent. Instead, what is proposed here is that the rat will select a
time to perform an action as a function of the payoﬀ that can be derived from the
counter-factual (we call this the counter-factual payoﬀ hypothesis). When the next
best thing the animal can do is associated with a high payoﬀ, we propose that the
animal will select an action that can be quickly completed and terminate that action
quickly. When the next best action is associated with a low payoﬀ, we propose that
the animal will select an action that will take longer to complete, and engage in that
activity at a more leisurely pace. For example, when the payoﬀ from self-stimulation
is maximal, the rat may rush to the lever (if it is not already there) as quickly as
possible. When the payoﬀ is negligible, the rat may opt to groom, an action that will
take considerably longer, and only lever press after it has been grooming for some
time.
The hypothesis is testable in principle. If, on a small subset of probe reward
encounters, the lever is not retracted and the reward is not delivered, it should be
possible to identify how long the rat is willing to work uncensored by lever retraction.
If the counter-factual payoﬀ hypothesis is correct, there should be no diﬀerence, on
these probe reward encounters, in the duration for which rats will hold the lever across
all brain stimulation payoﬀ conditions, because the termination rate is maintained
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by the payoﬀ from everything else. In contrast, background stimulation, delivered on
a variable-time schedule contingent on the lever being released, would increase the
payoﬀ from everything else. In this case, while the termination rate of holding on
probe reward encounters would be a function of whether or not there was background
stimulation, the time spent in post-reinforcement pause activity would not.
6.3.2 Learning the rules
In the randomized-triads design, the animal only needs a single-reward sample
to identify the subjective opportunity cost and reward intensity on oﬀer during the
test trial phase. On bracket trials, the rat knows these two determinants—as well
as their payoﬀ—in principle as soon as the inter-trial interval begins. The temporal
dynamics of estimating the subjective opportunity cost are, in our case, moot, as the
rat’s internalized model of the stability of the trial allow the animal to update this
quantity in a single step. The data provided by Gallistel et al. (2001) provide some
independent evidence that this process occurs as quickly as an ideal detector would
allow. The question, then, is how the world models of stability and change arise
through training.
The evolution of the world model that involves a comparison between the last
trial’s subjective opportunity cost and intensity and those they reliably predict may
be a very slow process indeed. Unpublished data demonstrate that the time course
over which post-priming pauses become stable—that is, reliably short on leading
bracket, intermediate on test, and reliably censored on trailing bracket trials—is on
the order of weeks, a slow process that may indeed involve traditional reinforcement
learning mechanisms. Given that rats appear to have no problem acting as quickly
as an ideal detector of changes in reinforcement rate, it is entirely plausible that rats
may have internalized some form of a hidden Markov model (HMM) of how trials lead
to each other. In the HMM framework, the subjective opportunity cost and intensity
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provide observable signals of the type of trial the animal is in (a hidden variable).
The task for the rat is to identify the most likely next hidden variable—the next trial
type—on the basis of the observable signals it has observed and the current signals
it has encountered. When it is ﬁrst placed in the randomized-triads design, the rat
has no way to know there will be, essentially, three diﬀerent unsignalled trial types,
and no way to know the mapping between one trial type and the next. Some process
must occur for the rat to identify the existence of statistical regularities inherent
in the observable symbols presented, identify the number of hidden trial types that
generated those observable symbols, and identify the mapping of hidden trial types to
each other. Similarly, some process must occur for the rat to identify the stationarity
of the subjective opportunity cost, reward intensity and probability of reinforcement
throughout the trial in the face of a possibly noisy evaluative system.
A natural framework for studying these would be Bayesian (Deneve et al., 1999;
Knill and Pouget, 2004; Beck et al., 2008), according to which the animal’s model of
the world changes in complexity as a function of the quality of the predictions that
can be made (thereby revising prior probabilities, numbers of states, etc.) without
necessarily referencing a reward prediction error per-se. The rat is trained, from
the time it is screened for the eﬀectiveness of the self-stimulation electrode, that
conditions between the time the cue signalling the start of a trial is presented to the
time the cue re-appears will be stable. This must place a high prior on the probability
that the subjective opportunity cost and reward intensity will be the same as the
last. Following training, rats are presented with the repeating pattern of trial triads
for weeks, and testing formally begins when responding is reliably high on leading
bracket and reliably low on trailing bracket trials. As a result of this training, it is
quite possible that animals have also placed a high prior probability on there being
three hidden states of the world, and on the permutation-like mapping of one hidden
trial type to the next.
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It is now possible to address a question that will be of interest to the general
neuroscience community: how can this simpliﬁed schematic of how the rat approaches
the action selection problem in the randomized-triads design be implemented in neural
circuitry? How does the brain solve the action selection problem as outlined here?
6.4 Stages of processing
The rat behaves as though it has a world model of the triad structure of the
randomized-triads design, a world model of the stability of trial conditions, and a
behavioural allocation strategy that depends on the payoﬀ from self-stimulation (in
the case of leisure-related activities) or the payoﬀ from everything else (in the case of
work-related activities). These processes must have some basis in neural machinery.
There must already be processes in place to perform the translation of objective
determinants (e.g. pulse frequency, price, force, probability) into subjective determi-
nants (e.g. intensity, opportunity cost, eﬀort cost and risk). We hypothesize three
stages of processing, above and beyond those necessary for the above psychophysical
mappings : a world model-generating process, a process by which the expected out-
come of various actions are rapidly updated, and a process by which the updated map
of actions to outcomes results in the behavioural policy. A world model generating
process is necessary for the rat to use the cued inter-trial interval and unsignalled but
available intensity and opportunity cost information in inferring the expected payoﬀ
and, potentially, its variability. Such a process is also necessary for the rat to explore
the mapping between lever-pressing and payoﬀ only until the ﬁrst reward has been
delivered. That expectation must, in some way, be tied to the saliency or desirability
of the actions to be performed in order for it to have any inﬂuence on performance.
Finally, the updated payoﬀ from self-stimulation must be part of the process by which
actions are selected.
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One process translates the strength of the stimulation—the directly observable
and manipulable “reward strength”—into its subjective impact. Previous work has
shown that the activity of directly activated neurons is spatio-temporally integrated
by a network, or a system of networks, the peak activity of which is translated into a
subjective intensity which endures as an engram to direct future behaviour (Gallistel
et al., 1974). Subjective intensity is related to pulse frequency and train duration by
logistic and hyperbolic functions, respectively (Sonnenschein et al., 2003; Gallistel,
1978; Simmons and Gallistel, 1994). Similarly, work by Solomon et al. (2007) has
shown that the subjective impact of price increases is roughly linear at high prices,
and rolls oﬀ to a minimum subjective opportunity cost at suﬃciently low prices. The
data provided in Chapter 2 suggest that the psychophysical translation in evaluating
the subjective risk of an option is linear.
As each of these psychophysical mappings provides independent information
regarding the payoﬀ that can be expected from lever-pressing, each must inform either
directly or indirectly (via their scalar combination) the process involved in mapping
the relationship between response and outcome. In the case of bracket trials, for
which the animal need not (and does not) engage in an exploration phase, the world
model directly provides an expected payoﬀ. As a result, the world model must either
maintain a representation of the identity of the last trial and its mapping to the next,
as well as the expected payoﬀ from the next trial, or it must maintain representations
of the subjective impacts of the last trial’s BSR and price and their mapping to
the next. According to the former, the vague stimuli “like a leading bracket”, “like
a trailing bracket” and “unlike leading or bracket” predict the next vague stimulus
to come when the inter-trial interval is begun as well as the payoﬀ on that trial,
which would require no further updating. According to the latter, the stimulus-
vectors “high intensity/low cost”, “low intensity/low cost” and “neither high/low
nor low/low” predict the next stimulus-vector, which can then be multiplicatively
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combined to inform the rat of the payoﬀ. The rat can then use its world model
of stability in conjunction with the stored record of reward, opportunity cost, and
probability to gauge the degree to which some actions ought to be selected. In
other words, the subjective opportunity cost accrued over the reward encounter and
the reward intensity delivered upon successful completion, combined multiplicatively
with the risk that has been associated with the lever over many trials, provide the
animal with the mapping between lever-pressing and payoﬀ. The mapping can thereby
inﬂuence which actions are selected and which will be neglected, and need not be
updated as the animal collects rewards.
When the animal has an expectation of the payoﬀs from self-stimulation (Ub)
and those from extraneous activities (Ue), these expectations must inform circuitry
that implements the action selection problem. One simple way is for the payoﬀs to
drive populations of neurons that collectively represent pursuit of diﬀerent goals. Each
population inhibits neighbouring populations, providing an on-centre, oﬀ-surround
population coding scheme. Such a scheme is presented in ﬁgure 6.2. When the payoﬀ
from self-stimulation is comparatively high, the increased activity inhibits pursuit of
all other goals. When the payoﬀ from self-stimulation is comparatively low, popula-
tions involved in grooming, resting and exploring “win” the competition and make it
less likely the rat enters into hidden hold and tap behavioural states.
Given the constraints posed by the animal’s behaviour, how might the brain
implement the strategies we describe here? How may we test whether it does?
6.4.1 World models
Any neural implementation of the action selection problem we have described
would need to incorporate the great inﬂuence that world models provide. For the
rat to have a sense of “trailing is followed by leading”, for example, there must be













Figure 6.2. Implementation of the action selection problem. To implement the action
selection problem, one may envision multiple populations of neurons responsible for
pursuit of various goals. Using lateral inhibition and excitatory feedback, each pop-
ulation acts as an on-centre, oﬀ-surround unit whereby increases to the payoﬀ of one
goal compared to others will increase the probability of engaging in activities related
to the higher-payoﬀ goal and decrease the probability of engaging in activities related
to other goals. For example, an increase in Ub compared to Ue will shut down, by
lateral inhibition, the probability that the rat grooms, rests and explores, increasing
the total amount of time spent holding and tapping.
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the decision to press were on the last trial, a mapping that provides the expected
values of these subjective determinants to those in eﬀect on the previous trial, and
a process that updates these values in the face of new information. The inter-trial
interval provides a potent cue that conditions will be diﬀerent; how they will diﬀer
will depend on the mapping of stimuli to each other, and their motivational impact
will require the scalar combination of the stimuli with each other.
Since the exploration stage during test trials (the period of time before a
reward is delivered) appears to diﬀer in terms of the duration of the pause to make, the
maximum duration of the responses made, and the overall proportion of time allocated
to lever-pressing, the motivational impact of the key determinants of decision may
not be the only process at work. The rat may “know,” in a sense, that the mapping
between responding and payoﬀ will need to be updated on the test trial. Thus, the
mapping between subjective opportunity cost and reward intensity from one trial to
the next may involve a representation of the variance that can be expected in these
variables, as well as their mean.
One region that would be well-suited to representing the world model would
be orbitofrontal cortex. Orbitofrontal cortex has been involved in ﬂavour-based un-
blocking (McDannald et al., 2011), temporal discounting (Roesch and Olson, 2005),
reversal learning (Rudebeck and Murray, 2008) and probabilistic learning (Roitman
and Roitman, 2010). Each of these is, essentially, a higher-order model of contingen-
cies and rewards: higher-order representations of identity (ﬂavour-based unblocking),
of when a reward will come (temporal discounting), of changing task demands (re-
versal learning), and of relations between stimuli (risk-based discounting). Indeed, it
has even been suggested that a fundamental value signal (Padoa-Schioppa and Assad,
2006) is represented in orbitofrontal cortex. There is certainly evidence that human
orbitofrontal cortex is diﬀerentially activated by reward and non-reward outcomes
(Knutson et al., 2001) and that this anticipatory neural activity is correlated with
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subsequent behaviour. It is quite possible that the orbitofrontal cortex maintains
model-based information speciﬁc to the task. The world model may be arbitrarily
simple, as is the case when behaving as though one had asked “was the last trial like
a trailing bracket, because then the next one will be a leading bracket trial.” It may
also be highly organized, as is the case when behaving as though one had asked “what
is the sequence that guarantees my opponent a checkmate in three moves and what
steps can I take to prevent it?”
The hypothesis that model-based information is represented in sensory and
association cortical structures and is relayed to sub-cortical evaluative mechanisms
may be diﬃcult to directly test, but it is not impossible to test some of the predictions
that arise from both the behavioural theory and its proposed neural manifestation.
Speciﬁcally, any region proposed to provide representations related to the world model
for a task would require an evidence-based modulation in ﬁring rate. Acquisition of
the world model itself would likely involve a fairly slow-changing, synaptic-weights
based system. Acting on the basis of that world model, however, can occur quickly
when it is in place.
6.4.2 Expected payoﬀ
The world model will provide essential information about the expected out-
come of a lever press: if the current trial follows a trial resembling a trailing bracket,
the payoﬀ will be high, if the current trial follows a trial resembling a leading bracket,
the payoﬀ is variable and must therefore be uncovered, and if the current trial follows
a trial resembling neither, the payoﬀ will be low. The combination of stimuli repre-
sented that signal a change in conditions must inform a process that evaluates the
expected mapping between each action and the payoﬀ it can be expected to provide.
This process would require stimuli—even those internal to the rat, such as subjective
opportunity cost and reward intensity—to update the mapping between an action
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and its desirability, which can then provide a sort of saliency signal to the process
that selects actions.
One means by which the binding of outcomes to actions could occur would
involve the ventral striatum, a major input region of the basal ganglia system that
receives convergent cortical inputs (Nakano et al., 1999) and dopaminergic inputs
(Voorn et al., 1986) from the ventral tegmental area (Beckstead et al., 1979; Ikemoto,
2007). Computational models of the basal ganglia (Chakravarthy et al., 2010) place
the ventral striatum at a critical point in the evaluative process: it receives inputs
from sensorimotor cortex and projects to diﬀerent regions of caudate and putamen
based on cortical topography (Berendse et al., 1992). The striatum is therefore su-
perbly placed anatomically to bind a variety of actions to the degree to which they
ought to be selected—in other words, their salience. Moreover, medium spiny neu-
rons of the ventral striatum have “up” and “down” states (Plenz and Kitai, 1998),
regulated in part by dopamine inﬂux, that could serve as a ﬁlter to weaken inputs
that are already low. Furthermore, local inhibitory connections (Lighthall and Kitai,
1983) and cholinergic tonically-active neurons (Anderson, 1978; Wilson et al., 1990)
would also improve the signal-to-noise ratio in ventral striatal representations. One
computational hypothesis of striatal activity (Chakravarthy et al., 2010) is that it rep-
resents the salience of requests from cortical structures to access the motor system.
We propose here that the process that updates the mapping between goals and out-
comes may occur at the level of the ventral striatum, using model-based information
from cortical pathways, and saliency-based information from tegmental regions.
van der Meer and Redish (2009) recorded from neural ensembles within the
hippocampus and the ventral striatum while rats navigated a multiple-T maze. Fol-
lowing two low-cost choice points (concatenated T’s), the rat would approach a ﬁnal
choice point with high cost: one arm was baited along the return rail, while the
other was not. If the rat made the incorrect choice, it would have to re-start the
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maze anew without a food reward. Various hippocampal cells were active while the
animal was in a particular place, and thus, one could decode the position the rat
was representing on the basis of the population’s activity. Similarly, various cells of
the ventral striatum were active when the click of the food dispenser was sounded.
One could decode, in principle, the reward the rat was representing on the basis of
the population’s activity. The maze changed conﬁguration every day, and thus, early
trials in an experimental session provide the rat with a mapping between actions (left,
right) and outcomes (reward, no reward). In these early trials, rats will often pause
at the ﬁnal choice point, seemingly deliberating the correct option. While the rat was
immobile at the choice point, early in the day’s experimental session, hippocampal
cells were reliably activated in a sequence, which when decoded proceeded as if the
rat had walked down one arm and the other. Similarly, ventral striatum cells were
reliably activated at the ﬁnal choice point as well as at reward sites, but only while the
animal was updating the map of where to go. These ﬁndings are certainly consistent
with a payoﬀ-updating role in ventral striatum. Were the ventral striatum involved
in representing the actual payoﬀ from taking an action, its activity would not be tied
to the short (fewer than 10 laps) period of time the mapping is updated.
Lesion studies also provide some indication that the ventral striatum is in-
volved in updating the goal-saliency mapping. In the blocking procedure, a condi-
tioned stimulus (CS) is paired with an unconditioned stimulus (US) until it reliably
elicits a conditioned response (CR). Following subsequent pairings of a compound
stimulus comprising the CS and a new, blocked stimulus (BS) with the US, presenta-
tions of the BS alone do not elicit any CR. This is because the unconditioned stimulus
is already predicted by the CS by the time the BS is presented, and therefore, no new
learning occurs. In the unblocking procedure, the US paired with the CS-BS com-
pound is diﬀerent (either in quantity, for value unblocking, or in quality, for identity
unblocking) from the original US that was paired with the CS. As a result, the animal
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learns that although CS predicts a particular US, that CS when the BS is present
predicts a diﬀerent US. When using a model-free strategy, the rat can learn that the
compound predicts more food but not that it predicts a diﬀerent ﬂavour of food.
When using a model-based strategy, the rat can learn both. McDannald et al. (2011)
found that NMDA lesions to ventral striatum impaired a rat’s ability to unblock value
(learning that the compound predicts more food) or to unblock identity (learning that
the compound predicts a diﬀerent ﬂavour), implying an impairment in their use of
either a model-free or model-based learning strategy. One would expect that impair-
ment of a system that updates the mapping between goals and their salience would
impair both model-free (strictly “amount” learning) and model-based (“amount and
identity” learning) strategies.
Human functional neuroimaging studies have shown a role of dorsal striatum
in the maintenance of the outcomes of actions so that they may be selected more
frequently (O’Doherty et al., 2004). In reward trials of the instrumental task, human
subjects had to choose between two stimuli, predicting a high probability of juice
reward (60% chance) or low probability of reward (30%). On neutral trials, they had
to choose between high and low probabilities of obtaining a neutral solution. In this
instrumental condition, one would expect both a process that updates the mapping
between actions and outcomes and a process that informs action selection of the
updated mapping. On a separate Pavlovian task, stimuli were presented passively
along with the reward, in yoked fashion, to individuals who simply had to identify
which of the two stimuli the computer had chosen. In this Pavlovian condition, one
would expect a process that updates the mapping of outcomes to still operate, but this
mapping need not inform action. While activity in ventral striatum was correlated
with a “prediction error” derived from reinforcement learning principles in both tasks,
the dorsal striatum was correlated with the prediction error only in the instrumental
task. Given that the “prediction error” is loosely related (though not identical) to
- 308 -
changes in the payoﬀ from each option, it is interesting that dorsal striatum showed
activation only when the updated mapping to outcomes needs to inform which action
to take.
Another experiment that supports the idea of a dorsal striatum-based action
selector comes from work by van der Meer et al. (2010). As previously described, rats
must complete three low-cost sequential choices along three concatenated T-mazes.
The ﬁnal choice point will lead to either a reward or non-reward, at which point
the rat returns to the start of the maze. If the rat has chosen incorrectly at the
ﬁnal choice point, it will have to re-navigate the entire maze anew. Unlike reward-
responsive neurons of the ventral striatum, whose activity at the ﬁnal choice point
becomes less important as the maze is learned, neurons of the dorsal striatum became
more eﬃcient at encoding the sequence of turns in the maze (and at not encoding
task-irrelevant portions of the maze) as the rat made more laps. If the dorsal striatum
is involved in using gated ventral striatum action-salience signals to select actions on
the basis of a noisy competition, those neurons that are most active will necessarily
gain behavioural control in the decision-rich portions of the task—that is, during the
sequence of turns in the maze—as those sub-populations are slowly updated with
respect to the degree to which the animal ought to choose them.
Lesions to the dorsal striatum prevent rats from using putative stimulus-
response associations that have been acquired over the course of training in a single
T-maze task (Packard and McGaugh, 1996). When navigating a single T maze, the
rat may have learned either or both of two contingencies: the reward is east of the
choice point (a stimulus-stimulus strategy), or the reward is right of the choice point
(a stimulus-response strategy). The rat can use either of the two strategies, which
can be assessed simply by rotating the maze 180 degrees. After 8 days of training,
rats predominantly use a stimulus-stimulus strategy, implying a model-based, goal-
directed process: a delicious food pellet lurks east of the current location. After
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16 days, rats predominantly use a stimulus-response strategy, implying a model-
free, habit-directed process: turning right is a good thing, and one need not know
why. Extensively trained rats (and, thus, rats using a model-free, habit-directed
stimulus-response process) with functionally lesioned dorsal striata began to use a
stimulus-stimulus, model-based, goal-directed strategy instead. This implies that the
goal-directed, stimulus-stimulus strategy is not lost over training, but rather, that
other, faster model-free pathways wrest behavioural control from slower model-based
solutions when feed-forward representations are unnecessary. These data suggest that
there may be multiple systems vying for control over behaviour. Indeed, it has been
proposed (White and McDonald, 2002) that the dorsal striatum, amygdala and hip-
pocampus subserve interdependent memory systems. Damage to the hippocampal
system disrupts performance on the Morris water maze (Morris et al., 1982), while
interference with normal dorsal striatum function McDonald and White (1993) dis-
rupts cued radial maze learning, and amygdaloid lesions disrupt the expression of
innate fear (Blanchard and Blanchard, 1972) and fear conditioning (Hitchcock and
Davis, 1986). It is quite possible that learning how things are related to each other
(hippocampus), which responses should be made under diﬀerent conditions (dorsal
striatum) and which stimuli are of any interest (amygdala) would be processed in
diﬀerent regions and would gain access to the motor system by diﬀerent means.
Optogenetic methods promise to provide an important key to testing whether
the ventral striatum is indeed involved in the rapid updating process we describe, and
whether the rapid-updating propagates to dorsal striatum sub-populations. These
methods involve the insertion of genes encoding a light-sensitive protein into cells
that can be targeted with respect to the neurotransmitter released, projection area, or
somatic origin. The question of rapid mapping updating is therefore a straightforward
one: if one inhibits activity within the nucleus accumbens that is related to updating
the payoﬀ from lever-pressing while the ﬁrst brain stimulation reward of a test trial is
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delivered, one would expect to lengthen the exploration phase to two rewards rather
than one. In other words, shutting oﬀ the area speciﬁcally responsible for the updating
process while it is in progress should prevent that process from occurring. As a result,
the animal would base its actions following the ﬁrst reward delivery on the same set of
saliencies it had before the ﬁrst reward was delivered. If every reward is accompanied
by a selective silencing of the neurons responsible for updating the mapping between
action and payoﬀ, although a new value of intensity and opportunity cost can be stored
and used to predict the next trial, the animal will not have used that information
during the trial to guide its behaviour. On a test trial for which stimulation is too
weak to normally support lever pressing, and for which the subjective opportunity
cost is also low, continually silencing the process that updates the mapping between
response and payoﬀ would presumably maintain the rat in the “exploration” phase
rather than allow it to enter the “exploitation” phase. As other processes, like those
storing records of the subjective intensity and opportunity cost, would not be aﬀected
by the mapping between response and outcome, the next expected trial would be a
leading trial (as the intensity and price are low). If the silencing in some way enhances
the reward, thereby dramatically reducing the post-reinforcement pause on these low-
payoﬀ trials to the duration of the post-priming pause, then the next expected trial
would be a test trial. The critical tests would require some very sophisticated technical
prowess, but the general behavioural methodology is easily transferable from ﬁndings
we have already reported in Chapter 3.
6.4.3 Payoﬀ-based selection
Provided payoﬀ sets the probability of selecting an action and the duration
for which the animal is engaged in that action, some mechanism must subserve the
process. The previous section has provided hints about the location where the saliency
of a mapping between response and payoﬀ could be represented and dynamically
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updated; below, we discuss what substrates may be involved in arbitrating between
competing actions available.
On our view, the process of action selection arises from noisy competition be-
tween elements representing actions and the payoﬀs that may be derived from their
pursuit. Neural sub-populations would therefore have to encode what to do, the
activity of which would be dependent on the payoﬀ from competing goals. Such a
scheme is not necessarily diﬃcult to entrust to sub-populations of neurons with local
inhibitory synapses and external diﬀuse excitatory synapses. The result would be an
on-centre, oﬀ-surround type of sub-population encoding, whereby the selected action
is that which is “on” and those that are not are “oﬀ.” An alternative view is to assume
that action selection emerges from reward delivery driving covariance between reward-
related circuitry and choice-related circuitry (Neiman and Loewenstein, 2013). These
models can, in fact, account for matching in the traditional inﬁnite-hold variable in-
terval schedule. However, it is unclear whether a covariance-based synaptic plasticity
rule can account for the pattern of behaviour seen under the cumulative handling
time schedule, given that it requires the rat to accumulate subjective estimates of
opportunity cost.
A simple alternative is to assume that the rat maintains an engram corre-
sponding to the subjective intensity of the rewarding stimulation, the opportunity
cost, risk, eﬀort, and waiting time involved in acquiring it. We propose that the ﬁnal
decision variable, that which would modulate which actions are salient and which
ought to be neglected, is the scalar combination of these key subjective determinants.
Under the inﬂuence of a high payoﬀ, a sub-population of cortical neurons representing
the higher-order goal of “acquiring rewards” would be selectively enhanced, and in so
doing, sub-populations representing “groom” and “rest” would be inhibited by local
inhibitory connections. The enhanced goal would propagate to the level of individual
motor programs like “approach lever” and “hold lever down.” Any action unrelated
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to the pursuit of the reward would be terminated, because lateral inhibition from
BSR-related sub-populations would have terminated it, either directly or upstream.
If actions are selected on the basis of payoﬀ and result from a competition be-
tween all motor responses possible, then inducing activity within the sub-population
responsible for representing lever-pressing actions will both (1) reduce the duration
of alternate responses and (2) increase the duration of time for which the action is
selected. In fact, one would expect the behavioural response to be tightly linked to
both ongoing activity and the trial phase. During the exploration phase, before the
rat knows what the actual payoﬀ will be, the activity of neurons related to lever-
pressing activities would be expected to track both the action that is chosen and the
decreasing payoﬀ of lever-pressing as the rat holds the lever down. In the exploitation
phase, the activity of neurons related to lever-pressing activities would be expected
to track only the action that is chosen. It remains to be seen whether or not this is
true, but advances in ensemble recording techniques and optogenetic methods make
these hypotheses empirically veriﬁable.
6.4.4 The MFB at the centre of it all
If sensory and association cortices, especially orbitofrontal cortex, are involved
in model-based learning, the striatum is involved in updating and maintaining the
mapping between the payoﬀ and response, and sensorimotor cortices are involved in
the payoﬀ-based selection of which action to take, where does one place the set of
neurons excited by the electrode implanted in the medial forebrain bundle?
Electrical stimulation can compete and summate with (Conover and Shizgal,
1994), and substitute for (Green and Rachlin, 1991) natural rewards like sucrose,
food, and water. It must therefore carry a signal, either directly or soon thereafter,
that is commensurate with all these stimuli. The organizing principle we have used
is to assume that this signal provides multimodal information about the underlying
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rewarding nature of a stimulus, that a leaky integration of this brief signal over its
spatial and temporal extent is conducted downstream, and that the peak activity of
the integration network is committed to memory. Animals working for brain stimu-
lation rewards respond consistently to variable and ﬁxed schedules of reinforcement.
In order to perform an expectation over the intervals one has seen, those intervals
must have been represented somewhere, especially in the cumulative handling time
schedule which requires a reasonable estimate of the time spent at the lever to be
accumulated. It is likely that a similar representation of the subjective opportunity
is committed to memory, and possibly any other key subjective determinant of the
decision to press. These representations would have to be combined somewhere—
possibly in dorsal striatum, and possibly following an updating process in ventral
striatum—in order to inform the rat of the mapping between lever-pressing and its
expected payoﬀ on a given trial.
The medial forebrain bundle is therefore at the very heart of this action selec-
tion system. Although stimulation via macroelectrodes does not have the speciﬁcity
necessary for determining which of the many dozens (Nieuwenhuys et al., 1982) of
ﬁbre tracts coursing past the electrode tip are responsible for reward, much progress
has been made in deriving their characteristics. The properties of these neurons have
been behaviourally derived: the direction of conduction of at least a subset of the
neurons is likely anterior-posterior (Shizgal et al., 1980), their absolute refractory
period is short (Yeomans, 1979), and can follow pulse frequencies of up to roughly
400Hz (Solomon et al., 2010). If one could identify the neurons responsible for the re-
warding eﬀect, it would greatly understand where each subsequent stage of processing
occurs and how that information is processed, including where world models may be
represented and how they evolve, where action-outcome mappings are updated and
maintained, where and how those mappings inﬂuence action selection. Techniques
that improve the spatial and temporal selectivity of a causal manipulation will likely
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provide the tools necessary for elucidating these pathways, while new protocols and
analysis methods, such as those presented in Chapters 2 through 5, could provide a
strong quantitative basis for evaluating theories of action selection.
6.5 Conclusions
Psychophysical methods have tremendous power to uncover the processes and
biophysical mechanisms at work in a large number of applications. For example,
painstaking work by Hecht et al. (1942) demonstrated that the retina was capable
of detecting on the order of 5 to 8 quanta of light. Were it not for carefully crafted
experiments, using the most sophisticated equipment available, it would have been
impossible to assess the incredible degree of sensitivity in the visual system. These
psychophysical data inspired a great deal of subsequent molecular and physiological
work regarding how vision is implemented in the brain. Their ﬁndings narrowed the
potential chemicals responsible for light transduction, and the biochemical cascade
that allows such minute quantities of light to result in visual perceptions. Psychophys-
ical methods provide the crucial information to direct and inspire molecular, cellular,
and systems neuroscience.
The same can be said of action selection. Crude methods, like response-rates
and the degree of a consummatory response, have been fairly good at detecting the
eﬀect of manipulations on a gross level. Indeed, it was the percentage of time spent
responding that was originally used in demonstrating the rewarding eﬀect of septal
stimulation (Olds and Milner, 1954). Without even an insensitive measure of choice,
it would not have been possible to assess where stimulation was eﬀective at reinforcing
an action and where it was not. However, as the various processes that govern choice
are parsed, the methods for measuring them must also be reﬁned. Seminal work
by Hodos and Valenstein (1962) showed that response rates alone were incapable
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of discriminating between highly rewarding stimulation that produced motoric side
eﬀects that competing with lever-pressing and weakly rewarding stimulation. By
measuring the threshold stimulation strength at which animals would lever-press at
some criterion rate, it was possible to determine whether a manipulation had altered
motivation, in some way, or whether it had altered the motor capacity to respond. The
curve-shift method (Miliaressis et al., 1986) has since become the dominant paradigm
in assessing the eﬀects of manipulations to rewarding brain stimulation, but it, too,
is incapable of a distinction: those manipulations that change the eﬀectiveness of
the stimulation to induce reward from those that change other key determinants
of decision-making. This thesis presents a way to disambiguate between the two,
by assuming that intensity is evaluated separately from opportunity cost, via the
Shizgal Reinforcement Mountain model. This molar model of choice is, despite its
great usefulness, not a model of individual action selection. This thesis presents
a molecular model of choice, based on the idea that animals do not simply make
stimulus-response associations that must be re-learned when conditions change. The
organism stands between stimulus and response, and has likely extracted statistical
properties of its environment to better act upon regularities that are apparent to it.
The great challenge is to accurately describe what the animal is doing, in real time,
along with how it accomplishes it.
The methods used to infer the processes that underlie action selection will nec-
essarily need to grow in complexity as our understanding of the decision-making pro-
cess becomes more complex. New methodologies will always allow us to probe deeper
and more insightfully into the neural organization of choice. This thesis demon-
strates that along with the increased power of new technologies, the behavioural and
statistical methods we use to relate neural ﬁndings to behaviour can—and will have
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